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WHEN GOOD BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS GO BAD: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF DARK SIDE VARIABLES IN MATURE SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS  
 
by 
 
HEATHER MONTEIRO 
(Under the Direction of Jacqueline Eastman) 
ABSTRACT 
This quantitative study examines the dark side effect of relationship variables on 
relationship financial performance and likelihood of relationship termination, 
moderated by relationship quality. The study tests propositions found in Social 
Exchange Theory. The cross-sectional survey was conducted with a population of 
logistics purchasers and providers. Three of ten hypotheses were supported; 
contributing evidence supporting the positive effect of relationship quality on the path 
between some relationship variables and performance, thereby corroborating Social 
Exchange Theory.  
The other hypotheses support the existence of the dark side effect of some 
relationship variables. Theoretically, this study strengthens the argument of Social 
Exchange Theory, while simultaneously supporting the earlier theoretical paths of Social 
Exchange Theory.  Post-hoc testing illuminates the non-linear relationship of some of 
the independent variables, indicating the point of diminishing returns from earlier 
conceptualizations of Social Exchange Theory, and showing boundary conditions for the 
existing conceptualization of Social Exchange Theory.  
INDEX WORDS: Supply Chain Relationships, Dark side, Survey, Social Exchange 
Theory, PLS 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
A supply chain is often defined as a series of relationships held together by various 
levels of partnership or collaboration (Cao and Zhang, 2011; Chen and Paulraj, 2004; 
Cooper, Lambert, and Pagh, 1997). Supply chains require coordination with these 
partners to meet the needs of their customers, which often have dynamic and quickly-
changing needs (Cannon and Perreault, 1999; Lusch and Brown, 1996). Because supply 
chain management is now considered to be strategically significant to firm performance 
(Giunipero et al.,  2008), all sources of competitive advantage, including relational 
sources, within the supply chain require investigation as they may determine, at least in 
part, supply chain performance (Croom, Romano, and Giannakis, 2000; Giunipero et 
al., 2008; Wisner and Tan, 2000). Recently, managers and researchers alike have come 
to believe in the importance of managing the supply chain as a strategic part of their 
business and have realized the ability to exploit close supply chain relationships with 
alliance partners (Hsu et al., 2008).  In particular, some have suggested that is it 
important to move away from studying competition at an individual firm level and 
instead focus on the competition that exists at the supply chain level (Hunt and Morgan, 
1994; Lambert and Cooper, 2000; Thorelli, 1986). 
1.1 Importance of supply chain relationships and alliances 
 
By the late 1990s, firms began to focus on a relationship approach to managing their 
supply chains with a focus on gaining value from these partnerships (Corsten and 
Kumar, 2005; McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000). Business relationships represent varying 
level of interactions and collaboration between firms, often with long term relationships 
or intentions, embedded in some larger network (Backhaus and Büschken, 1999; 
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Håkansson and Johanson, 1988; Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Harrison, 2004). These 
business-to-business relationships are central to supply chain management (Autry and 
Griffis, 2008) and are seen as a significant enabler of effective supply chains (Ellram 
and Cooper, 1990; Min et al., 2005), and the highest core competency (Min et al., 2005; 
Sanders and Premus, 2005).  Research has shown that business alliances have been 
increasing by about 25% per year and represent about 30% of the value and revenue of 
the companies involved (Hughes and Weiss, 2007). For many firms, the strategic 
management of supply chain relationships is an even higher priority than traditional 
marketing (Piercy, 2009).  In multiple industries, individual firms, driven by concerns 
for effectiveness and efficiency, are seeking fewer, closer, and more intense business 
relationships (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 1998). In the past, data has supported 
this conclusion: for example, by making more efficient and effective relationships, it is 
estimated that firms could save up to $30 billion in the U.S. food industry alone 
(Kumar, 1996).   
These fewer but closer supply chain relationships  are considered to produce long 
term, mutual benefits to the parties involved (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Backhaus and 
Büschken, 1999; Lambert, Knemeyer and Gardner, 2004; Cannon and Perreault, 1999; 
Piercy, 2009) and are often considered a top priority for many firms (Day, 2000; 
Helfert, Ritter, and Walter, 2002; Hofer, Knemeyer, and Dresner, 2009). See Table 1 for 
a summary of literature related to the beneficial outcomes of supply chain relationships.  
As illustrated in Table 1, conceptually, supply chain relationships have been 
proposed to show customer and financial benefits, waste reduction, time compression, 
flexibility, cost reduction (Brewer and Speh, 2000), mutual satisfaction (Dwyer, Schurr 
and Oh, 1987; Mentzer, Min, and Zacharia, 2000), stronger commitment (Dwyer et al., 
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1987), relational rent (Dyer, Singh, and Kale, 2008), business performance (Mentzer et 
al., 2000), loyalty (Mentzer et al., 2000), relationship effectiveness (Mentzer et al., 
2000), strategic advantage (Weitz and Jap, 1995), and abnormal stock returns (Koh and 
Venkatraman, 1991; Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2001). 
Empirically, some of these dependent variables have been confirmed. For example, 
dependence and communication have been found to have a positive relationship with 
relationship satisfaction (Anderson and Narus, 1990), as has relational behavior and 
performance of the focal firm in the wholesaler-distributor relationship (Lusch and 
Brown, 1996).  Anand and Khanna (2000) found a positive relationship between 
announcements of licensing agreements and an increase in stock returns, while Claro, 
Hagelaar and Omta (2003) confirmed a positive relationship between transaction 
specific investments, length of relationships, trust, intensity and stability and sales 
growth and perceived satisfaction in the potted plants and flowers industry. Finally, 
Moberg and Speh (2003) showed a positive relationship between trust, commitment, 
and partner type and relationship strength in multiple industries.  
Thus, both conceptual and empirical works suggest a positive relationship between 
certain relational variables and different conceptualizations of success, such as 
abnormal stock returns, relationship satisfaction, performance, relationship strength 
and satisfaction. The importance of relationships to performance cannot be 
downplayed. However, the linear relationship between relational variables and success 
or performance is not consistent across supply chain research. One stream of research 
on the dark side variables is, in part, beginning to explain this lack of consistency in the 
empirical results. Dark side variables are those which are hypothesized to have a 
positive relationship to performance or other positive relationship outcomes; however, 
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also exhibit a dampening effect on those outcomes (Anderson and Jap, 2005). This 
dissertation will contribute to literature through empirical testing of a set of the dark 
side variables derived from literature. 
These closer relationships exist along a relational continuum such as interfirm 
alliances. An interfirm alliance is defined as an interfirm arrangement entered into 
voluntarily, with the intention of sharing or exchanging resources (Gulati, 1998; Lavie, 
2006; Villena, Revilla, and Choi, 2011; Fredericks, 2005). Interfirm alliances take many 
forms including research and development partnerships, reciprocal trade agreements, 
long term marketing contracts, and joint ventures (Lavie, 2006). For several decades, 
the number and importance of interfirm alliances has grown considerably (Hagedoorn, 
1993, 1995; Gulati, 1998; Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer, 2000; Lavie, 2006). Gulati (1998) 
referred to strategic alliances as “a ubiquitous phenomenon” with a vast “proliferation” 
(p. 293) of interfirm alliances.  Hagedoorn (1993) and Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000) 
both addressed alliances as an increasingly important part of business, particularly 
global business, which may affect overall firm performance (Gulati et al., 2000).  
As illustrated in Table 1, research suggests that networks and alliances between 
firms do affect the performance of the network members  (Gulati et al., 2000; Lavie, 
2006) and that closer relationships lead to multiple tangible benefits including 
supernormal stock returns (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2001; Koh 
and Venkatraman, 1991); sales growth (Claro, Hagelaar and Omta, 2003; Mentzer et al., 
2000);  general financial benefits (Brewer and Speh, 2000; Lusch and Brown, 1996; 
Piercy, 2009; MacKintosh and Simon, 2006; Hollinger, 2007; Fink, Feldman and 
Hatten, 2007); improved response to complex consumer demands (Piercy, 2009; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), improved collaboration (Hamm, 2006), flexibility  
15 
 
Table 1: Beneficial Outcomes of Supply Chain Relationships 
Author Year 
Conceptual
/ empirical/ 
secondary 
Context,  
Industry, or 
notes 
IV DV 
Dwyer Schurr 
and Oh 
(1987) 
1987 Conceptual 
[Primarily about 
relationship 
phase] 
Deepening 
dependence 
Mutual 
satisfaction 
and 
commitment 
Weitz and Jap 
(1995) 
1995 Conceptual   
Relationship 
management 
Strategic 
advantage 
Brewer and 
Speh (2000) 
2000 Conceptual Logistics 
Integrated 
supply chain 
relationship 
Customer 
benefits, 
financial 
benefits, 
waste 
reduction, 
time 
compression
, flexible 
response, 
unit cost 
reduction 
Mentzer Min 
and Zacharia 
(2000) 
2000 Conceptual   
Environmental 
partnering 
pressure, 
interdependence
, conflict, trust, 
commitment, 
organizational 
compatibility, 
top management 
vision, 
partnering 
orientation, 
partnering 
implementation, 
competitive 
attainment 
Business 
performance 
outcome, 
economic 
outcome, 
customer 
satisfaction 
and loyalty, 
relationship 
effectiveness 
Dyer Singh 
and Kale 
(2008) 
2008 Conceptual   
Transaction 
specific 
investments, 
types of 
resources, 
information, 
stability 
Relational 
rent 
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Koh and 
Venkatraman 
(1991) 
1991 Secondary 
Information 
technology 
Alliance 
announcement 
Abnormal 
stock returns 
Kale Dyer and 
Singh (2001) 
2001 Secondary  
Manufacturers 
and suppliers 
Learning, 
alliance-related 
know-how 
Abnormal 
stock returns 
Anderson and 
Narus (1990) 
1990 Empirical 
Distributor/ 
manufacturer 
Dependence and 
communication 
Relationship 
satisfaction 
Heide and 
John (1992) 
1992 Empirical 
Manufacturers 
and suppliers 
Flexibility, 
information 
exchange, 
solidarity, 
relational 
norms, buyer 
specific assets 
Vertical 
control 
Lusch and 
Brown (1996) 
1996 Empirical 
Wholesaler-
distributor, and 
supplier 
Dependence, 
relationship 
length, contract 
type, relational 
behavior 
Performance 
of focal firm 
(wholesaler-
distributor) 
Anand and 
Khanna 
(2000) 
2000 Empirical 
Joint venture, 
licensing 
agreements 
Announcements 
of licensing 
agreement 
Stock 
returns 
(wealth 
effect) 
Claro 
Hagelaar 
Omta (2003) 
2003 Empirical 
Potted plants 
and flowers 
Exchange mode, 
transaction 
specific 
investment, 
length of 
relationship, 
trust, intensity, 
instability 
Sales growth 
rate, 
perceived 
satisfaction 
Moberg and 
Speh (2003) 
2003 Empirical 
Logistics, 
manufacturers 
of food, 
beverage, 
pharmaceuticals
, toiletries, 
consumer 
packaged goods 
Trust, 
commitment, 
type of trading 
partner, 
questionable 
business 
practices 
Relationship 
strength 
 
 (Fredericks, 2005; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2001), reduced costs (Skjott-Larsen et 
al., 2003), new product development (Fredericks, 2005; Hill and Jones, 1995), risk-
pooling (Fredericks, 2005), and strategic  or competitive advantage (Weitz and Jap, 
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1995; Doz and Hamel, 1998; Kogut 1988; Fredericks, 2005).  Thus, empirical 
investigation of alliance success contributes to our understanding of the value of alliance 
formation.  
Empirical work has also indicated several significant predictors of these 
numerous relational benefits including learning (Anand and Khanna, 2000), trust and 
transaction-specific investments (Claro et al., 2003), relational norms (Heide and John, 
1992), long term orientation (Lusch and Brown, 1996), alliance structure (Kale et al., 
2001), relatedness of companies, and the relative size of their partner (Koh and 
Venkatraman, 1991).  
Moberg and Speh’s (2003) empirical investigation is notable in that it is a study 
of, among other variables, questionable business practices. The study reveals that in 
existing trusting relationships, the presence of questionable business practices by either 
party erodes trust, commitment, and relationship strength (Moberg and Speh, 2003). 
These questionable business practices are frequently motivated by short-term financial 
interests derived from performance metrics. This study is one of the few studies which 
focus on negative effects of independent variables on business-to-business or supply 
chain relationships.  
In conclusion, businesses, when operating alone without collaboration, find it 
difficult to effectively cope with the increasingly diverse and complex customer 
requirements (Piercy, 2009). This emphasizes the ongoing importance and benefits of 
interfirm alliances (Piercy, 2009). In fact, effective supply chain management, at its 
core, requires that strong linkages are developed between supply chain members 
(Vickery, Calantone, and Droge, 1999; Fredericks, 2005). Vickery, Calantone and Droge 
(1999) conclude that, for example, to cope with volatile demand, volume flexibility can 
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only be obtained with close coordination between suppliers and manufacturers. 
Fredericks (2005) extended this concept by concurring that close coordination is 
required to enable flexibility and therefore, organizational performance. However, there 
have been situations in which collaboration, alliances, and close business relationships 
do not achieve these expected benefits: these unexpected results are the focus of this 
dissertation.  
1.2 How supply chain relationships create value 
 
According to Bowersox et al., (2000) and Nyaga and Whipple (2011), the creation 
of value within the supply chain relationship is contingent upon managing those 
relationships by working in close collaboration. This collaboration may involve 
operational coordination, joint research and development, or financial linkages 
(Bowersox et al., 2000). Closer supply chain relationships have long been described as a 
business strategy which is win-win for all members (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Nyaga 
and Whipple (2011) take this a step further by concluding that supply chain 
relationships can actually differentiate firms and contribute competitive advantage. Due 
to the expense of new product development and the ongoing and expanding needs to 
penetrate new geographic markets, the need for collaboration and coordination is ever 
increasing (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989).  
Relationships create value when they are successfully managed (Nyaga and 
Whipple, 2011); when competitive abilities are enhanced by the relationship (Min et al., 
2005), access to resources is expanded by the relationship and costs reduced (Fynes, De 
Burca, and Mangan, 2008; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar, 1998; Nyaga and 
Whipple, 2011; Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989) and risk is pooled amongst partners 
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(Bensaou and Anderson, 1999; Min et al., 2005; Moberg and Speh, 2003; Ohmae, 1989; 
Hamel, Doz and Prahalad, 1989). Both empirical and conceptual studies have confirmed 
the benefits of closer supply chain relationships.  
There are multiple avenues through which these benefit can be accrued, many 
based on empirical research including relationship quality (Nyaga and Whipple, 2011; 
Min et al., 2005; Fynes et al., 2008), trust (Geyskens et al., 1998; Moberg and Speh, 
2003), transaction-specific investment (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999), commitment 
(Moberg and Speh, 2003), information sharing (Droge and Germain, 2000), and 
collaboration (Stank et al., 2001; Corsten and Felde, 2005; Mentzer et al., 2000).  
To evaluate value created by an inter-firm relationship, relationship benefits are 
compared to the costs of creating and maintaining the relationship (Nyaga and Whipple, 
2011; Whipple, Frankel, and Anselmi, 1999), and when relationships do not meet the 
criteria for performance, i.e. when the costs of the relationship outweigh the benefits, 
those resources invested in it should be redeployed (Good and Evans, 2001; Rothbart 
and Hallmark, 1988). The most common goals of business relationships are to create 
and maintain a mutually beneficial, long term relationship which continues to reap 
rewards over its life span (Barnes, 2005; Lambert et al.,  2004).  
1.3 Academic and professional interest in supply chain relationships 
 
This emphasis on business relationships has been discussed in research since the 
1990s (Crosby, Evans, and Cowles, 1990; Hunt and Morgan, 1994; Kalwani and 
Narayandas, 1995) and its longevity as a research topic of interest indicates the 
continuing importance of relationships to firms and their expected results of mutually-
beneficial relationships (Golicic and Mentzer, 2006; Lambert et al., 2004; Rese, 2006). 
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Managing relationships accounts for the deployment of a considerable amount of 
resources for supply chain members (Cooper et al., 1997; Mentzer et al., 2001), 
highlighting the importance and need for continued research in this area. 
There have been questions in both practice and academia regarding the long-
term success of close business relationships which drives the need for further research 
(Daugherty, 2011).  Many of these questions are general relationship research questions 
such as: What influences the long term success of close business relationships? 
(Daugherty, 2011); What are the determinates of success in close relationships? 
(Daugherty, 2011); What recommendations may help firms establish close 
relationships? (Daugherty, 2011); and How should companies best deal with power 
imbalances in their relationships? (Daugherty, 2011). 
These questions indicate ongoing interests in business relationship research. This 
dissertation aims to address three other questions of interest raised in the literature: 
What factors drive problems in buyer-supplier relationships? (Daugherty, 2011); Why 
do many close relationships fail? (Daugherty, 2011); and Why are many collaborative 
relationships unsuccessful? (Daugherty, 2011; Slone et al., 2010).  
There have been multiple calls for papers seeking to answer these questions. 
Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar (1998) recommended additional research on the 
complexity of the relationship between trust and performance.  Other authors have 
called for research investigating the negative aspects of relationships as previous 
research has focused primarily on looking at the positive side of relationships and 
investigating only what is improving relational outcomes (Holmlund-Rytkönen and 
Strandvik, 2005; Piercy, 2009; Mitrega and Solkiewski, 2012; Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 
2012). Frequently, the focus is simply on this positive, bright side, and future research is 
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needed that helps balance the view of collaborative relationships (Villena, Revilla and 
Choi, 2011). Interest in the topic of dark side variables is evident: Abosag, Yen and 
Barnes (2014) specifically sought out research on dark side variables for inclusion in a 
special issue of Industrial Marketing Management which they represent as editors 
(deadline December, 2014). This dissertation aims to improve this balance by 
contributing to the dark side of relationships research.  
Additionally, Morgan and Hunt (1999) recommended the need for an 
improvement in understanding the relationship between competitive advantage and 
close relationships. Villena, Revilla and Choi (2011) recommend future research which 
evaluates mediators on the relationship of social capital to performance. This 
dissertation will answer both these calls by evaluating the dark side aspect to close 
relationships, as well as investigating that relationship within the relationship life cycle.  
 
1.4 GAP: Supply chain relationships do not always deliver 
 
According to Barratt (2004), both academics and practitioners suggest 
collaboration may not be sustainable over the long turn. Barratt (2004) and Sabath and 
Fontanella (2002) agree that firms have found supply chain collaboration to be very 
difficult to implement and particularly difficult to benefit from. Though Hamel, Doz and 
Prahalad (1989) felt that strategic alliances may fortify each partner against outside 
competition, that same alliance may increase dependence or vulnerability of one partner 
compared to the other. Ongoing problems experienced by firms regarding the 
development and maintenance of these interfirm alliances illustrate how closer 
relationships of many types do not always deliver the expected superior value (Piercy, 
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2009). Many companies have found collaboration very difficult to accomplish to 
achieve, and sufficient benefits elusive (Min et al., 2005). Thus, professionals are 
finding that these close relationships are not always good relationships (Anderson and 
Jap, 2005). Table 2 shows several studies which hypothesize or result in relationship 
failure or dissatisfaction.  
Table 2: Relationship failure or dissatisfaction 
Author Conceptual/ 
empirical/ 
secondary 
Context or 
Industry, or 
notes 
IV DV 
Doz and 
Hamel (1998) 
Conceptual NA Alliance Advantages and 
disadvantages 
Barringer and 
Harrison 
(2000) 
Conceptual NA Interorganizational 
relationships 
Advantages and 
disadvantages 
Good and 
Evans (2001) 
Conceptual NA Relational unrest Retention, 
reconfiguration, 
dissolution, 
status quo 
Jap and 
Ganesan 
(2000) 
Empirical Retail Transaction 
specific investment 
Commitment  
Barratt and 
Oliveira 
(2001) 
Empirical Manufacturing CPFR Barriers and 
enablers of 
CPFR 
Anderson and 
Jap (2005) 
Empirical Logistics Close relationships dark side 
Gulati and 
Sytch (2007) 
Empirical Automotive 
procurement 
Dependence 
asymmetry, joint 
dependence 
Performance 
(negative for 
the weaker of 
the two) 
Swink 
Narasimhan 
and Wang 
(2007) 
Empirical 
 
Manufacturing Strategic 
integration 
Business 
performance, 
competitive 
capabilities 
Villena, 
Revilla, and 
Choi (2011) 
Empirical Supply chain  Social capital Business 
performance 
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Empirical evidence has continued to show that very few businesses have achieved 
the anticipated level of results from collaborative efforts (Anderson and Jap, 2004; 
Barratt and Oliveira, 2001; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Swink, Narasimhan and Wang, 
2007; Villena, Revilla and Choi, 2011; Jap and Ganesan, 2000).  Mitrega and Zolkiewski 
(2012), for example, found multiple negative consequences to staying in deep buyer-
supplier relationships including weaker negotiation position, increased opportunity 
costs, less supplier effort, the supplier using power against the buyer and a higher risk of 
supply instability.  
Conceptual work has also pointed to multiple disadvantages resulting from both 
interorganizational relationships (Barringer and Harrison, 2000) and, more specifically, 
alliances (Doz and Hamel, 1998). See Table 3. Taking a closer look at the empirical 
findings, it becomes apparent that not all close relationships are delivering the expected 
results and benefits. For example, Swink, Narasimhan and Wang (2007) found a 
negative relationship between integration and market performance.  Fink, Edelman and 
Hatten (2007) showed that though closer, more cooperative relationships may lead to 
performance benefits; those benefits are not always reciprocal in nature, negating the 
mutually beneficial expectations of closer relationships. Villena, Revilla and Choi (2011) 
also conducted a survey which showed both the bright side and dark side of social 
capital. The inverted curved relationship found that too much or too little social capital 
reduces performance in the relationship and objectivity in decision-making (Villena et 
al., 2011).  
Jap and Ganesan (2000) empirically found that the presence of transaction 
specific investments did not always improve relationship satisfaction, reduce the conflict 
level of the relationship, or increase the buyer’s evaluation of their supplier’s 
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performance. Good and Evans (2001) developed a conceptual framework to suggest that 
business relationships frequently do not achieve the desired goals and frequently end 
prematurely. The authors, however, do not consider this a travesty to be avoided, but a 
relatively normal occurrence in the life of a business (Good and Evans, 2001). Hughes 
and Weiss (2007) report that alliances face upwards of 60% failure rate and advises 
companies involved in alliances to emphasize metrics to enable better relationship 
outcomes.   
Some authors consider firms excessively optimistic in their expectations of the 
benefits and return of closer relationships (Doz and Hamel, 1998; Barringer and 
Harrison, 2000). Doz and Hamel (1998) go on to say that some of the difficulties of 
managing relationships arise from the uncertainty regarding what resources are 
required and how to best combine them. The dynamics of firms and industries also 
bring uncertainty since a collaborator today may be a competitor tomorrow (Doz and 
Hamel, 1998).  
While evidence exists of the benefits of collaboration, some authors have 
concluded that historically, collaboration has been one of the larger failures in supply 
chain management strategies (Min et al., 2005; Sabath and Fontanella, 2002) as 
business to business relationships continue to be considerably difficult to maintain 
(Giller and Matear, 2001; Keefe and Maypole, 1983). Giller and Matear (2001) stated 
that it may even be unreasonable and unrealistic to expect business relationships to be 
long-term or indefinite, perhaps in part due to the probability of the relationship not 
attaining the desired return (Good and Evans, 2001; Inkpen, 1996).  
In conclusion, though literature has stressed the benefits of long term supply 
chain relationships (Ganesan, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Palmatier, Dant and 
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Grewal, 2007; Cannon and Homburg, 2001; Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 2012), there is 
vidence that the benefits do not always materialize, particularly mutual benefits (Fink, 
Edelman and Hatten, 2007). An emerging body of literature suggests one possible cause 
to this lack of expected benefits: the dark side effect of relationship variables (Anderson 
and Jap, 2005). Some studies have attempted to explain how good relationships go bad 
and results suggest that even in stronger relationships, insidious forces may be working 
at the very foundation of the relationship (Anderson and Jap, 2004). This phenomenon 
has been termed the dark side of close relationships (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  Dark 
side variables are those variables expected and predicted to have a positive relationship 
to relationship performance and relationship continuity (Grayson and Ambler, 1999). 
Dark side variables are distinct from dysfunctional relationships which are prone to 
failure (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Many business relationships experience negative 
factors, such as conflict and strife which make them likely to dissolve (Anderson and 
Jap, 2005). The dark side variables, however, work from the inside to undermine 
relationships even when one or both parties feel satisfied with their partnership and 
their received benefits (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
These dark side factors are quite insidious since there is no obvious problem 
spurring changes to the relationship (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Empirical results have 
supported that relationships can remain in a condition of diminishing satisfaction and 
return for quite some time, often without hostility (Anderson and Jap, 2005). The 
invasion of the dark side can be gradual, subtle, and pervasive (Anderson and Jap, 
2005). Often, the efforts of the partners to develop strong, lasting relationships are the 
very factors which contribute to the dark side effect (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
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This dissertation is focused on how dark side variables affect the perceptions of 
performance of a supply chain relationship and its continuity. The dark side variables 
can have both a positive effect, and, at different times, negative effects on relationship 
performance. The managerial contribution of this dissertation, in part, is that it would 
be unwise to blindly recommend always making relationship-specific investments if 
relationship-specific investments are beneficial only under certain circumstances. 
Research is needed to better understand when the dark side effect emerges. This 
dissertation will investigate how several relationship variables from literature may 
exhibit a dark side effect in supply chain relationship performance and relationship 
continuity.  
It has been seen that business relationships do experience negative relational 
outcomes including unrest and dissolution, and neglecting these negative outcomes 
avoids addressing the full complexity of business relationships (Good and Evans, 2001; 
Harrigan, 1988; Reukert and Walker, 1987). If empirical research only seeks 
confirmation of positive relationships, academia is neglecting the investigation of what 
is not working as well as positive relationship variables which are, if not responsible, at 
least indifferent in strengthening a supply chain relationship, as is the case with dark 
side variables. The investigation of dark side effect may help avoid the potentially 
uninformed practice of blindly calling for higher levels of certain relational variables, 
such as social capital, within supply chain relationships, since its presence at all levels 
may not lead to increased performance (Landolt and Portes, 1996) and may actually 
erode performance (Villena et al., 2011).  Investigating dark side variables will 
complement these “bright-side” studies by creating a more multi-dimensional picture of 
supply chain relationships.   
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1.5 Brief literature overview 
 
There has been considerable investigation in literature regarding constructs 
which negatively affect supply chain relationships such as opportunism (Gundlach et al., 
1995; Parkhe, 1993; Skarmeas, 2006), asymmetric power and dependence (Narayandas 
and Rangan, 2004; Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994),  conflict  (Holmlund-Rytkonen and 
Strandvik, 2005), and destructive acts or questionable business practices (Moberg and 
Speh, 2003; Hibbard et al., 2001). These negative factors are most often conceptualized 
as linearly related to the dependent variable in studies (Finch, Zhang, and Geiger, 2013; 
Gaski, 1984; John, 1984; Massey and Dawes, 2007; Skarmeas, 2006; Zhou et al., 2007). 
While there has been considerable investigation of these negative variables, there has 
been much less empirical investigation of the dark side effect. This dissertation will 
focus on the less-researched non-linear dark side effect (Anderson and Jap, 2005; 
Hansen, 1999; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004; Villena et al., 2011). See Table 3 for 
examples of dark side research.  
These dark side studies constitute a stream of research that evaluates relational 
constructs that are predicted to show a non- linear relationship with the dependent 
variable.  This dissertation will focus on these dark side variables: relationship-specific 
investment, long-term orientation, social capital, learning and reciprocity (Anderson 
and Jap, 2005). Research has often neglected these non-linear dark side factors which, 
under some circumstances, dampen the expected performance improvement from 
buyer-supplier relationships (Abosag, Yen, and Barnes, 2014; Lechner, Frankenberger, 
and Floyd, 2010; Wise, 2014; Gu, Hung and Tse, 2008; Villena, et al., 2011). Qualitative 
investigation has revealed some potential negative results based on very close, 
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collaborative, or deep relationships, including deteriorating negotiating position, 
opportunity costs, reduced supplier effort, asymmetric power, and higher risks (Mitrega 
and Zolkiewski, 2012). This research will empirically test dark side variables 
simultaneously in the supply chain context.  
1.6 Dark side variables, overview 
 
Several academic fields of study have addressed a possible dark side to certain 
relationship variables, including business strategy (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo and Benassi, 
1999; Adler and Kwon, 2002) and sociology (Granovetter, 1985; Portes and 
Sensenbrenner, 1993). In the field of business strategy, Uzzi (1997) found that excessive 
embeddedness reduced economic performance, while Adler and Kwon (2002) 
qualitatively investigated the negative consequences of social capital. In the field of 
sociology, Granovetter (1985) suggested conceptually that social capital leads to 
opportunism. There is also increasing evidence of the dark side effects in the supply 
chain literature (Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Villena et al., 2011). The dark side of 
relationship variables has relevant implications for the study of business management 
due to the significant investments firms place in building strong social relationships 
with their partners (Autry and Griffis, 2008; Adler and Kwon, 2002). Some social 
variables previously considered positive have been proposed and, in some cases, 
empirically shown to facilitate or promote opportunism (Granovetter, 1985) and 
reduced objectivity in decision-making (Locke, 1999; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004; 
Grover et al., 2006; Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 2012), concluding in an overall negative 
impact on the business relationship.  
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Table 3: Dark side variables 
Dark side 
variables 
Identified as 
dark side  
Hypothesize 
non-linear 
effects 
Citation Type DV Findings Theory? Inductive/ 
deductive 
In this 
study? 
E
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
n
e
ss
/ 
n
e
tw
o
rk
 
ce
n
tr
a
li
ty
 
No No  Uzzi (1997) Empirical, 
qualitative 
Economic 
performance 
Non-linear 
relationship 
No Inductive  No 
  
  
No Yes Lechner, 
Frankenberger 
and Floyd 
(2010) 
Empirical Performance Non-linear 
relationship 
Literature as 
theory 
Not theory 
testing 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 s
h
a
ri
n
g
 
Yes No Grover, Lim 
and Ayyagari 
(2006) 
Content 
analysis 
Pricing decision 
variance 
Info sharing 
leads to price 
dispersion 
Efficient market 
theory 
Boundary 
testing 
 No 
L
e
a
rn
in
g
/ 
A
b
so
rp
ti
v
e
 
ca
p
a
ci
ty
 
No No Hamel (1991) Empirical, 
qualitative 
Balance of 
power 
Learning can 
negatively 
affect balance 
of power 
Theory 
development 
Inductive Yes 
L
o
n
g
 t
e
rm
 
o
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 Yes 
(moderating 
role) 
No Grayson and 
Ambler (1999) 
Empirical Research use Trust sig in 
short but not 
long, 
involvement 
sig in long but 
not short 
Marketing 
theory 
Deductive, 
replication 
of previous 
study 
Yes 
R
e
ci
p
ro
ci
ty
 (
A
ls
o
 
g
u
a
n
x
i)
 
Yes No Gu Hung and 
Tse (2008) 
Empirical Market 
performance 
When guanxi 
is moderated 
by competition 
and 
technological 
turbulence, 
market 
performance 
suffers 
Social capital 
theory 
Neither  Yes 
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R
e
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
-s
p
e
ci
fi
c 
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
t 
No 
 
No Bensaou and 
Anderson 
(1999) 
Empirical Opportunism, 
Performance 
Supported TCE, Economic 
theory, 
Institutional 
theory, 
Organizational 
theory 
Neither  
S
o
ci
a
l 
ca
p
it
a
l 
No Conceptually 
but indirectly 
Adler and 
Kwon (2002) 
Conceptual Value  Organizational 
theory 
Neither Yes 
No Conceptually 
but indirectly 
Locke (1999) Conceptual Organizational 
effectiveness 
 Not specified Neither 
Yes Yes Villena, Revilla 
and Choi 
(2011) 
Empirical Performance Supported Social capital 
theory 
Neither 
No Yes 
 
McFadyen and 
Cannella 
(2004) 
Empirical Knowledge 
creation 
Supported 
 
Theory of 
knowledge 
creation 
Neither 
D
e
e
p
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
i
p
s 
Yes No Mitrega and 
Zolkiewski 
(2012) 
Empirical, 
qualitative 
Negative effects 
of staying in 
deep 
relationships 
Supported No Inductive No 
T
ru
st
 
No No Kosari, 
Hoeffler and 
Iacobucci 
(2013) 
Mixed 
methods 
Performance 
and satisfaction 
inverted 
relationship 
found 
moderated by 
relationship 
life cycle 
position 
Not specified Inductive 
followed by 
deductive 
No 
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Due to this paradox, pouring resources into building strong relationships may be 
ill-advised if there is a possibility of reduced return or a loss of resources (Landolt and 
Portest, 1996; Villena et al., 2011). There is considerable conjecture about why this may 
occur: perhaps the older a relationship, the more dissatisfied one or both parties may 
become (Grayson and Ambler, 1999; Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande, 1992; 
Anderson and Jap, 2005). Perhaps the relationship becomes dull or expectations 
increase to an unrealistic level (Anderson and Jap, 2005) or possibly the parties learn 
enough over time for the relationship to become extraneous (Inkpen and Paul, 1997), or 
for the parties to begin behaving opportunistically (Klein, 1996; Anderson and Jap, 
2005). 
1.6.1 Dark side variables, specific 
 
Several dark side variables have been conceptualized and some have been 
empirically tested in the field of supply chain management. Table 3 is organized by the 
dark side variable of study. The studies in Table 3 were identified in one of three ways: 
1) the variables of interest were explicitly identified as dark side variables; 2) the study 
hypothesized a non-linear or curvilinear relationship between relational variables and 
performance variables; or 3) the studies found a non-linear result between relational 
variables and performance variables.  
1.6.1.1 Embeddedness and network centrality 
 
The first dark side variable is embeddedness and network centrality. Uzzi (1997) 
found qualitatively that there was a non-linear relationship between embeddedness and 
network centrality and economic performance. Lechner, Frankenberger and Floyd 
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(2010) hypothesized and found support for a non-linear effect of embeddedness and 
network centrality on performance.  
1.6.1.2 Information sharing 
 
The next dark side variable is information sharing. Only one study was located 
which describes the potential dark side effects of information sharing: Grover, Lim and 
Ayyagari (2006). The authors referred to the dark side explicitly, but did not 
hypothesize a non-linear relationship between information sharing and  the dependent 
variable: pricing decision variance. Their deductive content analysis supported the 
initial hypothesis that increasing amounts of information sharing leads to increasing 
price dispersion (Grover, Lim and Ayyagari, 2006).  
1.6.1.3 Learning and absorptive capacity 
 
The third dark side variable is learning and absorptive capacity. Hamel (1991) 
neither referred to learning/ absorptive capacity as a dark side variable, nor 
hypothesized a non-linear effect on power, the dependent variable of interest. However, 
their qualitative results supported the negative effect of learning on the balance of power 
(Hamel, 1991).  
1.6.1.4 Long term orientation 
 
Another dark side variable is long term relationship orientation. Grayson and 
Ambler (1999) specifically referred to the dark side of long term orientation in their 
empirical study, but did not hypothesize a non-linear relationship between long term 
orientation and research use. The study evaluated factors which affected the use of 
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marketing research by clients (Grayson and Ambler, 1999). The results of the study were 
mixed, in that there was not a curvilinear relationship and the dark side effect was 
proposed as a moderator (Grayson and Ambler, 1999). Findings suggested that trust was 
significant in short-term oriented relationships, but not in long-term oriented 
relationships; while involvement as an independent variable was a significant predictor 
of research use only in long-term oriented relationships (Grayson and Ambler, 1999).   
1.6.1.5 Reciprocity/ guanxi 
 
The fifth dark side variable is reciprocity and guanxi. Gu, Hung and Tse (2008) 
referred to the reciprocal, though culturally-specific practice of guanxi as a dark side 
variable, but did not hypothesize a non-linear relationship between guanxi and market 
performance. The empirical study found that under certain conditions, guanxi has a 
negative relationship to market performance (Gu et al., 2008). In this specific study, 
those moderating conditions were competition and technological turbulence. This study 
was founded on social capital theory (Gu et al., 2008).  
1.6.1.6 Relationship-specific investment 
 
The next dark side variable is relationship-specific investments. Bensaou and 
Anderson (1999) empirically analyzed the relationship between relationship-specific 
investment, opportunism and performance. Though the authors neither referred to the 
dark side of relationship-specific investment nor hypothesized a non-linear relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables, their study results supported a 
negative effect of relationship-specific investment on performance, and a positive effect 
of relationship-specific investment on opportunism (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).  
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1.6.1.7 Social capital 
 
The seventh dark side variable is social capital. The first paper in this variable is 
Adler and Kwon’s (2002) conceptual discussion which, though did not refer to social 
capital as a possible dark side variable, indirectly suggested there may be dark side 
effects of social capital on value. Similarly, Locke (1999) proposed the same effect on 
organizational effectiveness. Villena, Revilla and Choi (2011) is one of the few empirical 
papers which referred to the variable explicitly as having dark side effects, hypothesized 
non-linear effects of social capital on the dependent variable, and empirically supported 
that hypothesis based on social capital theory. McFadyen and Cannella (2004) did not 
explicitly refer to the dark side of social capital, but did hypothesize non-linear effects of 
social capital on the dependent variable: knowledge creation. Their empirical study 
supported that hypothesis based on the theory of knowledge creation (McFadyen and 
Cannella, 2004). 
1.6.1.8 Deep relationships 
 
The following dark side variable is deep relationships. Mitrega and Zolkiewski 
(2012) explicitly referred to the dark side of deep relationships, but did not predict non-
linear effects of the independent variable. Due to the inductive nature of the study, the 
authors explored the possible dark side effects of deep relationships (Mitrega and 
Zolkiewski, 2012). The qualitative investigation revealed that yes, indeed, there are 
several dark side effects of deep relationships in the context studied.     
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1.6.1.9 Trust 
 
Trust is the final dark side variable to be discussed. Though Kusari, Hoeffler and 
Iacobucci (2013) neither referred to trust as having a “dark side,” nor did they 
hypothesize non-linear effects of trust on performance and satisfaction, their mixed 
methods study found an inverted relationship of trust on performance and satisfaction, 
moderated by position in the business relationship life cycle (Kusari et al., 2013).  
1.6.1.10 Dark side variable conclusion 
 
Regardless of the mechanism, empirical studies have confirmed the presence of 
dark side effects based on relationship variables which, from the outside, seem to be 
productive and beneficial (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Dark side variables erode 
relationships even when both partners feel the supply chain relationship is going well 
(Anderson and Jap, 2005). This brief review has evaluated and described empirical and 
conceptual works which have either identified a variable as dark side variable or having 
a dark side, hypothesized non-linear relationships between the exogenous and 
endogenous variables, or achieved that result empirically. In Table 3, there are only two 
articles which identify a variable as explicitly a dark side variable and hypothesize non-
linear relationship between the independent and dependent variable: Wise (2014) and 
Villena, Revilla and Choi (2011).  
Due to the focus on evaluating the boundary conditions of Social Exchange 
Theory (SET), this dissertation will focus on the following dark side variables: social 
capital, reciprocity, long term orientation, relationship specific investment and 
learning/ absorptive capacity. SET focuses on reciprocal behaviors and social norms, 
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and these relational variables are predicted by SET to improve performance. Many of 
these dark side effects have not been tested quantitatively or have been tested in very 
different contexts. For example, learning and absorptive capacity has only been tested in 
an inductive qualitative study; extending these studies by quantitative testing and by 
bringing the concepts into the supply chain context will contribute to supply chain 
literature by extending these dark side concepts and testing them in the supply chain 
context. The variables under study are those specifically relevant to Social Exchange 
Theory (SET), a well-supported SCM theory.   
This dissertation will be one of the first, if not the first, empirical explicit study of 
multiple dark side effects simultaneously which will allow the researcher to evaluate the 
behavior of each variable together (Hair and Black, 2009) instead of isolating the dark 
side independent variable as has been done in previous supply chain relationship 
studies (Grover et al., 2006; Gu et al., 2008) (See Table 3).  This dark side effect 
investigation will identify the boundary conditions of Social Exchange Theory and 
contribute to the currently fragmented dark side literature. For managers, 
understanding that indiscriminate promotion of relational variables may not have the 
same effect on performance as expected.  
Finally, the presence and result of the dark side effect is a complex occurrence 
and may be affected by many qualities or factors within a business relationship which 
may be evaluated as moderators. Two of these potential moderators include relationship 
quality (Rauyuen and Miller, 2007) and relationship life cycle (Eggert, Ulaga, and 
Schultz, 2006). This dissertation will focus on supply chain relationships in the mature 
phase of the life cycle moderated by relationship quality (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; 
Kusari et al., 2013).  
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1.7 Moderation 
 
 Relationship life cycle will be used to frame the response set of the study by 
instructing the respondents to consider only relationships in the mature phase of the life 
cycle. RQ will be used in its continuous form to moderate the relationship between the 
exogenous and endogenous variables.  
1.7.1 Framing the response set: Relationship life cycle 
 
The position in the relationship life cycle will be used to frame the response set 
only to those business relationships in the mature position of the life cycle. Relationship 
life cycle is defined as a continually changing process in which business relationships 
progress over time (Dwyer et al., 1987; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Min et al., 2005). The 
concept accepts that business relationships are not static, and the progression of a 
relationship in the life cycle stages is considered to alter the effect of certain relational 
constructs (Kusari et al., 2013; Eggert et al., 2006; Medlin, 2004; Johnson and Selnes, 
2004; Holmlund, 2004). According to Barnes (2005), there is significant professional 
and academic interest in the progress of buyer-seller relationships.  
In a simplistic fashion, it may seem that the age or duration of the relationship 
would provide similar effects. However, this has been shown to be incorrect (Ellram, 
1991; Kotler, 2003; Eggert et al., 2006). It is possible for relationships to stay in a single 
relationship life cycle phase for many years or experience rejuvenation or a second 
growth phase (Ellram, 1991; Kotler, 2003; Eggert et al., 2006).  
The idea of the business relationship life cycle is so pervasive that it is accepted as 
truth (Kusari et al., 2013). Researchers agree that there are distinguishable phases in the 
relationship life cycle and that these phases have identifying behaviors and orientation 
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(Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Kusari et al., 2013; Eggert et al., 2006; Dwyer et al., 1987; 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). There have been calls for research evaluating how close 
business relationships change over the stages of the relationship life cycle in the supply 
chain context  (Min et al., 2005) and specific calls for the investigation of the dark side 
variables and the business relationship life cycle (Villena et al., 2011). This dissertation’s 
contribution will be, in part, answering these calls for research.  
It is empirically shown that the phase of the business relationship affects 
relationship value (Eggert et al., 2006; Jap and Anderson, 2007; Van de Vijver, Vos, and 
Akkermans, 2011), and may therefore affect other facets of a business relationship, 
including the effect of the dark side variables. Empirical studies have investigated the 
moderating effect of the stages of the relationship life cycle (e.g. Kusari et al., 2013).  
Kusari et al.’s (2013) mixed methods study confirmed the phase of  relationship life 
cycle moderated the effect of trust on both performance and relationship satisfaction 
(Kusari et al., 2013). Fynes, deBurca and Mangan (2008) found empirical support for 
changes in relational variables in response to the relationship life cycle phases.  
There have been many conceptualizations of the business relationship life cycle 
stages in the industrial market or business-to-business market  (Barnes, 2005). One of 
the early examples is Frazier’s (1983) simple progression of initiation, implementation 
and review. Next is the Dwyer, Schurr and Oh’s (1987) more complex stages: awareness, 
exploration, expansion, commitment and dissolution. These stages were adapted by Jap 
and Ganesan (2000) and Fynes, deBurca and Mangan (2008), and the five stages were 
simplified to three by Eggert, Ulaga, and Schultz (2006) to growth, maturity and 
decline.   
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There are two commonalities among the various conceptualizations: the direction 
of growth and the strength of that growth of the relationship itself (Eggert et al., 2006). 
For example, if the parties intend to expand their business, the relationship is in its 
growth phase. When the firms have a lower intention to expand their relationship, this 
places them in the mature phase; while an intention to diminish their relationship 
shows a relationship in the decline phase (Eggert et al., 2006).  Next, the characteristics 
of the phases of the business relationship life cycle will be described. 
1.7.1.1 Growth  
 
The growth phase exhibits an increasing interest in investing in relationship-
specific assets, and increasing levels of commitment and trust between parties (Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000). There is an expansion in joint participation, investments, information 
sharing, and the willingness to take on increased risks and acceptance of 
interdependence (Dwyer et al., 1987). During the growth phase, the goal is to create a 
mutually-beneficial, long term relationship and to understand each party’s intentions 
and motivations (Narayandas and Rangan, 2004). The partners often feel confident in 
one another and in their expectations of their partner’s behavior (Dwyer et al., 1987).  
During this phase, shared experiences and the development of contractual governance 
increases the durability of the partnership (Dwyer et al., 1987; Kusari et al., 2013).  
1.7.1.2 Maturity 
 
The second phase is maturity.  During the maturity phase, the partners are more 
long-term oriented and willing to forego short-term benefit for the expectation of long-
term benefit (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Kusari et al., 2013). If the growth phase is 
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characterized by potential errors and a somewhat bumpy learning process, the mature 
phase finds the partners often finding the satisfaction and rewards they expected from 
the relationship (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Kusari et al., 2013). This feeling of 
accomplishment leads to a measure of relaxation in terms of expectation of the partner’s 
motivations and intentions (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Kusari et al., 2013). During this 
phase, competence has been proven, leading to additional trust (Kusari et al., 2013).  
1.7.1.3 Decline 
 
The decline phase typically includes one or both partners searching for 
alternatives and/ or signaling their desire to end the relationship due to relationship 
deterioration (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). During the decline phase, opportunistic 
behavior or short term orientation may become more common (Kosari et al., 2013).  
1.7.1.4 Focus and contribution of this dissertation 
 
The primary interest of this dissertation is the change of the relationship from 
maturity to the decline phase. During the mature phase, the relational variables which 
may exhibit a dark side effect are usually present. For example, it takes considerable 
time for individuals within a partnership to develop social capital. By the time the 
partners have developed social capital and have become more relaxed in their dealing 
with one another, they are often exhibiting characteristics of the maturity phase (Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000; Kusari et al., 2013). At the mature stage of the relationship life 
cycle, these variables have the highest probability of leading to an unexpected decline in 
the relationship.  
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This dissertation will contribute to managerial practice by providing knowledge 
of the relationship life cycle, in that it can create more realistic expectations for both 
partners (Fynes et al., 2008). Adding the dark side variable effect to this base of 
knowledge will arm supply chain managers with the knowledge to manipulate these 
factors to obtain the best possible outcome.  
1.7.2 Continuous moderator: Relationship quality 
 
The mature position in the relationship life cycle will frame the response set of 
relationships studied in this dissertation. Research shows, however, that there are other 
variables with very strong moderating effects on performance, satisfaction and related 
dependent variables. According to Palmatier, Dant and Grewal’s (2006) meta-analysis 
of relationships’ effect on performance, one of the more effective moderators of the 
business relationship outcome is relationship quality (RQ).  RQ provides more insight 
into the performance of relationships than other constructs (Palmatier et al., 2006; 
Nyaga and Whipple, 2011;  DeWulf, Odekerken-Schroder, and Iacobucci, 2001) which is 
composed of, most often, commitment, trust and relationship satisfaction (Palmatier et 
al., 2006).  
Some studies have used RQ as a dependent variable, such as Kumar, Scheer and 
Steenkamp (1995) who studied the effect of fairness of the suppliers on RQ, and found a 
strong, significant effect (Kumar et al., 1995). Other studies have used RQ as a mediator, 
moderator, or exogenous variable. Crosby, Evans and Cowles (1990) empirically found 
RQ to be both a strong significant predictor of future interaction (relationship 
continuity).  Nyaga and Whipple (2011) studied RQ’s impact on relationship satisfaction 
and supply chain operational performance. The study found that in higher levels of RQ, 
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both satisfaction and supply chain operational performance were higher (Nyaga and 
Whipple, 2011). DeWulf et al. (2001) empirically found a strong mediation effect of RQ 
on the relationship between relationship investment and behavioral loyalty in a 
business-to-consumer context and Rauyruen and Miller (2007) empirically found that 
RQ significantly influenced attitudinal loyalty in the business-to-business context.  
Due to the acceptance in literature of the strong effect and importance of RQ as a 
moderator of relationship studies, this study will include RQ as a moderator of the paths 
between the dark side variables and the dependent variable.  
1.8 Dependent variable 
 
There are two dependent variables of interest in this study: likelihood of 
relationship termination and perceptions of relationship financial performance. Because 
the end of a business relationship may be expected or beneficial (Giller and Matear, 
2001) and the exit of the relationship is not always an option due to exit barriers, inertia, 
or the need for stability (Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 2012), a measure of relationship 
financial performance will also be used as a dependent variable.  
Perceptions of relationship financial performance are the perceptions of financial 
costs and benefits incurred by a particular buyer-supplier relationship (Duffy, 2008). 
Because close business relationships are often promoted as a way of improving focal 
firm performance, the perceptions of the relationship partners can offer some insights 
into the partners’ perception of relationship success (O’Toole and Donaldson, 2000; 
Spekman and Carraway, 2006; Duffy, 2008), particular because the benefits of business 
relationships can be difficult to quantify.  
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1.9 Literature summary 
 
In summary, literature has encouraged firms to develop strong relationships as a 
way to improve performance and reduce uncertainty (Cannon and Perreault, 1999); 
however, empirical studies have shown mixed results of benefits in studying these types 
of relationships (Moorman et al., 1992; Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Grayson and 
Ambler, 1999; Barnes, 2005; John, 1984)  and a few studies have shown that 
characteristics of strong relationships also exhibit a dark side, or negative effect on the 
relationship’s performance and continuity (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Granson and 
Ambler, 1999; John, 1984; Backhaus and Buschken,  1999).  Supply chain management 
studies have focused most frequently on variables which have a positive effect on firm 
performance, and have often neglected the investigation of what makes relationships fail 
or perform poorly. This dissertation will focus exclusively on this category of variables 
known as the dark side variables, which have both positive and negative effects on 
relationship performance.  
This dissertation will replicate one previous empirical study: Villena, Revilla and 
Choi, 2011. Villena, Revilla and Choi (2011) empirically studied and supported the non-
linear relationship between social capital and performance. This dissertation will also 
extend multiple empirical studies. This study will extend Hamel (1991) by hypothesizing 
the non-linear effects of learning as a dark side variable. Hamel (1991) empirically 
studied the effect of learning on the balance of power and found that learning can both 
negatively and positively affect the balance of power. The authors did not refer to the 
effect as a dark side effect, nor did they hypothesize such a result.  
This study will also extend Grayson and Ambler (1999) by hypothesizing the non-
linear effects of long-term orientation, though they studied the dark side of long-term 
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orientation as a moderator. Grayson and Ambler (1999) referred to the dark side effect 
of long term orientation, though did not hypothesize the dark side effect. They found 
that long term orientation, as a moderator, dampened the beneficial effect of trust and 
involvement on research use.  
An additional extension resulting from this dissertation is to extend the findings 
of Gu, Hung and Tse (2008) by hypothesizing non-linear dark side effects of reciprocity. 
The authors referred to reciprocity/ guanxi as a dark side variable, but did not 
hypothesize non-linear effects. They found that when guanxi is moderated by 
competition and technological turbulence, performance is reduced (Gu et al., 2008).  
This study will incorporate the broader Political Economy Framework from 
general business literature, with the marketing and SCM theoretical foundation of Social 
Exchange Theory. The study explicitly identifies the variables as dark side variables and 
sets up the hypotheses to test the dark side effects of the independent variables on two 
dependent variables moderated by RQ. The overarching contribution of this dissertation 
is to test the boundary conditions of SET by demonstrating the non-linear effect of these 
relational variables on the dependent variables. Therefore, the research questions of 
interest are 1) How do dark side variables influence relationship financial performance 
in a mature supply chain relationship? 2) How do dark side variables influence the 
termination of a mature supply chain relationship? 
 
1.10 Relevance and contribution 
1.10.1 Managerial relevance and contribution   
 
Some empirical studies have had negative results from such previously-
considered positive factors such as collaboration (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Villena et 
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al., 2011; Fang et al., 2011; Grégoire and Fisher, 2008) and the relationships may have a 
considerably high failure rate (Fang et al., 2011; Heide and John, 1990; Kogut, 1988; 
Saxton, 1997; Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005).  Business and supply chain management 
literature shows  that even positive relationship variables may have a dark side.  
For supply chain managers, understanding the dark side of relational variables 
has important implications, due to the extensive resources firms extend to develop these 
relationships (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Autry and Griffis, 2008; Villena, Revilla, and 
Choi, 2011). For example, earned social capital, in its dark side, can lead to inefficient 
decision-making or opportunistic behaviors, instead of an expected improvement in 
performance (Locke, 1999; Granovetter, 1985; Grover et al., 2006; McFadyen and 
Cannella, 2004; Villena et al., 2011). Though the concept of dark side variables may 
seem counterintuitive, it has been empirically shown that some positive relational 
variables have allowed or even promoted the downfall of a previously well-performing, 
satisfactory supply chain relationship.  
For the benefit of supply chains, it is essential to discover the causes of supply 
chain partnership failure (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Autry and Griffis, 2008; Fang et al., 
2011; Landolt and Portes, 1996; Villena et al., 2011). Even those supply chain 
relationships which have been created with considerable time and investment are 
vulnerable to destruction (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Fang et al., 2011). This study 
focuses intently on the effect of the dark side variables: those variables which are highly 
recommended as a conduit to excellent and beneficial supply chain relationships, but 
have been suggested and shown to have mixed or negative effects on the performance of 
these relationships. In particular, this study will focus on the dark side effect of 
learning/ absorptive capacity, long term orientation, reciprocity and social capital 
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because these variables are most relevant to the theoretical foundation. Empirically 
studying these variables simultaneously through structural equation modeling creates 
results which may 1) confirm previous empirical results in dark side variable studies; 2)  
explore as-yet untested dark side variables; 3) and expand theoretical understanding of 
SET by testing its boundary conditions.  
There is clear acknowledgement of the importance and advantage conveyed by 
some supply chain partnerships. However, relationships do encounter complications, 
problems, and negative factors which detract from the outcome of the relationship 
(Fang et al., 2011; Grayson and Ambler, 1999; Pressey and Tzokas, 2004).  Most 
empirical research focuses on the positive effect or bright side of various relational 
constructs and evaluates how those constructs positively affect the performance of the 
firm (Abosag et al., 2014).  Thus, while research has suggested that partnering behavior 
and results have a significant positive impact on the performance of the member firms 
(Gulati, 1999; Lavie, 2006), in-depth knowledge of the factors which impact partnership 
failure is scant (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Mohr and Spekman, 1994).  
This research will indicate how the dark side relationship variables affect 
perceptions of relationship financial performance and relationship continuity. This 
study’s results will help supply chain managers assign resources more accurately and 
prudently when building relationships among many partners (Kusari et al., 2013). The 
results from this study will also help supply chain managers understand that 
relationship building, and investing in relationship-specific assets in particular, must be 
done with a clear knowledge that the expected performance improvement may not 
materialize (Fink, Edelman and Hatten, 2007). There is a large amount of literature 
confirming positive effects of independent variables on business performance, while 
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there is much less literature pointing out what hurts relationships (Anderson and Jap, 
2005). There is even less literature, particularly empirical literature, which reports on 
good constructs which hurt the relationship, that is, the dark side variables.  This 
knowledge and understanding will contribute significantly to normative 
recommendations offered to business managers particularly when the reality is that 
many of these types of relationships fail (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Mohr and Spekman, 
1994). Thus, this study intends to confirm the presence and effect of multiple dark side 
variables.  
Research has suggested that partnering behavior and results have a significant 
positive impact on the performance of the member firms (Gulati, 1999; Lavie, 2006).  
Managers though must remain aware and wary of all risks, including misplaced 
investments in relationships which may not have the expected benefit (Villena et al., 
2011). However, if the advantage typically attributed to strong buyer-supplier 
relationships does have the potential for implosion, it is essential and imperative to 
understand why, and how it may be mitigated (Grayson and Ambler, 1999). The risks 
and benefits of supply chain relationships is an essential area of research within supply 
chain management (Giunipero et al., 2008) in large part to assist supply chain managers 
in their supply chain relationship developments and effectiveness.  
 
1.10.2 Theoretical relevance and contribution 
 
Many theories have been used to explain supply chain relationships including 
Resource Dependence, Social Exchange Theory, the Political Economy Framework, 
Economic Sociology and Transaction Cost Economics (Robicheaux and Coleman, 1994; 
Fynes, deBurca and Mangan, 2008). Each of these theories has contributed to 
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understanding supply chain relationships and their dimensions (Fynes et al., 2008). 
Empirical studies in the field of supply chain management suggest that the study of 
supply chain relationships has moved from a more transactional model, e.g. Transaction 
Cost Economics, to a more relational perspective, e.g. Social Exchange Theory (Sako, 
1992, Lamming, 1993; Ellram and Krause, 1994; Handfield, 1994; Harland, 1996; Fynes 
and Voss, 2002; Fynes et al., 2008). This dissertation evaluates supply chain 
relationships using  a relational perspective vis-à-vis Social Exchange Theory (SET). 
One of the primary contributions of this dissertation is testing the boundary 
conditions of the current conceptualization of SET, which will provide a more nuanced 
perspective on commonly accepted theoretical propositions (Goldsby et al., 2013). As 
SCM research and literature becomes more mature, more attention is placed on 
empirically revealing the boundary conditions of accepted theories (Fawcett and Waller, 
2011). The more nuanced perspective achieved by identifying theoretical boundary 
conditions should be the goal of researchers (Goldsby et al., 2013; Knemeyer and 
Naylor, 2011). This dissertation also contributes to supply chain literature by answering 
calls for theory testing in supply chain management research (Carter, 2011; Mentzer et 
al., 2001; Mentzer and Kahn, 1995) and conducting research which expands the 
understanding of business relationships by evaluating negative outcomes of mature 
supply chain relationships (Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 2012).  
1.10.3 Theoretical Foundation 
 
This study is founded upon two academic theories; both of which are commonly 
accepted as theoretical foundations in the field of supply chain management: the 
Political Economy Framework and Social Exchange Theory (SET). The Political 
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Economy Framework attributes organizational performance to both social and 
economic factors. Therefore, the Political Economy Framework creates a grand 
framework in understanding supply chain relationships. Political Economy Framework 
is often recommended for analysis in buyer-supplier relationships because the theory 
can support analysis in many different relationship structures and takes into account 
the interactions and processes between channel members at multiple units of analysis 
while considering  the power-dependence relationship between partners (Stern and 
Reve, 1980; Duffy, 2008; Arndt, 1983; Krapfel, Salmond and Spekman, 1991; Nidumolu, 
1995; Webster, 1992; Duffy, 2008; Golicic and Mentzer, 2005; Izquierdo and Cillan, 
2004). The Political Economy Framework incorporates several forces which affect an 
organizational relationship, including negative forces such as the dark side effect of 
relationship variables. Taking the breadth of the Political Economy Framework and 
combining it with SET allows the research to focus on relational variables in the dark 
side study within the larger organizing framework of Political Economy Framework.  
SET focuses on the norms of reciprocating benefits or behavior such that parties 
will cooperate or behave in a mutually beneficial way under the expectation that they 
will give and receive relatively equally from the relationship (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 
1962; 1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). That is, SET 
contends that beneficial behavior would be met with reciprocity of beneficial behavior 
and relationships would deepen over time, due to the norm of reciprocity and the social 
norms inherent in SET (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987). However, limited empirical 
evidence has shown that the relationship variables known as dark side variables do not 
always create the expected positive results to the supply chain partners, as SET suggests.  
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A contribution of this dissertation is combining these theories to analyze the 
mature supply chain relationship and its progress. The Political Economy Framework 
gives an overall framework within which to view the entirety of the relationship between 
two organizations, including aspects of the relationship outside the realm of SET, such 
as power or competitive forces. However, the objective of this study is to focus primarily 
on the relational variables which may exhibit dark side characteristics during the mature 
phase of the supply chain relationship. Combining the Political Economy Framework 
with SET contributes the explanatory power of both to the behavioral aspect of business 
relationships while viewing these behavioral aspects as part of the total relationship 
which also includes organizational power, processes and interactions between 
organizations.  
Thus, this study frames the overall analysis with the Political Economy 
Framework, while simultaneously seeking to identify boundary conditions of SET. The 
combination of these theories provides both the behavioral foundation commonly found 
in SCM research, as well as a broader theory frequently used to frame business 
operations and relationships. Another contribution of this dissertation lies in testing the 
boundaries of SET, which even if disconfirmed, provides rich and relevant territory for 
further investigation. Relationship theories often attribute greater value to close 
relationships, above and beyond the cost of creating and maintaining that relationship. 
Deepening theoretical understanding of mature supply chain relationships provides 
valuable theoretical insight into how and why these relationships fail or succeed.   
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1.11 Overview of research approach  
 This research will be quantitatively studied through a survey of supply chain 
managers to provide a view of behaviors or attitude through this often-used method of 
data collection in academic research (Westbrook, 1995). Each research method has its 
own limitations, strengths and weaknesses which are evaluated in terms of internal and 
external validity (McGrath and Brinberg, 1983; Westbrook, 1995).  The clear strength of 
quantitative surveys is the external validity of the conclusion (McGrath and Brinberg, 
1983). Other strengths of survey research include its low cost,  quick data collection and 
analysis (Dillman and Smyth, 2014).   
 To clearly identify the most typical independent variables of the study, a 
thorough literature review was conducted. Existing scales will be used for all latent 
constructs and the survey will be pre-tested to identify statistical reliability of the 
constructs and understanding.  The respondents will consist of a sample of the 
population of mid- and upper-level managers who provide or purchase logistics services 
and are involved in managing those supply chain relationships. This sample will come 
from the readership of a leading logistics blog written by a logistics professional with 
over 30 years of management experience in the logistics and supply chain industry. 
Analysis will be conducted using partial least squares (PLS) - structural equation 
modeling (SEM).  
 While the aim of this dissertation is to support the existence and effect of the 
dark side variables (relationship-specific investment, long-term relationship 
orientation, learning/ absorptive capacity, social capital, and reciprocity) in mature 
supply chain relationships, there is value in the disconfirmation of the hypotheses, as 
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well. The disconfirmation of hypotheses contributes and reveals boundary conditions of 
theory which need further investigation (Webster and Sell, 2007). 
1.12 Conclusion 
 
This research will extend theoretical understanding of mature supply chain 
relationships by evaluating the damaging force of the dark side effect. Theories 
addressing supply chain relationships help both academics and practitioners 
understand and predict the most beneficial relationship strategies for a particular 
business situation. Because firms have a finite amount of resources, focal firms may 
have only a certain number of cooperative supply chain relationships.  
The remainder of this study will be organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a 
description of the theoretical foundation of the dissertation will be presented. This study 
is founded upon two theories: the Political Economy Framework and Social Exchange 
Theory. Next, dark side variables will be discussed in general, followed by a more 
specific description of the particular variables being studied, and then the full model will 
be presented.  Chapter 3 will discuss the methodology: a cross-sectional survey of 
management professionals involved in mature supply chain relationships. Also in this 
chapter, the analysis will be described. This survey will be analyzed using a partial-least 
squares (PLS) structural equation modeling approach using WarpPLS 5.0 software. 
Chapter 4 will describe the results of the analysis in detail including data and scale 
quality measure, path coefficients, and effect sizes. These results will be interpreted. 
Chapter 5 will include the discussion, theoretical implications and contributions, 
managerial implications and contributions, and future research opportunities. 
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2.0 Literature review 
 
This literature review will begin by describing the theoretical foundation for the 
study. The two theories upon which this study is based are Social Exchange Theory and 
the Political Economy Framework. Second, the literature on dark side variables will be 
presented including relationship-specific investments, long-term relationship 
orientation, learning and absorptive capacity, social capital, and reciprocity. Next, 
relationship life cycle position, and the moderator relationship quality (RQ), will be 
discussed. Finally, the structural model and hypotheses will be presented and discussed.  
2.1 Theory 
 
This study is founded on the combination of two widely-accepted academic 
theories: the Political Economy Framework and Social Exchange Theory (SET). The 
Political Economy Framework proposes that business performance is the result of many 
forces including social forces, economic forces, and the interaction of power of the 
various parties involved, both individual and organizational (Stern and Reve, 1980; 
Arndt, 1983; Buchanan, 1964). The Political Economy Framework is very broad and 
holds considerable explanatory power, though considered too broad for empirical 
testing (McIvor and Humphreys, 2004). For this particular study, combining the 
Political Economy Framework with SET creates a broad theoretical foundation. SET 
indicates, in part through its social norms and the norm of reciprocity, that negative 
behaviors would be met with a decrease in relational performance, while positive 
behaviors would be met with an increase in relational performance. However, evidence 
suggests and supports the existence of the dark side effect of relational variables, such as 
relationship-specific investments, long-term relationship orientation, learning and 
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absorptive capacity, social capital, network density and reciprocity, tie strength, 
embeddedness, information sharing and shared vision.  SET is unable to explain, using 
its theoretical propositions as currently formulated in business research, the effect of 
these dark side variables. That is, SET suggests that, for example, if one partner has high 
levels of social capital with another partner, their performance will improve. However, 
this is not always the case (Anderson and Jap, 2005). Therefore, this dissertation will 
empirically test the boundary conditions of the current business formulation of SET 
within the Political Economy Framework.    
2.1.1 Political Economy Framework 
 
 The Political Economy Framework is a theory which evaluates an interaction of 
power, economic forces, and social forces upon behaviors and performance of the 
system and its players (Stern and Reve, 1980; Arndt, 1983, Buchanan, 1964). The 
Political Economy Framework is a very broad theory supporting business performance 
based on multiple internal and external forces and has been used to conceptualize 
organizational behavior and relationships between organizations (Zald, 1970; Arndt, 
1983; Benson, 1975). The Political Economy Framework is highly appropriate for 
analyzing buyer-supplier relationships because it includes power, conflict, internal and 
external drivers of institutional behaviors and changes (Arndt, 1983) and can support 
analysis in many different relationships structures and types; taking into account the 
interactions and processes between channel members as well as the power-dependence 
relationship between parties (Stern and Reve, 1980; Duffy, 2008; Arndt, 1983; Krapfel 
et al., 1991; Nidumolu, 1995; Webster, 1992; Golicic and Mentzer, 2005; Izquierdo and 
Cillan, 2004) in evaluating the forces on performance (Duffy, 2008). Per Benson (1975), 
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there is a need of an integrative theory and framework in which to organize 
interorganizational research. The Political Economy Framework, because of its breadth, 
can serve as that integrative, organizing framework due to its attention on various and 
diverse factors impacting relationships (Benson, 1975). The Political Economy 
Framework considers behavioral factors of organizational relationships while also 
considering dependence, economic forces, and political forces which also impact 
organizational relationships (Benson, 1975).  
In 1980, Stern and Reve developed the Political Economy Framework based on 
previous work on social systems. This work was the initial identification of the possible 
variables considered responsible for determining the behavior and structure of channels 
(Stern and Reve, 1980). The authors brought the original framework from social 
sciences into the distribution channels literature to solve a theoretical need for the 
Political Economy Framework, because the polity and economy of organizational 
relationships are so tightly linked that they cannot be studied singularly (Stern and 
Reve, 1980). Since then, theoretical developments have made it possible, and sometimes 
essential to focus on finer details of supply chain relationships. For example, 
Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) describe the breadth of the Political Economy 
Framework  as a foundation lacking predictive capabilities; one of the developments the 
authors hoped to put forth were some more specific theoretical propositions. To provide 
focus, this dissertation will combine the overarching theoretical foundation of the 
Political Economy Framework with a more narrowly-focused theory, Social Exchange 
Theory.  
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2.1.1.1 Strength of Political Economy Framework  
 
One of the clear strengths of the Political Economy Framework is the 
aforementioned ability to incorporate many concerns, both internal and external to the 
focal organization in its general research framework (Stern and Reve, 1980; Arndt, 
1983; Duffy, 2008).  Though several research propositions were developed by Stern and 
Reve (1980) in the development of the Political Economy Framework, one proposition is 
particularly relevant to this study: the more cooperative the relationships between 
channel members, the more profitable the channel will be as a whole (Stern and Reve, 
1980). Though Stern and Reve (1980) focused on many larger, general, and more 
abstract concerns with the Framework, the authors also included what they termed 
channel sentiments. Channel sentiments included factors such as compatibility of goals, 
consensus, feelings of satisfaction and accomplishment and norms of exchange (Stern 
and Reve, 1980; Arndt, 1983). Combining the Political Economy Framework with Social 
Exchange Theory will create a strong focus on these channel sentiments.  
 Arndt (1983) was an early advocate of using the Political Economy Framework 
for analyzing buyer-supplier relationships (Duffy, 2008). Arndt (1983) also described 
how the Framework’s strengths included its generality as well as its integrative 
potential. The theory’s generality allows it to be applied to many different situations in 
marketing, channel, or buyer supplier relationships (Arndt, 1983). Using the concepts as 
written in Arndt’s (1983) article, this dissertation will be focused on the internal 
economy. There are four aspects of the internal economy: incentives, allocation rules, 
internal exchange processes, and the social unit (Arndt, 1983). When focusing in on the 
social unit, the attention is directed to the internal flows of information, resources and 
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various activities (Arndt, 1983). According to Arndt (1983), the Political Economy 
Framework is a paradigm rather than formal theory: “the foundation of theory rather 
than theory itself” (p. 50).  Therefore, the Political Economy Framework focuses 
primarily on research strategies, as opposed to defining specific theoretical relationships 
(Arndt, 1983).  
2.1.1.2 Use of Political Economy Framework in buyer-supplier relationships 
 
 Krapfel, Salmond and Spekman (1991) developed a conceptual work which 
advocated the use of the Political Economy Framework in analyzing buyer-supplier 
relationships. Krapfel et al., (1991) moved the Political Economy Framework into the 
field of analyzing business relationship value and using the framework to evaluate how 
different ways of managing relationships may lead to mutual benefits (Krapfel et al., 
1991). The Political Economy Framework also allows research to focus on social 
interactions, as opposed to the strict economic paradigm of the past (Krapfel et al., 
1991). The Political Economy Framework has been often recommended in the literature 
for studying buyer-supplier relationships of many types and in many industries 
(Webster, 1992; Duffy, 2008; Day and Klein, 1987; Nidumolu, 1995;  
2.1.1.3 Political Economy Framework: Exchange 
 
 This dissertation focuses on a part of the Political Economy Framework, that is: 
exchange. Norms of exchange are defined as “the extent to which interorganizational 
transactions are based on mutual trust and a feeling of affiliation” (Nidumolu, 1994; p. 
92). SET focuses on this norm almost explicitly. Nidumolu (1995) empirically confirmed 
that norms of exchange are part of the climate within the framework of the Political 
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Economy Framework. Izquierdo and Cillan (2004) drew from several theoretical 
foundations including  the Political Economy Framework to empirically test the 
relationship among trust, interdependence, and relational orientation on both the 
manufacturer and supplier perspectives (Izquierdo and Cillan, 2004). Golicic and 
Mentzer (2005) used the internal Political Economy as a foundation to study 
relationship magnitude and its antecedents. Duffy (2008) used the Political Economy 
Framework to examine inter-organizational relationships and create a continuum of 
buyer-supplier relationships.  
2.1.1.4 Dimensions of Political Economy Framework 
 
 There are two primary dimensions of the Political Economy Framework: the 
external-internal, and the polity-economy (Zald, 1970; Arndt, 1983). The external-
internal dimension refers to the environmental (external) and organizational (internal) 
linkages within and between the focal network, which may be visualized as a sphere 
(Arndt, 1983). The internal economy refers specifically to the degree of vertical 
arrangement between partners (Achrol, Reve, and Stern, 1983) and includes planning, 
bargaining, and decision making mechanisms (Achrole et al., 1983).  
 The second dimension or the polity-economy discusses the polity, which 
represents the power and control within and surrounding a certain social unit or 
network; while the economy refers to the transformation of inputs to outputs (Arndt, 
1983). The economy is mostly focused upon resource allocation and efficiency, while the 
polity focuses on interdependence of the social groups (Arndt, 1983). The sociopolitical 
structure in the relationship refers to the distribution of power and dependence among 
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channel members and is typically described in dichotomous terms such as conflict or 
cooperation (Achrol et al., 1983).   
The Political Economy Framework focuses on the focal social unit, the firm or 
organization and its relationship with other social units: business partners, for example 
(Arndt, 1983). These social units become tied together with repeated exchanges over 
time with links of a social nature (as is also discussed in SET), or of a political, 
informational, technical, or economic nature (Arndt, 1983).  In this instance, there is an 
overlap of Political Economy Framework and SET. However, the Political Economy 
Framework goes far beyond social relationship to describe the performance of 
businesses to address other internal, external and economic factors also affecting 
business performance.  
2.1.1.5 Limitations of Political Economy Framework 
 
 As noted earlier, the strength of the Political Economy Framework is its breadth, 
which is also one of its shortcomings. The theory is considered too broad by some and 
incomplete by others, lacking specific testable constructs and operationalization 
(McIvor and Humphreys, 2004; Arndt, 1983). The grand complexity of buyer-supplier 
relationships is well-served by this broad theory which combines internal and external 
forces to evaluate diverse influences behaviors and performance (Reve and Stern, 1979; 
Robicheaux and Coleman, 1994). Benson (1975) concurs: one of the advantages of the 
Political Economy Framework is that it provides structure to various and diverse 
inquiries in interorganizational relationships, and has a place for both behavioral and 
economic studies by allowing research to envision these studies in a broader context.  
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However, Political Economy Framework does not lend itself well to the development of 
specific hypotheses (McIvor and Humphreys, 2004). Because this dissertation is 
focused intently upon dark side variables, a second theory will contribute the sharp 
focus on these relational variables: Social Exchange Theory.  
2.1.2 Social Exchange Theory 
 
Social Exchange Theory (SET) has been very influential in business disciplines 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). The central tenet of the theory is that series of social 
exchanges create social obligations (Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005) 
which, over time, will create mutually beneficial relationships (Cropanzano and 
Mitchell, 2005).  In some circumstances, these exchanges and subsequent obligations 
create long term, beneficial relationships (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).  
The original work describing what became known as Social Exchange Theory was 
Homans (1958).  This work of behavioral psychology focused on general human 
behavior, not organizational or business relationship behavior (Homans, 1958). This 
theory based in operant psychology focused on social power controlling individual 
behavior (Homans, 1958; Emerson, 1976).   
SET predicts that benefits accumulate when partners behave in a reciprocal way 
to benefit one another (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and 
Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). According to SET, the costs to develop and maintain a 
supply chain relationship are lower in socially close relationships (Thibaut and Kelley 
1959). In the business context, behaviors by one firm, according to SET, will result in 
reciprocal behavior by the other firm (Hald et al., 2009; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959) as the 
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primary motivation for creating partnerships is to avoid punishments and seek rewards 
(Griffith, Harvey and Lusch, 2006; Emerson, 1976; Bandura, 1986).  
Thibaut and Kelly (1959) published a book presenting a theory of interpersonal 
relationships and group dynamics, which is also given seminal status for SET in 
business research. The theoretical description focuses on the costs and rewards obtained 
by individuals as a result of their interactions with other individuals (Thibaut and Kelly, 
1959) including various gratifications, pleasures and satisfactions enjoyed by the 
individual, while costs refer to any mechanism of inhibition or deterrence of subsequent 
performance of a similar or the same behavior (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). According to 
the authors, the rewards and costs which result from the behavior will deter or drive 
future occurrences of the same or similar behaviors (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959)—this 
concept is one of the central concepts in current SET studies in the business context. 
Another central concept in the current SET is the behavioral norm (Thibaut and 
Kelly, 1959). A behavioral norm is a social obligation which both parties to the 
partnership feel obligation to cooperate with and non-cooperation is opposed with the 
use of power to induce conformity (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). In many cases, these 
behavioral norms substitute for explicit or contractual cooperation and can be more 
efficient and economical forms of enforcement (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). Simply put, 
these behavioral norms allow parties to control behavior with a reduced need to exercise 
personal or organizational power (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). These behavioral norms can 
reduce costs, increase value and goal congruence, increase process compliance and 
increase the perception of rewards by each member (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). In the 
end, these behavioral norms are proposed to improve the strength of the dyadic 
relationship (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959).  
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By 2006, SET was being applied directly to supply chain relationship research  as 
a foundation for studying the effect of procedural and distributive just in supply chain 
relationships, with behavior and attitude as dependent variables (Griffith, Harvey and 
Lusch, 2006). The study described and supported the propositions of SET according to 
Blau (1964) in that actions which are rewarded are repeated over time and those which 
are punished are eliminated (Griffith et al., 2006).  
Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) intended to trace the conceptual ambiguities  of 
SET back to their roots in social psychology. The authors’ primary criticism of SET is its 
ambiguity which creates opportunities for multiple interpretations (Cropanzano and 
Mitchell, 2005). In this theoretical review, it is seen that the essence of SET is central to 
the various conceptualizations: each party in a relationships performs actions 
contingent upon the similar actions of others, which, in the longer term, should prove to 
be rewarding and mutually beneficial; also known as the norm of reciprocity 
(Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).  
2.1.2.1 Earlier conceptualizations of SET incorporating the dark side effect 
 
Even though Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) present a ‘going back to the roots’ 
analysis of the SET, they fail to mention some of the theoretical conceptualizations 
within the foundational writings which support the point of diminishing returns for 
reciprocity and social exchange such as the point of diminishing returns (Homans, 1958; 
Emerson, 1976; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Blau, 1964), and the fatigue and satiation 
concepts (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959) that are present in earlier SET writings. These 
concepts are central and supportive to the study of the dark side effect in business 
relationships.  
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By 1976, Emerson had defined five related propositions related to reciprocal 
behaviors and social norms based on Homan’s (1958) work. One specific proposal is 
directly related to the study of the dark side variables. This proposition states that the 
more often a particular reward is received, the less valuable additional units of reward 
become (Emerson, 1976). This proposition indicates, conceptually, the point of 
diminishing returns of the value of reciprocal behavior and social norms. As an example, 
as reciprocal behaviors increase, according to this proposition, the incremental value of 
each additional reciprocal behavior has less and less value over time. This concept is 
also called diminishing marginal utility (Emerson, 1976).  
This concept leads to the realization of diminishing returns on behavioral 
rewards (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959), as is seen in the dark side variable effect. According 
to the authors, these diminishing returns create a situation in which the “recipient of the 
behavior would become less and less likely, as satiation develops to instigate the 
producer to repeat his behavior” (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959, p. 125). 
Blau (1964) also described a point of diminishing returns with reciprocity in a 
way similar to Emerson (1976) and Thibaut and Kelly (1959): as the quantity of the 
rewards increase, the value derived from each additional unit declines (Blau 1964). 
From the cost perspective, at some point the cost to obtain additional benefits becomes 
greater than the incremental value of the benefits, and declines over time (Blau, 1964). 
The concepts of fatigue and satiation are also described by the foundational authors of 
SET, Thibaut and Kelly (1959). Fatigue and satiation are conceptually similar and states 
that as the same behavior is performed repeatedly, the perception of cost of performing 
the behavior each time will increase over multiple repetitions (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959).  
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A related concept, also developed by Thibaut and Kelly (1959), is the comparison 
level. The comparison is the standard used to compare rewards and costs at the 
individual level (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). This comparison level is used when 
evaluating both additional and future interactions, as well as alternative partners, 
providers, and individuals (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). This comparison level, in the case 
of partnerships, is often used to decide whether to continue in a particular partnership 
or abandon it (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959).  The comparison level is the base-line 
comparison; that is, if the level of performance stays at a given level, whether high or 
low, that becomes the comparison or neutral point (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). The 
comparison levels shift based on performance, and as performance increases, the 
comparison or neutral point increases (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). In essence, this 
concept indicates that as the level of performance increases, the goal gradually loses its 
attractiveness; that is, reaches a point of diminishing returns (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959) a 
theoretical concept similar in result to fatigue and satiation.   
Finally, Gouldner (1960) identified exploitation and tension as potential negative 
results of reciprocity.  Exploitation is the exchange of things of perceptually unequal 
value (Gouldner, 1960). When exploitation occurs, the stability of the relationship is 
jeopardized; which suggests that there must always be equality or near-equality of 
exchange to maintain the stability of any relationship (Gouldner, 1960). Along similar 
lines as Homan (1958) and Emerson (1976), Gouldner (1960) also describes a potential 
negative effect of reciprocity: tension creation. Gouldner (1960) points out that it is 
possible for reciprocity to force tension and change in relationships. Therefore, 
Gouldner’s (1960) additions to SET also reinforce the potential negative effect of the 
dark side variables.  
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These concepts theoretically support the dark side effect of relationship variables 
and are more predictive of the dark side than the current conceptualization of SET in 
organizational research, which excludes these concepts.  Combining the aforementioned 
concepts creates a foundation for the understanding and predictive theoretical 
constructs related to dark side effects which the current definition of SET in the 
business context does not. The central idea of the dark side variables are that they either 
arrive at a point of diminishing returns or do not achieve the expected and predicted 
light side effect (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
Because this study is intent upon discovering when relationship variables do not 
lead to beneficial relationships as intended, it is seeking a set of boundary-conditions for 
the current formulation of SET as presented in Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005) and is 
testing the newly reincorporated theoretical propositions just discussed. In evaluating 
this study’s hypotheses, the predictive value of SET will be tested as will the existence of 
the dark side effect.  
2.1.3 Using both theories as a foundation  
 
The Political Economy Framework provides an overarching framework by which 
to organize this research, allowing consideration of internal and external factors, as well 
as economic and behavioral factors. However, when empirically studying a topic as 
complex as supply chain relationships, SET allows the researcher to focus in on the 
social norms and reciprocal behaviors of the multi-dimensional occurrence of supply 
chain relationships.  
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2.2 Model and variables 
 
The theoretical foundation and academic literature were used to develop the 
model under study. While the constructs were determined by the theoretical logic, the 
dark side and relationship quality literature drove the directions of the hypotheses. 
Figure 1 shows the entire structural model. The dependent variables of interest are the 
perceptions of financial performance of the supply chain relationship and the likelihood 
of relationship termination. The exogenous constructs are based upon a literature 
review on dark side variables of supply chain relationships.  
Relational variables are often proposed as positively related to performance 
outcomes in buyer-supplier relationships, however, conceptual and limited empirical 
studies have shown these to, in some circumstances, have a negative, or dark side, 
impact on mature supply chain relationship performance and a positive impact on the 
likelihood of relationship termination (Villenna et al., 2011, Anderson and Jap, 2005). 
Based on literature, these dark side variables include relationship-specific investment, 
long-term relationship orientation, learning and absorptive capacity, social capital, and 
reciprocity. These constructs are included in the study due to their appropriateness and 
fit with SET. Each of these variables’ expected effect can be explained by SET, an 
empirically-tested theory in SCM.  
Several potential moderating variables have been discussed in the literature 
including relationship quality, environmental dynamism, phase in the relationship life 
cycle, and the degree of exploration and exploitation present in the supply chain 
relationship. This research will focus on the mature phase of the relationship life cycle to 
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frame the study, and the moderator of relationship quality (RQ) because the light or 
dark effect of the variables will depend upon the level of RQ.  
 
Figure 1: Structural model 
 
 
2.2.1 Relationship life cycle 
 
Empirical investigation has supported the role of relationship life cycle phase on 
the perception of relationship value (Eggert et al., 2006). Eggert et al. (2006) discovered 
that social variables have a stronger effect in the build-up phase of the relationship and 
that in later phases, social support and personal interaction has less influence on the 
perception of relationship value (Eggert et al., 2006).  Van de Vijver, Vos and 
Akkermans (2011) empirically showed that the relationship life cycle moderated the 
beneficial effect of socialization on communication quality. Jap and Ganesan (2000) 
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empirically confirmed that the relationship phase determined, in large part, the 
effectiveness of various relationship investments and relationship satisfaction. These 
results suggest that relationship life cycle phase moderates the effect of social variables 
on the value of the business relationship.  
Researchers have often conceptualized buyer-supplier relationships as having 
different behaviors, orientations, and processes separated by a series of phases (Dwyer 
et al., 1987; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Eggert et al., 2006). Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 
(1987) described five general relationship phases in the business life cycle: awareness, 
exploration, expansion, commitment and dissolution (Dwyer et al. 1987).  Awareness is 
a unilateral phase in which one party recognizes another party as a potential exchange 
partner (Dwyer et al., 1987). The second phase, exploration, begins with bilateral 
interaction and indicates the trail phase of a business relationship is underway (Dwyer 
et al., 1987). In this phase, there is considerable calculation of costs and benefits, a 
willingness to develop trust and some experience of satisfaction, and may be short or 
long in duration (Dwyer et al., 1987). Expansion occurs when the partners are 
increasingly willing to create additional interdependence and experience an increasing 
amount of benefits and dependence from their partnership as well as an increase in risk-
taking (Dwyer et al., 1987). The next stage in the progression is commitment, which is 
identified by an implicit or explicit pledge of continuity between the parties, and may be 
explicit or implicit; typified by a level of satisfaction, loyalty, and a relative disinterest in 
other partner options (Dwyer et al., 1987). The final stage, dissolution, is the ending of 
the relationship (Dwyer et al., 1987).  
The next conceptualization of the relationship life cycle is Ellram (1993). Ellram 
(1993) discusses the following stages of the relationship life cycle: development, 
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commitment, integration and dissolution. The first step is development, in which the 
parties of the relationship are becoming familiar with one another (Ellram, 1993). At 
this early stage, positive interactions are essential to continuation of the relationship 
(Ellram, 1993). This positive interaction in the development stage creates, either 
explicitly or implicitly, the ground rules for the ongoing relationship (Ellram, 1993). If 
the development stages proceed in a pleasing way, the parties will enter into the 
commitment stage (Ellram, 1993). The goal in this stage is to create dependence, 
strength, commitment and a generally improved relationship, and is characterized by 
expansion of the magnitude of the relationship (Ellram, 1993). The next stage of the 
relationship life cycle is integration (Ellram, 1993). This stage is primarily concerned 
with stabilizing and maintaining the relationship and exhibits high levels of benefits for 
both parties to the relationship (Ellram, 1993). Due to the level of commitment and 
shared strategy, less direct contact is required between parties at this stage (Ellram, 
1993). Finally, the last stage of relationships is the dissolution stage where the primary 
goal is to withdraw from the relationship (Ellram, 1993). Ellram (1993) is in agreement 
with Dwyer et al. (1987) that not every relationship goes through every point in the 
relationship.  
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) also developed a relationship life cycle typology 
including four stages: negotiation, commitment, execution and discharge. These stages 
are conceptually similar to Ellram’s (1993) development, commitment, integration and 
dissolution; however, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) define the stages in terms of equality 
and efficiency of operations. In the first stage, negotiation, the partners develop 
expectations about investments, uncertainties and mutual or unilateral investments 
when the focus is strongly on behaviors and bargaining processes which lead to the 
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development of levels of trust and ideas about the equality and efficiency of the 
relationship (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). In the next phase, commitment, the partners 
have agreed on rules for future interaction and future obligations which have likely been 
codified into a contract or understood informally as a psychological contract (Ring and 
Van de Ven, 1994).  
The next stage, execution, involves the carrying out of the function of the 
relationship, e.g. giving orders, buying material, paying monies owed, and administering 
any processes required for executing the agreement (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
Personal interactions become again more important in this stage (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994). Over longer term relationships, conflicts, misunderstandings and noncompliance 
with expectations create a situation in which one or both parties begin rethinking the 
relationship (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). If the parties decide that the relationship 
should be ended, termination occurs (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). This may occur when 
the relationship comes to a natural end, with the parties having fulfilled their initial 
purpose, or may occur as a result of failure or transgression (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994).  
Eggert, Ulaga and Schultz (2006) continued the development of the life cycle 
concept with three life cycle stages: growth, maturity and decline, but define the 
characteristics of the stages by their direction and strength of growth. During the growth 
phase, there is a very high intention to increase business with the partner (Eggert et al., 
2006).  In the maturity phase, there is a low to no intention to expand business with the 
partner; while in the declining phase, there is an intention to reduce business with the 
partner (Eggert et al., 2006).   
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Jap and Ganesan (2000) identified four phases of the relationship life cycle based 
upon the conceptualization of Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987). The phases are exploration, 
buildup, maturity, and decline (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). The phases vary in terms of 
their direction of relationship growth (i.e. increasing or decreasing) and their 
relationship strength in line with the conceptual developments of Eggert, Ulaga and 
Schultz (2006).  This dissertation will use the Jap and Ganesan (2000) 
conceptualization of the phases of the relationship life cycle, as detailed in the following 
sections.  
2.2.1.1 Exploration phase of relationship life cycle 
 
During the exploration phase, the parties do not yet know or trust one another 
yet and are primarily exploring the compatibilities of the relationship and evaluating the 
cost benefit ratio to determine willingness of continuing the relationship (Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000; Dwyer et al., 1987). During the exploration phase, both partners are in a 
search or trial phase (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Brickman, 1987; Eidelson, 1980; Holmes, 
1991). The primary goals of the exploration phase are to reduce uncertainty in the 
relationship, and assess the value of the ongoing relationship (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; 
Berger and Bradac, 1982; Berger and Calabrese, 1975; Kent, Davis and Shapiro, 1981).  
2.2.1.2 Buildup phase of the relationship life cycle 
 
The buildup phase represents a time at which the relationship has passed the 
initial evaluation and is now beginning to experience trust, satisfaction and both parties 
are becoming more willing to commit to the relationship and social processes become 
more important by communicating norms and value (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Dwyer et 
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al., 1987; Frazier, 1983). This increase in social norms and values, therefore, signals the 
long-term intentions of both parties and may lead to risk-taking by each partner (Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000; Frazier, 1983).  
2.2.1.3 Maturity phase of the relationship life cycle 
 
The maturity phase of the relationship is typified by an acceptable level of 
benefits in, most often, a longer-term relationship (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Dwyer et 
al., 1987) and there is often an unspoken pledge to continue the relationship for a longer 
term (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Blau, 1964). The maturity phase is often identified by 
evaluating the high level of relationship investments, both tangible and intangible (Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000; Blau, 1964) and  both supply chain partners most often feel they 
are getting acceptable amounts of benefits and satisfaction from the relationship (Jap 
and Ganesan, 2000).  
However, this may be the stage in which complacency, fatigue and opportunity 
costs become problematic. During the maturity phase, commitment and trust may be 
taken for granted, and complacency may be setting in (Jap and Ganesan, 2000). 
Because of the dynamics and potential outcomes of the maturity stage, i.e. continuation 
or decline, this dissertation will focus on the mature stage of the relationship life cycle in 
examining the impact of the dark side effect of relationship variables.  In broad strokes, 
the mature stage is usually a phase with relative satisfaction and commitment, at which 
investments have been made and volume is stable; however, this is also the stage at 
which relationships may move into decline or deterioration.  
To reiterate, due to the pivotal nature of the mature life cycle, this dissertation 
will focus explicitly on relationships in the mature phase of the life cycle. This is the 
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point at which relationships have trust, commitment and some level of satisfaction, yet 
some relationships descend into discharge or decline while others experience 
rejuvenation. What causes these relationships to move into decline instead of 
rejuvenation? Dark side variables may be able to inform this quandary.  
2.2.2 Moderator: Relationship Quality  
 
 The relationship life cycle will be used as a way to frame the response set of the 
study. However, there are other variables which have strong moderating effects on 
business relationship performance. In 2006, Palmatier, Dant, Grewal and Evans 
conducted a meta-analysis of factors influencing marketing relationship effectiveness. 
While Palmatier et al. (2006) suggest that business relationships have many dimensions 
and there is not any specific variable with consistent influence on relationship 
performance across multiple studies, the literature frequently cites relationship quality 
(RQ) as one of the more effective moderators of business relationships (DeWulf et al., 
2001;Palmatier et al., 2006; Nyaga and Whipple, 2011).  RQ refers to the condition in 
which partners can rely on performance levels and honesty of one another because the 
mutual expectations are essential to maintaining a productive relationship (Crosby, 
Evans and Cowles, 1990; Fang et al., 2011). Relationship quality is most frequently 
conceptualized as a higher order construct made of trust and commitment (Palmatier et 
al., 2006; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Fang et al., 2011), and relationship satisfaction 
(Crosby et al., 1990).   
Studies have used RQ as exogenous, endogenous, mediating and moderating 
variables in various studies. For example, Crosby et al. (1990) found RQ to be a 
significant exogenous variable in determining relationship continuity, while Kumar, 
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Scheer and Steenkamp (1995) tested RQ as an endogenous variable. Both Nyaga and 
Whipple (2011) and DeWulf et al. (2001) hypothesized and tested a mediation effect of 
RQ. Due to the evidence of significance of the strong effect of RQ on relationship 
performance, this study will include RQ as a moderator of the dark side variables effect 
on the dependent variables.  
Conceptualizing RQ as a higher order construct composed of trust, commitment 
and relationship satisfaction provides insights into how this moderator may affect the 
relationship between the dark side variables and the dependent variables in this study. 
Zeithaml, Berry and Parasuraman (1996) concluded that trust reduces the potential of 
opportunistic behavior and a greater focus on long-term, mutual benefits by making the 
actual economic exchange more transparent and efficient (Doney and Cannon, 1997; 
Fang et al., 2011). The other conceptualized dimension of RQ, commitment has a similar 
affect. Commitment is the ongoing desire to continue a relationship considered valuable 
(Fang et al., 2011). High levels of commitment in a relationship reduces the desire to 
seek alternative partners, increases the amount of effort and investment expended on 
improving the relationship,  and increased perceptions and expectations of future 
rewards (Lam et al., 2004; Fang et al., 2011). This variable will be tested as a second 
order construct composed of satisfaction, commitment, and trust.  
This dissertation will focus on the dark side effect of relationship variables, 
framed by the mature stage in the relationship life cycle and moderated by RQ.  The 
study of dark side variables is of particular importance to both academics and 
professionals. Academic contributions to boundary conditions of SET and clarification 
of when and if relationship variables damage relationships instead of improve them is of 
particular importance to professionals. 
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2.3 Dependent variables 
 
Many dependent variables have been used when studying the potential impact of 
supply chain relationships including benefits (Dyer et al., 2008),  satisfaction and 
financial performance (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Hibbard, Kumar and Stern, 2001; 
Hunt and Morgan, 1994; Massey and Dawes, 2007; Moorman et al., 1992), relationship 
function (Boles, Barksdale, and Johnson, 1997; Fang et al., 2011; Håkansson and 
Snehota, 1995; Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Min et al., 2007; Walter et al., 2003; 
Walter, Ritter, and Gemünden, 2001), relationship value (Helm et al., 2006), 
relationship effectiveness (Massey and Dawes, 2007; Van de Ven, 1976), relational rent 
or quasirent  (Backhaus and Büschken, 1999; Lavie, 2006; Williamson, 1985).  
This study, however, is interested primarily in how dark side variables affect 
relationship dissolution and the perceptions of financial performance of the 
relationship. The first dependent variable of interest is the termination or dissolution of 
the partnership (Giller and Matear, 2001;  Harrison, 2004; Helm, Rolfes, and Günter, 
2006; Kim, Oh, and Swaminathan, 2006) which is the counterpoint to relationship 
continuity (Anderson and Narus, 1990; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern, 2001; Hunt and 
Morgan, 1994; Massey and Dawes, 2007; Moorman et al., 1992; Anderson and Weitz, 
1992).  
2.3.1 Dependent variable: Likelihood of relationship termination 
 
 Relationship dissolution or termination is the disconnection of the various links, 
bonds, and ties in a business relationship (Halinen and Tahtinen, 2002; Helm, Rolfes 
and Gunter, 2006). Relationship dissolution occurs for many reasons including reduced 
volume of trade or production or an evaluation of a cost-benefit consideration (Helm et 
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al., 2006) and has been ignored as a relational outcome in business relationships (Helm 
et al., 2006). 
Das and Teng (2000) point out a lack of empirical evidence regarding relationship 
dissolution causes. However, literature has examined the instability of various types of 
alliances using several theoretical approaches (Das and Teng, 2000). These instabilities 
refer, in particular, to unplanned relationship termination (Das and Teng, 2000). 
Research has shown some progress towards the causes of relationship dissolution, but 
the results are inconsistent (Das and Teng, 2000). Giller and Matear (2001) also focused 
on relationship dissolution as a dependent variable. The authors point out that a 
considerable amount of relationship research focuses solely on the maintenance and 
improvement of existing business relationships, while neglecting negatively-perceived 
relationship dissolution (Giller and Matear, 2001).  
Harrison (2004) conducted a case study to evaluate the dissolution process and its 
aftermath. The relationship under study had high relationship-specific investments, was 
long-term and exclusive (Harrison, 2004). The partners had no written contract in 
place, though at least one of the partners considered the relationship itself a 
psychological contract (Harrison, 2004). The paper qualitatively pointed out, in this one 
case, how the relationship deteriorated and dissolved (Harrison, 2004).  
Anderson and Jap (2005) agree with previous studies that there is a lack of empirical 
studies determining and reinforcing the various causes of relationship dissolution. Kim, 
Oh and Swaminathan (2006) conclude that dissatisfaction with a business relationship 
may lead to relationship dissolution and the development of a new relationship, which 
they consider a strategic option for strengthening internal capabilities. Fang et al. (2011) 
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agrees that the research investigating the causes of relationship termination is 
incomplete, or have weak results.  
2.3.2 Dependent variable: Perception of relationship financial performance 
 
Because the primary goal of this dissertation is to identify negative results of dark 
side effect of relationship variables, an additional dependent variable will be used: 
perceptions of relationship financial performance (Duffy, 2008). Because businesses are 
frequently recommended to develop close partnerships as a way to improve 
performance (Christopher, 1998; O’Toole and Donaldson, 2000; Spekman and 
Carraway, 2006; Duffy, 2008), this measure offers insights into the value of the 
relationship (Duffy, 2008). The measurement items include perceptual measurements 
of the investments made in that customer, the financial returns from the relationship, 
and the costs of keeping this partner and satisfaction level of financial performance in 
this relationship (Duffy, 2008).  Due to the difficulty in gaining access to accurate 
financial performance measurements, the perceptions of financial performance are 
sought (Duffy, 2008).  
 The combination of these two dependent variables are expected to show a more 
complex picture of relationships that end or are expected to end due to a relationship 
failure. Multicollinearity between these two dependent variables is unexpected as prior 
research has indicated that the likelihood to terminate a relationship does not directly 
impact performance (Morris and Carter, 2005).  
2.4 Dark side variables 
  
The dark side variables are those variables which are most often expected to, and 
in some cases purposefully composed to have a positive, stabilizing effect on a buyer-
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supplier relationship, however, may cause the demise of the relationship (Anderson and 
Jap, 2005). Very close business relationships were revealed, through qualitative study, 
to, in some circumstances, be perceived as a burden as the relationship prevented the 
exploration of other, perhaps more beneficial business relationships (Hakansson and 
Snehota, 1998). While the current SET does not predict this negative relationship 
between relationship variables and performance, the Political Economy Framework 
takes a more holistic view of these supply chain relationships and includes in its analysis 
social, economic, and inter-relational variables.  
These dark side variables are those that, though they have positive effects on the 
relationship performance, may at some point attain diminishing returns while still 
requiring increasing costs in time and investment (Villenna et al., 2011, Anderson and 
Jap, 2005). The dark side variables, in their entirety, are proposed to exhibit a non-
linear relationship to performance, most often hypothesized as an inverted-u shaped 
relationship, or curvilinear relationship (Villenna et al., 2011). These dark side variables 
include relationship-specific investment (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Backhaus and 
Buschken, 1999; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999), long-term relationship orientation 
(Moorman et al., 1992; Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Grayson and Ambler, 1999; Barnes, 
2005, John 1984), learning and absorptive capacity (Dyer, Singh and Kale, 2008; 
Hamel, 1991), social capital (Locke, 1999; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Autry and Griffis, 
2008; Adler and Kwon, 2002), and  reciprocity (Gu et al., 2008; Lechner et al., 2010). 
 Both academic and professional literatures frequently recommend the 
implementation and development of these relationship variables to stabilize and 
improve buyer-supplier relationships, however, some evidence has shown that their 
effect is not always positive or realized at all (Villenna et al., 2011, Anderson and Jap, 
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2005). The dark side variables which are the focus of this dissertation are those 
specifically relevant to SET: relationship-specific investment, long term relationship 
orientation, learning and absorptive capacity, social capital and reciprocity. These 
variables are most relevant to SET because they are social behaviors, determined by 
human behavior patterns in which social norms and the norm of reciprocity create an 
expected equal return in behavior.  
This dissertation seeks to clarify when relationship variables do or do not 
contribute to the perceptions of relationship financial performance or continuity of a 
supply chain relationship. This selection of dark side variables is the focus of this study 
because they are most appropriate for the theoretical foundation of SET.    
2.4.1 Relationship-specific investment 
  
Relationship-specific assets are those investments which are mutual, though not 
necessarily balanced, and cannot be used with another business partner (Bensaou and 
Anderson, 1999). These assets are the reason a continuous relationship makes 
economic, financial, and operational sense and creates an atmosphere of mutual 
commitment (Backhaus and Büschken, 1999; Riordan and Williamson, 1985). In 
relationships with these types of investments, each partner’s investment is at risk of loss 
if the relationship is ended before the return is realized (Backhaus and Büschken, 1999). 
Even in situations of dissatisfaction with the relationship, a relationship-specific asset 
may hold a firm in a relationship (Backhaus and Büschken, 1999).  
Relationship specific assets may be simultaneously considered a path to 
improved performance and an exit barrier for the buyer-supplier relationship (Bensaou 
and Anderson, 1999; Ghemawat, 1991; Poppo et al., 2008). Due to this exit barrier, 
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these investments create both a safeguard and a vulnerability leading to dependence and 
making it difficult to back away from the relationship without excessive financial loss 
(Bensaou and Anderson, 1999). In effect, this traps the firm into the relationship (Giller 
and Matear, 2001)—and has even been referred to as a “hostage” (Heide and John, 
1990; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Macneil, 1980) or a “hold-up” (Harrison, 2004). Because 
these assets make it more difficult to leave the relationship, it increases vulnerability to 
opportunism (Backhaus and Büschken, 1999; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).  
Also, when the relationship-specific investments are asymmetrical, one partner 
may experience increased bargaining power, thereby gaining benefits in excess of what 
the partner firm receives (Dyer et al., 2008; Lavie, 2006; Jap and Ganesan, 2000).  
Mutual and balanced relationship-specific investments (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999), 
conceptually, reduce the probability of opportunism (Backhaus and Büschken, 1999). 
Empirical results support that imbalanced relationship-specific assets create the 
potential for opportunism by the party with the smaller investment (Jap and Ganesan, 
2000). It is ironic that a specific asset is created to protect the relationship, when, 
theoretically speaking, that same asset can actually endanger the very same relationship 
by increasing the potential gains of opportunistic behaviors and actions (Bensaou and 
Anderson, 1999).   
In Jap and Ganesan’s (2000) empirical study, methods of controlling the ‘hold-
up’ potential of these relationship-specific investments are investigated. These control 
mechanisms include relational norms, explicit contracting and the level of relationship-
specific investment on the part of the other party. Interestingly, this study incorporated 
the position in the relationship life cycle and empirically found that relatively balanced 
relationship-specific investments increase the perception of commitment of the other 
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partner, but only in the exploration phase of the relationship life cycle (Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000).  
 Other studies have discussed relational norms and trust as factors to protect 
these relationship-specific investments and assets (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Das and 
Teng, 2000; Harrison, 2004; Heide and John, 1990, 1992) suggesting that in the 
presence of relational norms and trust, the role of relationship-specific investments and 
assets in protecting and enriching the relationship will be more effective. That is, if 
relational norms are present, relationship-specific investments and assets will increase 
relationship financial performance, and reduce the likelihood of relationship 
dissolution. There is a suggestion that, particularly in asymmetric investments, there 
may be an increase in opportunistic behavior, vulnerability, and risk resulting from 
relationship-specific investments.  
 The mature position in the relationship life cycle would indicate that 
relationship-specific investments, if used, have led to a feeling of satisfaction and 
commitment, inherent in the position. According to Achrol and Gundlach (1999), it 
takes a combination of both relational norms and formal contracting to maintain a 
productive business relationship. For this reason, RQ is expected to positively affect 
relationship performance, and reduce the likelihood of relationship dissolution.  
Based upon this literature review, it is established that there are contradictory 
conceptualizations and empirical results regarding the contribution of relationship-
specific investments and assets to the performance of supply chain relationships 
(Bensaou and Anderson, 1999; Ghemawat, 1991; Poppo et al., 2008; Heide and John, 
1990; Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Harrison, 2004; Jap and Ganesan, 2000). This study will 
empirically investigate the effect of relationship-specific investments on relationship 
82 
 
financial performance and likelihood of termination, when moderated by relationship 
quality. Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1a: The relationship between relationship-specific investment and relationship 
financial performance is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level 
of relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of 
relationship quality.  
 
H1b: The relationship between relationship-specific investment and likelihood of 
termination is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a low level of 
relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a high level of 
relationship quality.  
2.4.2 Long term relationship/long term relationship orientation 
  
Long term relationships and long term relationship orientation involve the long 
term, continuous business relationship between two partners, as opposed to an arm’s 
length, market- or transaction-based (i.e. short-term) relationship.  Research has 
suggested that longer term relationships reduce costs and increase profits to both 
parties over time (Ganesan, 1994; Skarmeas, 2006), increase trust and commitment 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Bitner, 1995; Poppo et al., 2008), reduce risk (Bitner, 1995), 
and improve profit (Keiningham et al., 2009).   
Empirical results by Barnes (2005) supported the concept of relationships 
becoming stronger and more involved over longer periods of time as longer term 
relationships are typically well-structured, and well-regarded by both partners (Barnes, 
2005).  Per Keiningham, Aksory, Buoye and Williams (2009), long term relationships 
equate to loyalty, and long term relationships are the most profitable from the business-
to-consumer perspective.  The expected returns of these long-term relationships are 
high (Barnes, 2005; Christopher et al., 1991; Reinartz and Kumar, 2003; Verhoef, 
2003).  However, the length of the relationship itself is not necessarily an asset: an old 
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but unproductive relationship may not be as valuable or provide as much return as a 
shorter, more productive relationship (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).  
Many industry relationships are not committed through legal means such as long 
term contracts (Heide and John, 1990; Walker and Poppo, 1991; Poppo et al., 2008; 
Uzzi, 1997); relationships in these industries often continue working together on a 
continuing basis even during the period of contract development and agreement (Poppo 
et al., 2008). The partners’ expectations of continuity, therefore, are perceptual in 
nature (Poppo et al., 2008).  
Research concludes that as the length of the relationship increases, so does trust 
(Barnes, 2005; Hunt and Morgan, 1994; Moorman et al., 1992; Shemwell, Cronin, and 
Bullard, 1994; Wetzels, De Ruyter, and Van Birgelen, 1998) and commitment (Barnes, 
2005; Gundlach et al., 1995). Though Gundlach, Achrol and Mentzer (1995) studied 
long-term commitment intentions, their results indicate that there was a direct, positive 
relationship between relational social norms and long-term commitment. Barnes (2005) 
concluded that business relationships become more intense over time, not less.  
Contrary to those results, longer term relationships also increase the potential for 
opportunism since the dissolution of the relationship can be difficult and expensive 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992; John, 1984; Williamson, 1975).  
Unfortunately, it has also been seen that longer relationships do not always show 
the expected profit (Dowling and Uncles, 1997; Helm et al., 2006; Reinartz and Kumar, 
2003; Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande , 1992) and that some long-term 
relationships are terminated in spite of outward contentment (Bitner, 1995). As the 
relationships continue to develop over long periods of time, negative influences become 
more common (Barnes, 2005; Grayson and Ambler, 1999; Moorman et al., 1992) which 
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reduce the long term relational impact on trust and commitment (Grayson and Ambler, 
1999; Moorman et al., 1992).  Some authors, however, report that long-term 
relationships may end even when satisfaction is achieved (Bitner, 1995). According to 
Dowling and Uncles (1997), as the duration of relationships increase, the customer’s 
expectations increase. This agrees with the early SET descriptions of the comparison 
level and the concept that as a certain level of service continues, the level of comparison 
meets that level of service and becomes the expected standard (Homans, 1958). In that 
situation, the customer may come to expect more impressive service that will appear to 
be above that frame of reference.  This may, in part, explain the diminishing returns, or 
dark side effect possible in long-term relationships. Barnes (2005) corroborates this 
concept in describing complacency which may become normal in long-term 
relationships.  
 Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande (1992) found empirically that some 
long-term buyer-supplier relationships experience a dampening effect of commitment 
and trust. They propose some possible causes for this dynamic including loss of 
objectivity, a sense of staleness in the relationship, or the perception of reduced value-
added from the other party (Moorman et al., 1992). The authors also suggest that it is 
possible that expectations increase over time, increasing the possibility of feelings of 
dissatisfaction with the relationship or that the possibility of opportunistic behavior 
increases concurrently with the age of the relationship (Moorman et al., 1992).  Partner 
firms also reported experiencing complacency or comfort with longer-term relationships 
(Barnes, 2005). Some researchers refer to this complacency as relational inertia (Villena 
et al., 2011) which indicates that partners are unlikely to seek other partners or replace 
their current partner even if expected benefits are not forthcoming (Anderson and Jap, 
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2005; Fang et al., 2011). Relational inertia limits innovation (Anderson and Jap, 2005), 
knowledge creation (McFadyen and Cannella, 2004) and product or market 
development (Fang et al., 2011; Levinthal and March, 1993).  
Fang et al. (2011) empirically confirm that there are some undermining forces at 
play in long-term relationships. The authors identify “structural inertia” as a factor 
which may devolve into rigidity which decreases organizational performance and may 
lead to the dissolution of relationships (Fang et al., 2011). This is due primarily to the 
lack of innovation and business intelligence gathered by firms involved in strong, close 
relationships (Fang et al., 2011).  
The theoretical concepts in SET, namely the comparison level, fatigue-satiation 
concept and point of diminishing returns concur with these suppositions by Moorman et 
al. (1992) and Fang et al. (2011). Longer-term relationships, to achieve economic 
benefit, increase the need for relationship-specific investment, since without these 
investments a relationship is less profitable than arm’s length relationships (Backhaus 
and Büschken, 1999; Williamson, 1985).  Kalwani and Narayandas (1995) empirically 
studied the effect of long-term relationships on performance, including sales growth; 
the results showed that growth was not higher for firms in closer relationships than 
those with transactional relationships (Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995; Backhaus and 
Buschken, 1999).  
Suppliers with closer relationships achieved cost reductions primarily due to 
improved inventory utilization and reduction in administrative expenses, however, 
these reductions were negotiated away over time by their customers (Kalwani and 
Narayandas, 1995). This research also corroborates the earlier theoretical propositions 
of comparison level: as relationship spans increase, the existing service level becomes 
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the new normal, the new comparison level, with which partners become dissatisfied 
(Homans, 1958).  
Thus, empirical evidence has supported that long-term relationships are not 
always profitable, despite the fact that conventional wisdom recommends that 
companies aim for customer retention for the purpose of reducing costs and improving 
profits (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Skjott-Larsen, Kotzab and Grieger, 2003). The 
contradiction in empirical evidence suggests that while long term relationship 
orientation does, in some circumstances, affect supply chain relationships positively, it 
does not consistently have this result. Because RQ is composed of a minimum, trust and 
commitment, the moderator is expected to improve the potential longevity and 
performance of the relationship.  
To summarize, literature reports that long-term relationships and long–term 
relationship orientation has a positive effect in supply chain relationships (Ganesan, 
1994; Skarmeas, 2006; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Bitner, 1995; Poppo et al., 2008; 
Keiningham et al., 2009), but also as contributing to complacency, reducing market 
awareness, and reducing evaluation of better alternatives (Barnes, 2005; Grayson and 
Ambler, 1999; Moorman et al., 1992; Dowling and Uncles, 1997; Villena et al., 2011; 
McFadyen and Cannella, 2004; Fang et al., 2011; Levinthal and March, 1993). The 
current conceptualization of SET would suggest that the trust and commitment inherent 
in RQ will, as social exchange mechanisms, improve the outcomes of the relationship. 
Therefore, based upon this literature review, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H2a: The relationship between long-term relationship orientation and relationship 
financial performance is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level 
of relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of 
relationship quality.  
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H2b: The relationship between long-term relationship orientation and likelihood of 
termination is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a low level of 
relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a high level of 
relationship quality.  
2.4.3 Learning and absorptive capacity 
 
Partnerships have a considerable role in distributing skills and knowledge 
(Hamel, 1991). Absorptive capacity, specifically, is the learning ability of a firm in which 
the firm can exploit the knowledge base of its alliance partners by identifying, 
evaluating, and assimilating their knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  Often, firms 
enter alliances with a perception of value arising from acquiring new knowledge and 
learning in addition to the other resources which generate relational benefits or 
performance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut, 1988; 1991; Mowery et al., 1996; 
Poppo et al., 2008; Dyer et al., 2008; Hamel, 1991; Lavie, 2006; Teece and Pisano, 
1994; Li, Liu, Li, and Wu, 2008).  
One complication in evaluating the level of absorptive capacity is that it is 
intangible and benefits are difficult to specify, so it is difficult to determine the most 
appropriate level of investment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  According to Hamel 
(1991), many business relationships are generated for gaining knowledge. These 
relationships most often occur when knowledge asymmetries are involved and the 
process of collaboration creates a conduit though which knowledge is shared. Hamel 
(1991) conducted a series of case studies which shows how asymmetries in absorptive 
capacity alters the bargaining power of the partners and that partners may have 
mercenary intentions in developing relationships. In an earlier study on interfirm 
knowledge transfer, Mowery, Oxley and Silverman (1996) evaluated how learning-
related alliances altered each partner’s capabilities. This study confirms that, in this 
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context, knowledge is acquired through close relationships and some relationships 
provide only access to knowledge instead of absorption of knowledge (Mowery et al., 
1996). The authors also emphasize the need for additional empirical study in knowledge 
transfers (Mowery et al., 1996).  
Lavie (2006) agreed that firms often enter relationships to gather new knowledge 
and gain access to additional resources. Some studies have shown that absorptive 
capacity is partially responsible for firm performance through actual learning from 
partners, which suggests the higher the absorptive capacity, the higher the proportion of 
performance appropriated to the firm (Lavie, 2006). Poppo et al., (2009) indicated that 
deeper learning strengthens business relationships and makes it more difficult for 
partners to disengage or dissolve the relationship.  
Learning alliances are often focused on interdependence, problem solving, and 
gaining of tacit knowledge from each partner (Inkpen, 2000; Li, Liu, Li and Wu, 2008; 
Grant and Baden-full, 2004). Simultaneously, each firm in a learning-type alliance must 
balance the relationship between the flow of tacit knowledge in both directions, and 
trying to protect any knowledge they don’t wish to share (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2001; Li 
et al., 2008; Khanna et al., 1998; Bresser, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Inkpen and Beamish, 
1997). Bresser (1988) points out differences between collective and competitive 
strategies in learning expectations. The author cautions against the potentially 
damaging, unintentional disclosure of information which may result from close 
relationships (Bresser, 1988). This concept of unintentional disclosure emphasizes the 
potential dark side effects of learning and absorptive capacity. Inkpen and Beamish 
(1997) declared that there is a dramatic need for more investigation of why joint 
ventures end prematurely even in cases of high absorptive capacity. The authors point 
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out that the acquisition of knowledge creates an imbalance of power which may, in the 
longer run, make the relationship obsolete (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Khanna, Gulati 
and Nohria (1998) describe different perspectives in the quest and investment for 
learning: private benefits (those that accrue to the focal firm) and common benefits 
(mutual benefits accruing to both firms). The authors state, conceptually, that the 
benefits to learning may be asymmetric even when the primary factors of the 
relationship (power, etc.) are relatively symmetric (Khanna et al., 1998).  
Kale, Singh and Perlmutter (2000) empirically test know-how leakage between 
firms in relationships. The authors point out that knowledge transfer is one of the main 
reasons that firms ally with one another (Kale et al., 2000). The authors tie in the 
concept of social capital, stating that when relational capital is combined with 
interaction and trust, the basis for know-how and knowledge transfer is highly probable 
and can prevent unintentional leakage of knowledge between the partners (Kale et al., 
2000). If firms behave opportunistically in their desire to win the learning race though, 
this may lead to the failure of gaining or maintaining competitive advantage, reduced 
performance for the relationship, as well as reduced potential for innovation (Li et al., 
2008).  
Thus, despite the seeming benevolence and benefit of learning from alliance 
partners, there is a dark side to learning in the relationship, too. A very strong learning 
goal may in reality be an effort to poach as much knowledge, learning and technology as 
possible and then quit the relationship to avoid the dependence which comes along with 
it (Hamel, 1991). Empirical study has shown that if an alliance partner could not learn 
from its partner as quickly as its partner could learn from them, the first party would 
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become dependent and inevitably redundant to the partner and the relationship; while 
the faster-learning partner would become more powerful (Hamel, 1991).  
Hamel (1991) points out in a grounded theory article that there may be vast 
differences in the absorptive capacity between partners and that the goal of partners 
developing close relationships may differ in terms of learning goals (Hamel, 1991). An 
interesting concept emerged in this study: the partnership as a race to internalize as 
much knowledge and information from the partner as possible (Hamel, 1991). The 
author also describes the close relationship between absorptive capacity and bargaining 
power; more specifically, the higher the level of comparative absorptive capacity, the 
higher the relative level of bargaining power (Hamel, 1991).  In relationships where 
learning is the intent and specific goal of one of the parties, the relationship may 
dissolve once the level of learning is deemed sufficient (Dyer et al., 2008; Hamel, 1991).  
The negative effects of learning become evident when companies attempt to 
prevent learning on the part of their partner. For example, managers are continually 
concerned about unintentional knowledge transfer, partner encroachment, and 
information poaching (Hamel, 1991). Some firms invest in information gatekeepers: 
employees who monitor and restrict the flow of knowledge between partners (Hamel, 
1991).  Though not stated explicitly in the literature, this information gatekeeping 
indicates a lack of trust, while the concept of firms gaining as much knowledge as they 
can and then quitting the relationship indicates a reduction in commitment. In the 
mature stage of the relationship life cycle, learning paths would be expected to be 
relatively established and stable. In cases of high RQ, which includes trust and 
commitment, Hamel’s (1991) race to learn, competitive learning environment is unlikely 
to exist  
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In summary, though learning and absorptive capacity has been seen as a valuable 
goal for close supply chain relationships (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kogut, 1988; 1991; 
Mowery et al., 1996; Poppo et al., 2008; Dyer et al., 2008; Hamel, 1991; Lavie, 2006; 
Teece and Pisano, 1994; Li et al., 2008), there are instances in which learning is 
opportunistic or so goal-driven as to impede the valuable development and performance 
of relationships (Hamel, 1991; Dyer et al., 2008). SET would suggest that learning would 
improve relationship financial performance and reduce the likelihood of termination 
(Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 
1958), particularly when combined with high levels of RQ (DeWulf et al., 2001; 
Palmatier et al., 2006; Nyaga and Whipple, 2011). Based upon this literature review, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H3a: The relationship between learning/ absorptive capacity and relationship financial 
performance is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of 
relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of 
relationship quality.  
 
H3b: The relationship between learning/ absorptive capacity and likelihood of 
termination is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a low level of 
relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a high level of 
relationship quality.  
2.4.4 Social capital 
 
Social capital is defined as the interpersonal relationships between individuals 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Burt, 1992; 
McFadyen and Cannella, 2004) and is unique from relationship specific investments in 
that relationship specific investments are investments in primarily tangible assets that 
are unique to a specific relationship (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999). Social capital refers 
to intangible social dimensions of relationships (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1990; Lin, 
2001; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Burt, 1992; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004). There 
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are three dimensions of social capital: structural, cognitive and relational (Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998). This dissertation focuses on the relational dimension of social capital, 
due to its appropriateness to the theoretical foundation (SET).  Relational social capital 
includes such perceptual variables as reciprocity, respect and friendship which are 
developed over a longer term relationship (Villena et al., 2011).  
Though theory (SET) and evidence suggests that social capital creates value for 
partners, researchers from both sociology and business strategy have cautioned against 
the dark side of social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Granovetter, 1985; Inkpen and 
Tsang, 2005; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).  Conceptual work has explicitly stated 
that firms that base their competitive advantage goals primarily on social capital will 
likely encounter extreme disadvantage (Lock et al., 1999). These personal networks are 
capable of creating very strong group identification and group norms, which limits the 
members’ openness to other groups, information, or views (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004). The results of the dark side of social capital 
include loss of flexibility in making business decisions (Gargiulo and Benassi, 1999) and 
ignoring new options in partners (Kern, 1998), thereby reducing the performance of 
both the firm and the partnering relationship (Villena et al., 2011).   
Villena Revilla and Choi (2011) have empirically confirmed the paradox 
surrounding social capital. Though social capital is often attributed with increasing 
trust, commitment and performance; it may also lead to opportunistic behavior, non-
optimal decision making or loss of objectivity (Granovetter, 1985; Grover, Lim, and 
Ayyagari, 2006; Locke et al., 1999; McFadyen and Cannella, 2004; Villena et al., 2011). 
In some circumstances, relational social capital even reduces performance (Villena et 
al., 2011).  
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Despite various benefits which are attributed to social capital, these benefits earn 
diminishing returns, according to empirical research, and have been shown to both 
improve and diminish performance measures (Villena et al., 2011). At a certain point, 
social capital becomes a disadvantage and may lead to foolish investments, poor 
decision making, and opportunism (Villena et al., 2011). Giller and Matear (2001) have 
reported that social capital allowed the relationship to deteriorate imperceptibly slowly, 
to the point of no repair.  Finally, several studies evaluating the positive effect on 
performance from social capital have not found a significant result (Gulati and Sytch, 
2007; Peterson et al., 2005; Swink et al., 2007; Villena et al., 2011).  
The mature position in the relationship life cycle would support the positive effect 
of social capital on the relationship performance, increasing the relationship 
performance, while reducing the probability of termination. Adding RQ as a moderator 
would accentuate the positive results, while reducing the probability of termination.  A 
curvilinear effect of social capital has been supported due to the point of diminishing 
returns it is proposed to experience (Villena et al., 2011). Because this curvilinear 
relationship has been found (Villena et al., 2011), the dark side of social capital has been 
supported (McFadyen and Cannella, 2004).  Based upon this literature review, the 
following hypotheses are proposed: 
H4a: The relationship between social capital and relationship financial performance is 
stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of relationship quality 
than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of relationship quality.  
 
H4b: The relationship between social capital and likelihood of termination is stronger 
for mature supply chain relationships with a low level of relationship quality than for 
mature supply chain relationships for a high level of relationship quality.  
2.4.6 Reciprocity 
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Reciprocity is one of the central tenets of SET.  Reciprocity describes the 
perception of increased benefit based on cooperation and the expectation of the same 
behavior from the partner, e.g. if I act in a cooperative way, you will, also (Poppo et al., 
2008; Gouldner, 1960).  When one partner understands it is in their best interest to act 
cooperatively, they often assume the other party is aware of this often unspoken 
agreement (Hill, 1990; Parkhe, 1993; Poppo et al., 2008). Reciprocity has long been 
proposed to create substantial performance benefits in supply chain relationships, and 
has been supported through theory (Social Exchange Theory) as well as empirical 
studies. Reciprocity, as a concept, refers to the social obligations arising from behaviors 
between individuals (Gouldner, 1960).  
 There are also negative results though from reciprocity. The dark side of 
reciprocity becomes apparent when considering its consumption of resources without a 
guarantee of return on investment (Hansen, 1999; Lechner et al., 2010). When 
reciprocity is strong, a feeling of obligation may become strong enough to diminish the 
importance of the original goals or effective actions (Gimeno and Woo, 1996; Uzzi, 1997; 
Lechner et al., 2010). Reciprocity has caught on in the Western world and has long been 
embedded in the Chinese culture as guanxi (Gu, Hung, and Tse, 2008). Guanxi was 
originally intended as a way for companies to help one another succeed and build trust 
(Gu et al., 2008), however, guanxi has been shown to also have a dark side with 
unintended consequences including ignorance of true market conditions (Gu et al., 
2008), failure of network relationships (Uzzi, 1997), and even excessive debt 
accumulation  (Vanhonacker, 2004). This blindness to the market can affect a firm’s 
performance and survival (Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999; Gu et al., 2008). The dark 
side of guanxi has been empirically supported particularly in industries with high 
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competition and rates of technological change (Moorman and Slotegraaf, 1999; Gu et al., 
2008).  Due to the levels of trust and commitment, reciprocity would be an expected 
factor during the mature phase of the relationship life cycle. The diminishing returns of 
reciprocity as described in the initial theoretical literature (Homans, 1958) support the 
potential dark side effect.    
Numerous studies have touted the performance benefits of reciprocity, often 
supported by SET (Gu et al., 2008; Thomas, Esper and Stank, 2010). However, other 
studies have contradicted those findings supporting the dark side of reciprocity 
(Vanhonacker, 2004; Uzzi, 1997; Gu et al., 2008; Hansen, 1999; Lechner et al., 2010). 
SET, in its current conceptualization, would predict that reciprocity would have a 
positive effect on relationship performance and a negative effect on likelihood of 
termination (Homans, 1958). However, revisiting the original conceptualizations of the 
theory would suggest there is a point of diminishing returns for reciprocity on the 
dependent variables.  Therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H5a: The relationship between reciprocity and relationship financial performance is 
stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of relationship quality 
than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of relationship quality.  
 
H5b: The relationship between reciprocity and likelihood of termination is stronger for 
mature supply chain relationships with a low level of relationship quality than for 
mature supply chain relationships for a high level of relationship quality.  
2.6 Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, this study will test the boundary conditions of the current 
conceptualization of SET, through an overarching lens of Political Economy Framework 
literature. See Figure 2 for the full measurement model.  Based on the literature review, 
this analysis will evaluate the following exogenous variables: relationship specific 
investment, long term relationships and long term relationship orientation, learning 
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and absorptive capacity, social capital, and reciprocity. The response set will be framed 
using the mature phase in the relationship life cycle. The moderator of interest in this 
study is relationship quality. 
Figure 2: Measurement model 
 
 
 
 
 
3.0 Methodology  
 
This chapter will discuss the methodology which will be used to analyze the data 
collected for this study. This study will first discuss the target respondents and sample 
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details, and then will provide a description of the survey setup. Next, a description of all 
the measurement scales will be described including both independent and dependent 
variables.  Then there is a description of pre-test procedures, distribution and analysis 
method.  
The methodology to test the hypotheses for this study is a quantitative survey. 
The most common purpose of survey research is to generalize from a sample to a 
population (Creswell, 2009; Babbie, 1990). For this study, a survey is an appropriate 
methodology due to the intent of testing theoretical boundary conditions, the low cost of 
administration, and the quick data collection (Creswell, 2009; Babbie, 1990; Fowler, 
2002). Surveys, like every methodology, have both strengths and weaknesses (Creswell, 
2009). The strengths of surveys include its simple, easy and cost-effective distribution, 
while its weaknesses are typically considered to be its lack of precision and depth 
(Creswell, 2009). The survey will be cross-sectional, self-administered questionnaires 
(Creswell, 2009; Fink, 2002), and administered online via Qualtrics (Creswell, 2009; 
Nesbary, 2000; Sue and Ritter, 2007).  
 The survey distribution will be electronic and will include a blog post invitation 
on “The Logistics of Logistics” blog, owned by Mr. Joe Lynch, with the offer of a 
professional report published for the blog readers in return for their participation. The 
survey will include demographic and perceptual items with scales adapted from existing 
management, marketing and supply chain research as described later in this chapter.  
3.1.0 Target respondents 
 
 The target population includes mid- and upper-level management involved in 
supply chain relationships. Though the ideal sample would be one drawn at random 
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from the population, this study will utilize a convenience sample drawn from a 
professional logistics and supply chain management blog. It is difficult to locate samples 
which are not over-surveyed, and the author has had excellent results focusing on 
professional blog readership by offering, in return for participation, an original, a 
summary practitioner report published exclusively on the blog once the survey is 
complete. Though the nonprobability sample, or convenience sample, reduces the 
generalizability of the results (Creswell, 2009; Babbie, 1990), the purpose of using the 
nonprobability is to increase the response rate. In the interest of achieving excellent 
response rates, this study will utilize this nonprobability sample.  
 Because this study includes investigating human subjects, IRB approval will be 
sought. The researcher’s CITI training and credentials are up-to-date.  
3.1.1 Survey setup 
 
 The survey respondents will be instructed to consider a business relationship 
they are involved in which is in the mature phase of the life cycle; the definition will be 
provided. The respondents will then be asked an open-ended question asking them to 
briefly describe the relationship, as a check on understanding the type of relationship 
that is being studied. Then, the survey items will be asked.  
 
The following table shows the text that will be included in the instructions for the survey 
based on the description of the mature position of the relationship life cycle by Jap and 
Anderson (2007):  
Table 4: Survey instructions text 
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Thank you so much for clicking on the link for the business relationship survey! This 
survey is specifically studying mature business relationships. Mature business 
relationships are typically mutually-dependent relationships that often have 
relationship-specific investments and a willingness to take risks for mutual benefit. This 
mature relationship is often an older relationship with a history of satisfactory 
interaction. While answering all the following questions, please think of an existing 
business relationship that is a mature relationship and has many of the above criteria.  
 
 
The full survey instrument can be seen in Appendix A and information about the 
measurement scale items are in Table 5.   
3.2 Measurement scales 
 
The measurement scales are all adapted from established, tested scale items as 
described in Table 5 for each variable and will all be tested on a 5-point Likert scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
3.2.1 Dependent variables—Relationship continuity/ termination  
 
This study will adapt Johnson’s (1999) four scale items for relationship 
continuity, which have an alpha of 0.74. The four survey items within the relationship 
continuity/ termination include items such as “We expect the relationship with this 
partner to last a long time,” and “Our firm has been successful in getting this partner to 
commit to long term cooperation” (Johnson, 1999).  The scale was adapted by 
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substituting the word ‘partner’ for the word ‘supplier’ because the survey respondents 
may be a buyer or supplier for their partner of focus.  
3.2.2 Dependent variable—Perceptions of relationship financial performance 
 
This study will adapt Duffy’s (2008) nine scale items for perceptions of 
relationship financial performance, with an alpha of 0.84. Perceptions of relationship 
financial performance includes nine perceptual survey items such as “We see a lot of 
future growth potential with this partner,” and “Investments of time and money in this 
partner have been worthwhile,” which is reverse-coded (Duffy, 2008). The scale was 
adapted by substituting the word ‘partner’ for the word ‘customer’ because the survey 
respondents may be a customer or supplier for their partner of focus. 
3.2.3 Independent variable--- Social capital (relational)  
 
This study will adapt Villena et al’s (2011) five scale items for relational social 
capital, which have an alpha of 0.81. Social capital will be measured using five scale 
items such as “Please indicate to which the relationship between your company and this 
partner is characterized by … a close personal interaction between the partners,” and 
“…mutual trust between the partners” (Villena et al., 2011). The scale was adapted by 
substituting the word ‘partner’ for the word ‘supplier’ because the survey respondents 
may be a buyer or supplier for their partner of focus. 
 
3.2.4 Independent variable—Long term orientation  
 
This study will adapt Ganesan’s (1994) seven scale items for long term 
orientation, with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.94 (Ganesan, 1994). An example of the long-
term orientation items include “We believe that over the long run our relationship with 
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this partner will be profitable,” and “We expect this partner to be working with us for a 
long time” (Ganesan, 1994). The scale was adapted by substituting the word ‘partner’ for 
the word ‘resource’ to clarify the position of the survey respondents. 
3.2.5 Independent variable—Relationship-specific investment  
 
 Relationship-specific investment items will be adapted from Nyaga and 
Whipple’s (2011) three items, with an alpha of 0.76. The items include “We have 
invested substantially in personnel dedicated to this relationship,” and “We have 
dedicated significant investments to this relationship” (Nyaga and Whipple, 2011).  
3.2.6 Independent variable—Learning and absorptive capacity 
 
This study will adapt Schoenherr et al’s (2014) six scale items for learning and 
absorptive capacity, with an alpha of 0.71. Learning and absorptive capacity will include 
items such as “Working with my supply chain partner, we have developed processes for 
… acquiring knowledge about new products and services within our industry” and 
“…generating new knowledge from existing knowledge” (Schoenherr, Griffith and 
Chandra, 2014). The scale was adapted by substituting the word ‘partner’ for the word 
‘supplier’ because the survey respondents may be a buyer or supplier for their partner of 
focus. 
 
3.2.7 Independent variable—Reciprocity 
 
This study will adapt Chan and Li’s (2010) four scale items for reciprocity, with 
an alpha of 0.86. These items include “When my partner needs my help, I am willing to 
assist them, even if it may cost me time and effort,” and “When I ask my partner for 
help, I think my partner will help me” (Chan and Li, 2010). The scale was adapted by 
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substituting the word ‘partner’ for the word ‘supplier’ because the survey respondents 
may be a buyer or supplier for their partner of focus. 
3.2.8 Moderator—Relationship quality 
 
 Relationship quality is a second order latent construct composed of trust, 
commitment and relationship satisfaction, and it is tested as a second order latent 
construct. This study will use Kumar et al’s (1995), Anderson and Weitz’s (1992) and 
Crosby et al’s (1990) scale items for trust, commitment, and relationship satisfaction, 
respectively. The five measurement items for trust are adapted from Kumar et al’s 
(1995), which has an alpha of 0.91.  Examples of the trust scale includes  “When making 
important decisions, the partner is concerned about our welfare” and “We are convinced 
that this partner performs its tasks professionally” (Fang, Chang and Peng, 2011). The 
scale was adapted by substituting the word ‘partner’ for the phrase ‘buyer/supplier’ to 
encourage the survey respondents to remain consistent with their responses. 
The commitment scale items are adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992) five 
items with an alpha of 0.85. Examples of the commitment scale include items such as 
“We are patient with this supplier/ customer when they make mistakes that cause us 
trouble” and “We are not continually on the lookout for another product to add to or 
replace this partner for this product type/ for another customer to replace or to add in 
this partner’s territory” (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). The scale was adapted by 
substituting the word ‘partner’ for the word ‘supplier’ because the survey respondents 
may be a buyer or supplier for their partner of focus. 
This study will adapt Nyaga and Whipple’s (2011) four relationship satisfaction 
items, which have a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.90. The items include items such as “My firm 
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is satisfied with this partner in terms of coordination of activities,” and “My firm is 
satisfied with this partner in terms of management of activities” (Nyaga and Whipple, 
2011). The scale was adapted by substituting the word ‘partner’ for the word 
‘relationship” because the survey respondents may be a buyer or supplier for their 
partner of focus. 
3.3 Pretest 
   
A pretest with ten logistics and supply chain managers will be conducted to 
assure the readability, face validity, understandability and ease of completion of the 
survey. This pretest will be conducted with academic subject matter experts in supply 
chain relationships and experienced managers who have experience in dealing with 
supply chain relationships. This pretest is important to improve the format of the survey 
and the wording of the scale items (Creswell, 2009). The pretest may result in additional 
adaptation of the survey items.  
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Table 5: Measurement items 
Construct Citation Alpha Item Tested in 
hypothesis: 
Relationship 
termination, 7-
point Likert 
scale 
Johnson (1999) JAMS 0.74 We expect the relationship with this 
partner to last a long time. (R) 
All 
It is likely that our relationship with this 
partner will be terminated within the next 
2 years. 
Our firm has been successful in getting this 
partner to commit to long term 
cooperation. (R) 
This partner is hesitant to come to any 
long term agreements. 
Perceptions of 
relationship 
financial 
performance, 
scale not 
reported 
Duffy (2008) IMM 0.84 We see a lot of future growth potential 
with this partner. 
All 
The amount of business we have with this 
partner is growing. 
The future viability of this relationship 
does not look good. [R]  
Investments of time and money in this 
partner have been worthwhile. 
Investments we have made in this 
relationship have made our business 
operations more cost effective and 
efficient. 
Returns we have made from this 
relationship have enabled us to reinvest 
and expand our business with this 
customer. 
The cost of servicing this partner is low 
given the amount of business it generates. 
We have been required to make 
investments in this relationship that have 
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cost us a lot of money but offer little 
benefit to our own operations. [R] 
We are satisfied with the level of profits we 
achieve with this partner.  
 
Social Capital, 5-
point Likert 
scale 
Villena, Revilla, and Choi 
(2011) JOM 
0.81 Please indicate the extent to which the 
relationship between your company and 
this supplier is characterized by:  
H4a, H4b 
     A close personal interaction between the  
     partners. 
     Mutual respect between the partners. 
     Mutual trust between the partners. 
     Personal friendship between the 
     partners. 
     Reciprocity between the partners.  
Long term 
orientation, 7-
point Likert 
scale 
Ganesan (1994) JM 0.94 We believe that over the long run our 
relationship with this partner will be 
profitable. 
H2a, H2b 
Maintaining a long term relationship with 
this partner is important to us. 
We focus on long term goals in this 
relationship. 
We are willing to make sacrifices to help 
this partner from time to time.  
We are only concerned with our outcomes 
in this relationship. [R] 
We expect this partner to be working with 
us for a long time. 
Any concessions we make to help out this 
partner will even out in the long run. 
Relationship 
specific 
investment, 7-
point Likert 
Nyaga and Whipple (2011) JBL 0.76 We have invested substantially in 
personnel dedicated to this relationship. 
H1a, H1b 
We have provided proprietary expertise 
and/ or technology to this relationship. 
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scale We have dedicated significant investments 
(e.g. equipment or support systems) to this 
relationship. 
Learning/ 
absorptive 
capacity, 7-point 
Likert scale 
Schoenherr, Griffith, and 
Chandra (2014) JBL 
0.892 Working with this specific partner, we 
have developed processes for  
H3a, H3b 
     Protecting knowledge from 
     inappropriate use outside the  
     organization. 
     Encouraging the protection of  
     knowledge. 
     Restricting access to some sources of  
     knowledge.  
     Acquiring knowledge about new  
     products or services within our 
industry.  
     Generating new knowledge from 
existing 
     knowledge.  
     Collaborating. 
Relationship 
Quality  
Composed of trust, commitment and relationship satisfaction.  
Trust, 
5-point Likert 
scale 
Kumar et al. (1995) JMR 0.91 When making important decisions, this 
partner is concerned about our welfare.  
All 
We can rely on this partner handling 
critical information on our company 
confidentially. 
When we have an important requirement, 
we can depend on this partner’s support. 
We are convinced that this partner 
performs its tasks professionally. 
We can count on this partner’s promises 
made to our firm.  
Commitment, 7- Anderson and Weitz (1992) 0.85 We are patient with this partner when they All 
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point Likert 
scale 
JMR make mistakes that cause us trouble. 
We are willing to dedicate whatever people 
and resources it takes to grow sales for this 
partner. 
We are quite willing to make long-term 
investments in this partner. 
We are not continually on the lookout for 
another partner to replace this partner.  
Satisfaction, 7-
point Likert 
scale 
Nyaga and Whipple (2011) JBL 0.90 My firm is satisfied with this partner in 
terms of: 
All 
     Coordination of activities. 
     Level of commitment. 
     Level of information sharing. 
     Management of activities. 
Reciprocity, 5-
point Likert 
scale 
Chan and Li (2010) JBR 0.86 I am willing to help and share information 
with my partner when they need it. 
H5a, H5b 
When my partner needs my help, I am 
willing to assist them even if it may cost 
me time and effort. 
When I ask this partner for help, I think 
they will help me. 
Even if this partner, who I have helped 
may not help me in return, I believe they 
will in the future.  
Statistical  
Process Controls 
(Marker), 5-
point Likert 
scale 
Shah and Ward (2007) JOM NR At my company, we make extensive use of 
statistical techniques to reduce variance in 
our business volume. 
Marker 
Note: All items are measured on a five item Likert scale (Strongly disagree to strongly agree) 
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3.4 Survey distribution 
 
 The data collection for this study is via an online- survey approach. The online 
survey will be developed and distributed in English using Qualtrics. The researcher will 
start by using a systematic random sample of 1,800 email addresses from a logistics and 
supply chain management professional blog.  The total blog subscribership is 
approximately 3,600. Selecting 1,800 email addresses using a systematic random 
sample (every other email address), gives a relatively large pool from which to draw 
responses. The blog simply serves as a method to reach an adequate and related sample 
of respondents, just as other researchers have done by sending invitations to a list of 
organization membership (e.g. CSCMP). In this blog invitation, the author will request 
participation and will offer, in return, an executive summary of the survey results to 
motivate participation.  See Table 5 for the invitation text. This method has yielded 
excellent results in a previous study of a similar group by the researcher. The researcher 
expects the required sample size to respond within six weeks or initiation of the survey.  
Table 6: Blog invitation to survey 
Dear Logistics of Logistics blog readers,  
I appreciate all your interest and participation in my and Joe’s last study on power in 
negotiations! Joe and I have recently discussed conducting an additional study about 
causes of good business relationships going bad. We’ve created a survey that I hope will 
be of great interest to you! Once the data is collected, I will publish a professional 
summary of the paper on the Logistics of Logistics that I hope will be very helpful and 
informative for you in your everyday work! Thank you so very much for your help and 
interest! 
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If you are interested in taking this fifteen-minute survey, please click on this link: 
{Link} 
Warmly, 
Heather and Joe 
 
3.5 Analysis method 
 
This study will be analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM). SEM 
methods allow us to test a big picture model. One of the significant advantages of SEM is 
the ability to include latent variables in a complex model (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). 
These latent variables may be made of many indicators which are each considered either 
a reflection or dimension of that latent variable (Haenlein and Kaplan, 2004; Bagozzi 
and Yi, 1989; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). First generation statistical methods, that is, 
simple regressions cannot adequately interpret or address complex models or latent 
variables (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). Instead, SEM runs many regression equations 
simultaneously and does so in an interdependent manner, taking each regression into 
account when solving each other regression (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). Therefore, the 
effects of all variables are considered codependently of one another (Lowry and Gaskin, 
2014).  
Because this study is testing the boundary conditions of an existing theory, SET, 
covariance-based structural equation modeling (CB-SEM) may not be the most 
appropriate technique for analysis (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). CB-SEM is well-suited for 
testing established and empirically supporting theoretical models (Fornell and 
Bookstein, 1982; Mulaik, 1976; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). However, when testing less 
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well-established models, CB-SEM will accept and well-fit several different, though 
statistically equivalent models, and are subject therefore, to over-fitting (Lowry and 
Gaskin, 2014).  
The full model will be evaluated using Partial Least Squares (PLS) Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis using WarpPLS 4.0 (Kock, 2013).  PLS has become a 
popular method of analysis in management-related research (Bergman et al., 2012). 
PLS-SEM is a mathematically iterative approach which maximizes the explained 
variance of the dependent variables, or latent constructs (Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 
2011). This predictive method is solved one latent variable block at a time before 
estimating the overall structural path before moving on (Peng and Lai, 2012). PLS-SEM 
also allows rigorous mathematical analysis with a smaller sample size than covariance-
based SEM methodologies (Chin, 1998; Peng and Lai 2012; Sosik et al., 2009; Hair et 
al,. 2011).   
WarpPLS is a powerful software which runs PLS and is capable, unlike other PLS 
software, to estimate nonlinear relationships among the latent variables (Kock, 2013).  
Though this study is not hypothesizing non-linear or curvilinear relationships between 
dark side variables and likelihood of relationship termination and relationship 
performance, because some other studies have found curvilinear relationships between 
similar variable sets, WarpPLS will allow the data to be analyzed most accurately.  
 The minimum required sample size to run PLS-SEM is commonly considered to 
be the number required to run the estimates for one latent variable block at a time and 
can be estimated using one of two rules of thumb: 1) ten times the number of manifest 
variables on the latent variable with the highest number of manifest indicators, or 2) ten 
times the number of latent variables with a path to the dependent latent variable (Peng 
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and Lai, 2012). However, there has been some criticism of this sample size rule of 
thumb (Marcoulides, Chin, and Saunders, 2009; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014).  Even 
though PLS will often run with low sample sizes, where CB-SEM will not, the resulting 
estimates in PLS may be unstable and do not exhibit acceptable levels of power 
(Goodhue, Lewis and Thompson, 2006; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). According to Chin 
and Newsted (1999), to be the most accurate in a PLS estimation, the effect size and 
power tables must be used to determine the most appropriate sample size (Lowry and 
Gaskin, 2014; Marcoulides and Saunders, 2006).  
The largest number of manifest variables in the model (9) belongs to the 
endogenous variable: relationship financial performance, indicating that by the above 
rule of thumb, a sample size of 90 is sufficient to run a rigorous PLS-SEM analysis.  
However, according to previous studies, for the most rigorous PLS study, a power 
analysis must be conducted. According to Cohen (1992), if the maximum number of 
paths from manifest variables to their latent variable is 9, the sample size 
recommendations for a significance level of 5% is n=88 to detect R squared values of 
0.25 and above, to achieve statistical power of 80%. If detecting R2 levels of 0.10 is 
desired, the recommended sample size increases to 181 to attain statistical power of 80% 
(Hair et al., 2014; Cohen, 1992). Because this study is looking for standardized paths 
above 0.20 for meaningful predictive power (Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted, 2003), the 
goal is for a sample size just above n=88 (Hair, Hult, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2014; Cohen, 
1992).  
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Table 7: Power analysis 
Significance 
level= 0.05 
Minimum R-squared 
Highest 
number of 
manifest 
variables 
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 
9 181 88 57 46 
Adapted from Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt, 2014; Cohen, 1992. 
3.5.1 Data quality 
 
Once data has been collected, we will report the numbers of respondents and 
non-respondents in a table, as well as the data descriptives including means, standard 
deviations and ranges of all independent and dependent variables. The randomness of 
missing values will be evaluated and outliers will be discarded (Bergman et al., 2012). 
3.5.2 Nonresponse bias 
 
 Nonresponse bias will then be evaluated. Nonresponse bias is an ongoing and 
common problem (Cycyota and Harrison, 2002) that is considered a worse problem in 
online surveys than other survey distribution techniques (Couper, 2000; Grancolas, 
Rettie and Marusenko, 2003). A time-trend extrapolation test will be conducted 
comparing early and late respondents on both demographic variables and constructs to 
evaluate any systematic differences (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). This will be 
accomplished using a two-tailed t-test, with p> 0.05 (Bergman et al., 2012).  
3.5.3 Common method bias 
 
Next, common method bias will be evaluated. Common method bias is a bias 
which may occur in data sets due to factors outside the measures in the study (Lowry 
and Gaskin, 2014). More specifically, common method variance is a characteristic of 
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cross-sectional studies in which often the attitude and behaviors are asked about at the 
same time in the same survey, which may create an unrealistically high correlation 
between the two variables thereby confounding the results and interpretation (Lindell 
and Whitney, 2001). Using one method for collecting data, such as an online survey may 
introduce a common method bias which may alter responses systematically (Gaskin, 
2013). There are two commonly accepted methods of evaluating possible common 
method bias: Harman’s one factor test and the marker variable.  This study will use 
Harman’s one factor test. Harman’s one factor test (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) will be 
used by conducting an exploratory factor analysis and constraining the number of 
factors in the EFA to one (Gaskin, 2013). If common method bias is an issue, that single 
factor will account for a large amount of variance in the overall model (Gaskin, 2013).  
A second test of common method bias is to include a marker variable in the 
survey instrument which is theoretically unrelated to the constructs of the study (Lowry 
and Gaskin, 2014; Lindell and Whitney, 2001). The marker variable is then correlated to 
the data; if correlations are higher than expected, then the common method bias may be 
present (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014).  The best way to address this problem using the 
marker variable is to include a theoretically unrelated variable in the questionnaire to 
justify the a priori zero correlation between this marker variables and the other study 
variables (Lindell and Whitney, 2001). According to Williams, Hartman and Cavazotte 
(2010), many published studies have used single-item Likert-scale marker variables 
(e.g. Waldman, Javidan and Varella, 2004; Johnson and Hall, 2005; Arnold and Spell, 
2006). The marker variable that will be used in the study is part of a survey designed for 
studying lean production methods, specifically statistical process control and is adapted 
from Shah and Ward (2007).  The marker variable is: 
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At my company, we make extensive use of statistical techniques to reduce  
variance in our business volume. 
3.5.4 Reliability 
 
 Even though the measures used in the study are all existing measures with 
acceptable reliabilities, this study will still evaluate the measure reliability. When the 
survey scale or instrument is altered, it is essential to reestablish the reliability 
concurrently with data analysis (Creswell, 2009).  Reliability will be evaluated using 
both Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (Nunnally, 1978). For best results, 
reliability should be above the 0.7 threshold (Nunnally, 1978).  
3.5.5 Validity—Discriminant validity 
 
Next, discriminant validity will be checked using two accepted methods. First, we 
will check that the average variance extracted (AVE) does not exceed the squared inter-
construct correlations between latent constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Next, all 
cross loadings will be evaluated to confirm that each indicator or manifest variable loads 
higher on its own latent variable than any other latent variable (Bergman et al., 2012).  
It is possible that multicollinearity may be present with some of the variable 
scales. For example, the scale items for long-term orientation and the commitment 
scales within RQ are quite similar. For this reason, three separate dimensions of RQ 
were included in the case of multicollinearity and multicollinearity tests will be 
conducted.   
According to Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson (2010), multicollinearity is not a 
problem of the model specification, but a somewhat common problem with the data. 
Detection of multicollinearity can be done in three ways. First, and simplest, evaluation 
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of the correlation matrix for all independent variables (Hair et al., 2010). If correlations 
exist above .90, then substantial collinearity is present (Hair et al., 2010). The other two 
tests which will be conducted to evaluate the presence of multicollinearity is the 
calculation of tolerance and the variance inflation factor (VIF) (Hair et al., 2010). 
Tolerance is the measure of variability in the independent variable which is not 
explained by the other independent variables and VIF is the inverse of tolerance (Hair et 
al., 2010).  
3.5.6 Validity—Convergent validity 
 
Convergent validity is the condition upon which items that are indicators for a 
latent construct share a proportion of variance with one another (Hair et al., 2010). This 
study will establish convergent validity by confirming that the manifest variables loaded 
with significant t-values on their latent variables (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014).  Then, the 
outer model loadings will be evaluated to confirm the manifest variables are significant 
at the 0.05 level (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). If both these conditions are satisfied at the 
0.05 level, strong convergent validity is established (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014).  
3.6 Demographics and control variables 
 
 In order to perform a robust analysis, this study will include control variables in 
the analysis (Villena et al., 2011), both about the firm and the demographics of the 
individual respondents. Demographic questions for the respondents will include age, 
duration at the current position, and job title (Modi and Mabert, 2007). Firm level 
control variables will include individual firm financial performance (measured as 
approximate value of annual net sales) (Tokman, Richey, Marino and Weaver, 2007; 
Modi and Mabert, 2007), firm size (measured by number of employees) (Gulati, 1983; 
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Tokman, Richey, Marino and Weaver, 2007; Modi and Mabert, 2007), relationship 
criticality (measured by the percent of business satisfied by the particular relationship in 
question) (Modi and Mabert, 2007), and industry (Modi and Mabert, 2007). Analysis 
will be made during data analysis for potential differences in groups based on control 
variables. Initially, correlation tables will be created to determine which control 
variables require further evaluation. The impact of the control variables on the model 
will be tested by including the control variables in the full model and evaluating the 
paths for significance.  
3.7 Test the predictive power of the model 
 
 To assess the predictive power of the PLS model, there must be both high R2 and 
significant and substantial paths between variables (Chin, 1998; Lowry and Gaskin, 
2014). The rule of thumb when determining substantial paths, 0.30 or higher shows that 
the model has significant, substantial predictive power (Chin, Marcolin, and Newsted, 
2003; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). There are times, however, when even lower interaction 
terms, if significant, are still important to the model and may be retained (Chin et al., 
2003; Lowry and Gaskin, 2014).  
3.8 Hypotheses testing 
 
 The hypotheses will be tested in a structural equation model, designed as 
pictured in the structural model in Chapter 2. This structural model has been specified 
using theory and literature. The measurement model was defined using the structural 
model along with existing measurement scale items. The continuous moderation effect 
of RQ will be tested for its effect to evaluate alteration in strength of direction of the 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables (Hair, Hult, Ringle and 
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Sarstedt, 2014). The moderator is a higher-order construct which requires testing of two 
layers of constructs (Hair et al., 2014). This involves testing the contribution of the 
lower order constructs on the higher order construct to create a more parsimonious 
variable (Hair et al., 2014). The moderation testing is simple to set up in the software as 
a higher order latent construct with a direct moderating path to the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables.  
First, the variables will be attached to the theoretical constructs and the data will 
be imported into the program. Next, the PLS algorithm will be performed.  Then, the 
final statistics will be calculated and reported, and their interpretation will be discussed. 
This will include the measurement model statistics, a summary of the path coefficients 
and their significance levels (Lowry and Gaskin, 2014). This comprehensive evaluation 
of the statistical results will include indicator reliability (goal of standardized indicators 
above 0.70), R2 levels, the effect size to evaluate weak, moderate, or strong effects, path 
coefficient estimates with significance and predictive relevance (Q2, also evaluated for 
weak, moderate and strong predictive relevance) (Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt, 2013). 
Finally, complementary PLS analyses will be conducted including the evaluation of the 
effect of the moderator and the control variables (Hair et al., 2013).  
The research results will be compared to the original research questions, and 
then to the specific hypotheses under study. The discussion will address why these 
results may have occurred and relate those results back to the theory and the 
foundational literature.  
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4.0 Results 
 
4.1 Pretest feedback and Sample Size 
 
From the initial survey review of 12 professionals and academics, it was 
concluded that the measurement items were easy to understand and the questions were 
well-written, but the instructions were poorly placed and unclear. Because the initial 
instructions were determined to be somewhat unclear, a second set of instructions was 
added after the IRB informed consent sections on the survey instrument. See Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Additional Instructions for Survey 
     As you are reading the survey questions, please keep in mind a specific business 
that your company has worked with. This should be a relationship that you are and 
have been closely involved with and that you would consider a mature business 
relationship.  
 
Please recall that mature business relationships are typically mutually-dependent 
relationships that often have relationship-specific investments and a willingness to 
take risks for mutual benefit. This mature relationship is often an older relationship 
with a history of satisfactory interaction.  
 
 As was established in Chapter 3, the minimum sample size to achieve adequate 
statistical power in the study was n=181 to detect R2  as low as 0.10. The invitation was 
sent to 1,800 email addresses from the blog readership of The Logistics of Logistics. 
There were 305 initial responses. First, surveys which were unfinished were deleted (n= 
77), leaving 228 finished surveys. Next, the respondents who answered “No” to Question 
15 were removed (n=2), leaving a remaining n=226. Question 15 was: “Would you 
characterize this specific relationship as a mature relationship?” Finally, listwise 
deletion was used to eliminate any respondents who left any question blank (n=35), 
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leaving a remaining n=191. This final sample size of 191 is adequate to detect R2 as low 
as 0.10 (Chin, 1989).  
The data set was tested in its entirety, as WarpPLS path coefficient calculation 
allows interpretation of the path coefficients as if they are the path coefficients of linear 
regressions (Kock, 2014). Therefore, there is no need to split the data set into high or 
low conditions of the moderator.  
4.2 Data quality 
4.2.1 Data descriptives and demographics 
 
The final sample size was gathered in two waves: the first wave responded to the 
initial invitation, and the second wave responded after the second invitation was sent 
approximately four weeks later. The first wave of respondents received the following 
invitation:  
Figure 4: First Wave Invitation 
Dear Logistics of Logistics blog readers,  
I appreciate all your interest and participation in my and Joe’s last study on power in 
negotiations! Joe and I have recently discussed conducting an additional study about 
causes of good business relationships going bad. We’ve created a survey that I hope 
will be of great interest to you! Once the data is collected, I will publish a professional 
summary of the paper on the Logistics of Logistics that I hope will be very helpful and 
informative for you in your everyday work! Thank you so very much for your help and 
interest! 
If you are interested in taking this fifteen-minute survey, please click on this link: 
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{Link} 
Warmly, 
Heather and Joe 
  
The second wave invitation was as follows (differences are bolded): 
Figure 5: Second Wave Invitation 
Dear Logistics of Logistics blog readers,  
Joe and I would like to follow up on a recent invitation we sent to you requesting 
participation in a very interesting study! We’ve created a survey that I hope will be of 
great interest to you! Once the data is collected, I will publish a professional summary 
of the paper on the Logistics of Logistics that I hope will be very helpful and 
informative for you in your everyday work! Thank you so very much for your help and 
interest! 
If you are interested in taking this fifteen-minute survey, please click on this link: 
{Link} 
Warmly, 
Heather and Joe 
 
The number of respondents for each wave is n=79 for the first wave invitation and 112 
for the second wave invitation.  
Table 8: N for Each Wave 
 First Wave Second 
Wave 
N 79 112 
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As illustrated in the following tables, the majority of the respondents were 
supervisors/managers (69.6%) who have been in the position for at least a year (97%) 
for the same firm (98%).  There was a diversity of industries and firm sizes in terms of 
revenue and number of employees represented in the sample.  Below are the 
descriptives for the respondents.  
Table 9: Demographics of Respondents 
 
Q10: Please choose your general job title from the following list. 
Code Answer Frequency % 
1/ 2 Supervisor/ Manager 132 69.6% 
3 Front-line employee 43 22.5% 
4 Vice President 2 1% 
5 Director 13 6.8% 
6 C-suite 0 0% 
Q11: How long have you held this position? 
Code Answer Frequency % 
1 Less than one year 4 2.1% 
2 Between one and five years 102 53.4% 
3 Between five and ten years 62 32.5% 
4 Between ten and fifteen years 13 6.8% 
5 More than fifteen years 10 5.2% 
Q21: In what industry category would this partner belong in? 
Code Answer Frequency % 
1 Manufacturing 35 18.3% 
2 Logistics 17 8.9% 
3 Retail 28 14.7% 
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4 Information technology 44 23% 
5 Marketing 10 5.2% 
6 Hospitality 14 7.3% 
Q24: How long have you been with this company? 
Code Answer Frequency % 
1 Less than one year 4 2.1% 
2 Between one and five years 73 38.2% 
3 Between five and ten years 78 40.8% 
4 Between ten and fifteen years 27 14.1% 
5 More than fifteen years 9 4.7% 
Q12: Please choose the approximate annual revenue of your company. 
Code Answer Frequency % 
1 Less than $100,000 15 7.9% 
2 Between $100,000 and $500,000 32 16.8% 
3 Between $500,000 and 
$1,000,000 
39 
20.4% 
4 Between $1,000,000 and 
$2,000,000 
30 
15.7% 
5 Above $2,000,000 75 39.3% 
Q13: Please choose the number of employees in your company. 
Code Answer Frequency % 
1 Less than 50 52 27.2% 
2 Between 50 and 100 34 17.8% 
3 Between 100 and 200 26 13.6% 
4 Between 200 and 500 26 13.6% 
5 More than 500 53 27.7% 
Q14: In what industry category does your company operate? 
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Code Answer Frequency % 
1 Manufacturing 30 15.7% 
2 Logistics 21 11% 
3 Retail 44 23% 
4 Information technology 43 22.5% 
5 Marketing 12 6.3% 
6 Hospitality 21 11% 
7 Research/ development 20 10.5% 
 
4.2.3 Outlier  and normality analysis 
 
There were no outliers present, based upon visual inspection of box and whisker 
plots. Skew and kurtosis were calculated to check for normality, though, normality is not 
a required distribution assumption for partial least squares (PLS) (Hair et al., 2014). 
The thresholds used in this study are skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 7 to satisfy 
assumptions of normality (Curran, West and Finch, 1996). A single item does not show 
normality: Q_15. This question was “Would you characterize this specific relationship as 
a mature relationship?” The dichotomous yes/ no answer is sharply skewed to “Yes” as 
would be expected based on the survey instructions to answer the questions in the 
survey with a mature business relationship in mind. However, the respondents 
answering “No” to Question 15 were eliminated during the data cleansing process. 
Therefore, the non-normality of this item does not affect the analysis of the data.  
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Table 10: Normality Testing for Manifest Variables 
Construct Item Skewness Below 
threshold? 
Kurtosis Below threshold? 
   Q16  -0.803 Yes 1.615 Yes 
  Q15  10.625 No 111.901 No 
Relational 
Social Capital 
 Q2_1  -1.028 Yes 1.428 Yes 
 Q2_2  -1.194 Yes 1.669 Yes 
 Q2_3  -1.091 Yes 1.279 Yes 
 Q2_4  -0.435 Yes -0.258 Yes 
 Q2_5  -0.971 Yes 1.845 Yes 
Long term 
orientation 
 Q3_1  -0.923 Yes 1.531 Yes 
 Q3_2  -1.44 Yes 2.433 Yes 
 Q3_3  -1.195 Yes 1.923 Yes 
 Q3_4  -0.723 Yes 1.047 Yes 
 Q3_5  -0.547 Yes -0.549 Yes 
 Q3_6  -1.267 Yes 3.472 Yes 
 Q3_7  -0.553 Yes 0.891 Yes 
Relationship 
specific 
investment 
 Q4_1  -0.981 Yes 1.509 Yes 
 Q4_2  -0.877 Yes 0.749 Yes 
 Q4_3  -0.89 Yes 0.808 Yes 
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Learning and 
absorptive 
capacity 
 Q5_1  -1.04 Yes 1.347 Yes 
 Q5_2  -1.273 Yes 2.019 Yes 
 Q5_3  -1.235 Yes 2.1 Yes 
 Q5_4  -0.565 Yes -0.271 Yes 
 Q5_5  -0.765 Yes 0.434 Yes 
 Q5_6  -0.352 Yes -0.452 Yes 
Likelihood of 
Relationship 
Termination 
 Q8_1  1.702 Yes 3.306 Yes 
 Q8_2  1.309 Yes 0.782 Yes 
 Q8_3  1.24 Yes 1.624 Yes 
 Q8_4  1.062 Yes 0.647 Yes 
Perceptions of 
relationship 
financial 
performance 
 Q9_1  -0.873 Yes 2.549 Yes 
 Q9_2  -1.064 Yes 2.446 Yes 
 Q9_3  -1.091 Yes 0.131 Yes 
 Q9_4  -1.206 Yes 2.795 Yes 
 Q9_5  -0.644 Yes 0.178 Yes 
 Q9_6  -0.915 Yes 1.579 Yes 
 Q9_7  -0.716 Yes 0.247 Yes 
 Q9_8  -0.659 Yes -0.652 Yes 
 Q9_9  -0.996 Yes 2.123 Yes 
RQ (Trust)  Q17_1  -1.044 Yes 2.443 Yes 
 Q17_2  -1.157 Yes 2.343 Yes 
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 Q17_3  -1.019 Yes 2.819 Yes 
 Q17_4  -1.139 Yes 2.641 Yes 
 Q17_5  -1.121 Yes 2.663 Yes 
RQ 
(Commitment) 
 Q19_1  -0.747 Yes 0.995 Yes 
 Q19_2  -0.741 Yes 1.293 Yes 
 Q19_3  -0.999 Yes 1.649 Yes 
 Q19_4  -0.863 Yes 0.031 Yes 
RQ 
(Satisfaction) 
 Q20_1  -0.689 Yes 1.863 Yes 
 Q20_2  -1.083 Yes 1.473 Yes 
 Q20_3  -0.742 Yes 0.79 Yes 
 Q20_4  -1.157 Yes 2.923 Yes 
Reciprocity  Q22_1  -0.984 Yes 2.263 Yes 
 Q22_2  -0.896 Yes 1.599 Yes 
 Q22_3  -0.777 Yes 0.697 Yes 
 Q22_4  -0.829 Yes 1.173 Yes 
           
 How many above 
threshold?  
1   1 
 
4.2.4 Nonresponse bias testing 
 
Next, early versus late responders were tested for significant differences 
(Armstrong and Overton, 1977). Data was collected over roughly a two month period. 
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The “End Date” was used to rank all responses and first wave respondents were placed 
in the early respondents category, while respondents after the second wave invitation 
were classified as late respondents. As was discussed in Chapter 3, two-tailed t-tests 
were conducted for all latent variables, control variables, and demographic variables. 
There were no significant results, indicating that nonresponse bias is not problematic in 
this data set.  
4.2.5 Common method bias testing 
 
To test for common method bias, a theoretically unrelated marker variable was 
included in the study (Lindell and Whitney, 2001): statistical control processes (Shah 
and Ward, 2007). The marker variable was non-significant to both endogenous 
variables indicating that common method bias is not a serious concern in this study.  
Figure 6: Marker Variable 
To what extent do you agree with the following statement? 
At my company, we make extensive use of statistical techniques to reduce variance in 
our business volume.  
 
4.2.6 Multicollinearity: Indicators 
 
Next, univariate testing was conducted to analyze loadings and significance of the 
manifest variables on their latent variables. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
reported for each variable to evaluate them for indicator multicollinearity. Though there 
are several rules of thumb, the more commonly used recommendations are VIF < 10 
(Hair et al., 2010) and VIF < 5 (Hair et al., 2014), while the recommended threshold in 
WarpPLS software is VIF < 3.3 (Kock, 2014). All indicators satisfy even the most 
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restrictive threshold of VIF < 3.3, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue.  The 
following tables show the initial univariate testing, before scale revision was conducted 
to optimize convergent and discriminant validity.  
Table 11: Univariate Testing: Relational Social Capital 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q2_1 (0.240) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.318 1 0.144 
Q2_2 (0.329) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.511 1 0.272 
Q2_3 (0.326) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.449 1 0.266 
Q2_4 (0.253) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.348 1 0.160 
Q2_5 (0.251) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.241 1 0.157 
 
Table 12: Univariate Testing: Long Term Orientation 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q3_1 (0.216) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.097 1 0.174 
Q3_2 (0.211) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.080 1 0.166 
Q3_3 (0.212) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.934 1 0.168 
Q3_4 (0.193) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.692 1 0.139 
Q3_5 (0.083) Reflective 0.055 0.067 1.115 1 0.026 
Q3_6 (0.216) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.034 1 0.174 
Q3_7 0.203 Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.831 1 0.153 
 
Table 13: Univariate Testing: Relationship Specific Investment 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q4_1 (0.392) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.564 1 0.320 
Q4_2 (0.412) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.777 1 0.354 
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Q4_3 (0.394) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.593 1 0.325 
 
Table 14: Univariate Testing: Learning/ Absorptive Capacity 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q5_1 (0.244) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.672 1 0.175 
Q5_2 (0.240) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.701 1 0.170 
Q5_3 (0.186) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.282 1 0.102 
Q5_4 (0.270) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.086 1 0.215 
Q5_5 (0.279) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.257 1 0.230 
Q5_6 (0.191) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.272 1 0.107 
Q3_7 0.203 Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.831 1 0.153 
 
Table 15: Univariate Testing: Likelihood of Relationship Termination 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q8_1 (0.341) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.533 1 0.276 
Q8_2 (0.314) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.109 1 0.234 
Q8_3 (0.320) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.421 1 0.244 
Q8_4 (0.322) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.060 1 0.246 
 
Table 16: Univariate Testing: Perceptions of Relationship Financial Performance 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q9_1 (0.200) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.210 1 0.156 
Q9_2 (0.185) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.816 1 0.134 
Q9_3 (0.150) Reflective 0.055 0.004 1.992 1 0.088 
Q9_4 (0.185) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.720 1 0.134 
Q9_5 (0.179) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.648 1 0.125 
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Q9_6 (0.180) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.746 1 0.127 
Q9_7 (0.096) Reflective 0.055 0.042 1.176 1 0.036 
Q9_8 (0.102) Reflective 0.055 0.032 1.663 1 0.041 
Q9_9 (0.201) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.007 1 0.158 
 
Table 17: Univariate Testing: Trust 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q17_1 (0.227) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.645 1 0.168 
Q17_2 (0.238) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.810 1 0.185 
Q17_3 (0.259) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.359 1 0.219 
Q17_4 (0.256) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.161 1 0.213 
Q17_5 (0.256) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.214 1 0.214 
 
Table 18: Univariate Testing: Commitment 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q19_1 (0.381) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.236 1 0.273 
Q19_2 (0.395) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.360 1 0.294 
Q19_3 (0.440) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.489 1 0.363 
Q19_4 (0.192) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.058 1 0.069 
Q19_5 (0.381) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.236 1 0.273 
 
 
Table 19: Univariate Testing: Satisfaction 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q20_1 (0.287) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.354 1 0.246 
Q20_2 (0.285) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.222 1 0.243 
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Q20_3 (0.288) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.335 1 0.249 
Q20_4 (0.296) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.680 1 0.262 
Q20_5 (0.287) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 2.354 1 0.246 
 
Table 20: Univariate Testing: Reciprocity 
Item Loading Type SE P value VIF WLS ES 
Q22_1 (0.346) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.567 1 0.273 
Q22_2 (0.322) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.397 1 0.238 
Q22_3 (0.353) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.611 1 0.285 
Q22_4 (0.298) Reflective 0.055 <0.001 1.295 1 0.203 
 
4.3 Internal consistency 
 
 Next, the model’s internal consistency was evaluated using reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity. This was an iterative process which 
involved evaluating all internal consistency measures and removing measurement items 
which may be reducing internal consistency. In this iterative process, 11 measurement 
items were removed from the model. Once those items were removed, reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity were within accepted thresholds, and there 
were an adequate number of items remaining for each construct. Measures must comply 
with acceptable levels of reliability and validity (Duffy, 2008; Churchill, 1979), and must 
be newly evaluated any time they are not adopted verbatim from existing scales, as is the 
case in this study during which the items were adopted. It is acceptable to refine 
measures to correct lower internal consistency scores, including reliabilities (Duffy, 
2008).  
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The final set of measurement items retained for the hypotheses tests can be seen in Table 21. The items highlighted 
gray were removed from the analysis for the improvement of the internal consistency.  
Table 21: Final Set of Retained Measurement Items 
Construct Citation Question 
number 
Item Tested in 
hypothesis: 
Relationship 
termination 
 
4 items 
Johnson (1999) 
JAMS 
8_1 We expect the relationship with this partner to 
last a long time. (R) 
All 
8_2 It is likely that our relationship with this partner 
will be terminated within the next 2 years. 
8_3 Our firm has been successful in getting this 
partner to commit to long term cooperation. (R) 
8_4 This partner is hesitant to come to any long term 
agreements. 
Perceptions 
of 
relationship 
financial 
performance 
 
3 items 
Duffy (2008) 
IMM 
9_1 We see a lot of future growth potential with this 
partner. 
All 
9_2 The amount of business we have with this 
partner is growing. 
9_3 The future viability of this relationship does not 
look good. [R]  
9_4 Investments of time and money in this partner 
have been worthwhile. 
9_5 Investments we have made in this relationship 
have made our business operations more cost 
effective and efficient. 
9_6 Returns we have made from this relationship 
have enabled us to reinvest and expand our 
business with this customer. 
9_7 The cost of servicing this partner is low given the 
amount of business it generates. 
9_8 We have been required to make investments in 
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this relationship that have cost us a lot of money 
but offer little benefit to our own operations. [R] 
9_9 We are satisfied with the level of profits we 
achieve with this partner.  
 
Social 
Capital 
 
5 items 
Villena, Revilla, 
and Choi (2011) 
JOM 
 Please indicate the extent to which the 
relationship between your company and this 
supplier is characterized by:  
H4a, H4b 
2_1      A close personal interaction between the  
     partners. 
2_2      Mutual respect between the partners. 
2_3      Mutual trust between the partners. 
2_4      Personal friendship between the 
     partners. 
2_5      Reciprocity between the partners.  
Long term 
orientation 
 
5 items 
Ganesan (1994) 
JM 
3_1 We believe that over the long run our 
relationship with this partner will be profitable. 
H2a, H2b 
3_2 Maintaining a long term relationship with this 
partner is important to us. 
3_3 We focus on long term goals in this relationship. 
3_4 We are willing to make sacrifices to help this 
partner from time to time.  
3_5 We are only concerned with our outcomes in this 
relationship. [R] 
3_6 We expect this partner to be working with us for 
a long time. 
3_7 Any concessions we make to help out this partner 
will even out in the long run. 
Relationship 
specific 
investment 
 
3 items 
Nyaga and 
Whipple (2011) 
JBL 
4_1 We have invested substantially in personnel 
dedicated to this relationship. 
H1a, H1b 
4_2 We have provided proprietary expertise and/ or 
technology to this relationship. 
4_3 We have dedicated significant investments (e.g. 
equipment or support systems) to this 
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relationship. 
Learning/ 
absorptive 
capacity 
 
4 items 
Schoenherr, 
Griffith, and 
Chandra (2014) 
JBL 
 Working with this specific partner, we have 
developed processes for  
H3a, H3b 
5_1      Protecting knowledge from 
     inappropriate use outside the  
     organization. 
5_2      Encouraging the protection of  
     knowledge. 
5_3      Restricting access to some sources of  
     knowledge.  
5_4      Acquiring knowledge about new  
     products or services within our industry.  
 
5_5      Generating new knowledge from existing 
     knowledge.  
 
5_6      Collaborating.  
Relationship 
Quality  
Composed of trust, commitment and relationship satisfaction.  
Trust 
 
5 items 
Kumar et al. 
(1995) JMR 
17_1 When making important decisions, this partner 
is concerned about our welfare.  
All 
17_2 We can rely on this partner handling critical 
information on our company confidentially. 
17_3 When we have an important requirement, we can 
depend on this partner’s support. 
17_4 We are convinced that this partner performs its 
tasks professionally. 
17_5 We can count on this partner’s promises made to 
our firm.  
Commitment 
 
4 items 
Anderson and 
Weitz (1992) 
JMR 
19_1 We are patient with this partner when they make 
mistakes that cause us trouble. 
All 
19_2 We are willing to dedicate whatever people and 
resources it takes to grow sales for this partner. 
19_3 We are quite willing to make long-term 
investments in this partner. 
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19_4 We are not continually on the lookout for another 
partner to replace this partner.  
Satisfaction 
 
4 items 
Nyaga and 
Whipple (2011) 
JBL 
 My firm is satisfied with this partner in terms of: All 
20_1      Coordination of activities. 
20_2      Level of commitment. 
20_3      Level of information sharing. 
20_4      Management of activities. 
Reciprocity 
 
3 items 
Chan and Li 
(2010) JBR 
22_1 I am willing to help and share information with 
my partner when they need it. 
H5a, H5b 
22_2 When my partner needs my help, I am willing to 
assist them even if it may cost me time and effort. 
22_3 When I ask this partner for help, I think they will 
help me. 
22_4 Even if this partner, who I have helped may not 
help me in return, I believe they will in the 
future.  
Statistical  
Process 
Controls 
(Marker) 
 
1 item 
Shah and Ward 
(2007) JOM 
28 At my company, we make extensive use of 
statistical techniques to reduce variance in our 
business volume. 
Marker 
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4.3.1 Control variable tests 
 
The path coefficients and significance of the control variable paths were 
evaluated, including the marker variable.  
Table 22: Effect of Control Variables 
Control variable Likelihood of Relationship 
Termination 
Perceptions of Relationship 
Financial Performance 
Path Coefficient P Value Path Coefficient P Value 
Importance -0.162 0.006 0.065 0.160 
Marker 0.063 0.167 0.002 0.490 
Job Title 0.085 0.096 -0.048 0.233 
Duration in 
Position 
0.033 0.307 0.010 0.443 
Partner Industry  -0.087 0.090 0.033 0.443 
Duration at 
Company 
0.044 0.251 0.011 0.435 
Own Revenue -0.106 0.051 0.045 0.247 
Own 
Employment 
0.091 0.082 0.006 0.464 
Own Industry 0.001 0.496 -0.038 0.279 
 
Because only one control variable, importance of this partner to your company, 
was significant for one dependent variable, likelihood of relationship termination, only 
that control variable and path will be retained for further testing in the model. The 
significance of the ‘importance’ control variable means that if the importance of the 
partner to your company’s success is high, the likelihood of relationship termination is 
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significantly decreased.  None of the other control variables significantly impact either 
dependent variables and are therefore excluded from further testing. 
Figure 7 shows the full structural model.  
Figure 7: Full Final Structural Model 
 
4.3.2 Reliability 
 
Next, reliability was calculated for each latent variable using both Cronbach’s 
alpha and composite reliability. Those statistics are reported in the following table.  
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When calculating the reliability for the first order constructs which make up the 
second order latent construct, Relationship Quality, the recommendation is to calculate 
a reliability for the second order construct (Kock, 2014,). All latent construct reliabilities 
exceed the 0.7 threshold for both Cronbach’s alpha and composite reliability (Nunnally, 
1970).    
Table 23: Reliabilities for Latent Constructs 
Construct Final 
number 
of items 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
Relational social 
capital 
5 0.795 0.86 
Long term 
orientation 
5 0.876 0.91 
Relationship specific 
investment 
3 0.781 0.873 
Learning/ absorptive 
capacity 
4 0.827 0.885 
Relationship 
termination 
4 0.816 0.879 
Relationship financial 
performance 
3 0.751 0.858 
Reciprocity 3 0.713 0.84 
Relationship Quality 13 0.893 0.934 
 
 
4.3.3 Convergent validity 
 
Criteria for acceptable convergent validity is that average variance extracted 
(AVE) are above 0.50 (Hair et al., 2013; Chin 1998). With the original set of 
measurement items, only one construct did not achieve the threshold of 0.50, 
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perceptions of relationship financial performance. The table below shows the 
improvement in convergent validity, in terms of AVE, when some measurement items 
were removed. The AVE increased for the constructs which had measurement items 
removed that were diminishing the construct’s convergent reliability: long term 
orientation increased from an AVE of 0.572 to 0.669; learning and absorptive capacity 
increased from 0.527 to 0.658; reciprocity increased from 0.615 to 0.636; and 
perceptions of relationship financial performance increased from below the threshold at 
0.45 to above the threshold at 0.668.  
Table 23: Average Variance Extracted 
Construct Original AVE AVE with items 
removed  
Relational social capital 0.554 0.554 
Long term orientation 0.572 0.669 
Relationship specific investment 0.696 0.696 
Learning/ absorptive capacity 0.527 0.658 
Relationship termination 0.644 0.644 
Relationship financial performance 0.45 0.668 
Reciprocity 0.615 0.636 
Relationship Quality 0.824 0.824 
 
 
4.3.4 Discriminant validity 
 
To satisfy the criteria for discriminant validity, the square root of the AVE should 
be higher than the correlation between latent variables (Hair et al., 2010). See the table 
below for correlations between latent variables with the square root of AVE on the 
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diagonal, highlighted in yellow. All constructs satisfy the criteria for discriminant 
validity. This process was, like reliability and convergent validity, an iterative process 
involving cleaning the measurement items of items which were diminishing the internal 
consistency of the full model. This section has shown that all construct reliabilities (CR 
and Alpha) are acceptable at the > 0.70 level, convergent validity is satisfactory (AVEs > 
0.50) and discriminant validity criteria are met (Hair et al., 2010; 2014; Kock, 2014).   
Table 24: Discriminant Validity of Full Model, Latent Variable Correlations with Square 
Root of AVEs on Diagonal 
 
SocCal LTO RSI Learn Recip Term Perf RQ 
SocCal 0.744 0.673 0.41 0.451 0.551 0.48 0.618 0.711 
LTO 0.673 0.818 0.573 0.509 0.664 0.75 0.799 0.798 
RSI 0.41 0.573 0.834 0.559 0.435 0.397 0.538 0.547 
Learn 0.451 0.509 0.559 0.811 0.434 0.322 0.557 0.541 
Recip 0.551 0.664 0.435 0.434 0.798 0.51 0.631 0.777 
Term 0.48 0.75 0.397 0.322 0.51 0.803 0.617 0.695 
Perf 0.618 0.799 0.538 0.557 0.631 0.617 0.817 0.795 
RQ 0.711 0.798 0.547 0.541 0.777 0.695 0.795 0.908 
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4.4 Evaluation of the Model 
 
To evaluate the model, fit statistics, as used in covariance-based SEM, are not 
used as measures of fit in PLS-SEM.  PLS-SEM, unlike CB-SEM, maximizes he 
explained variance in the dependent variables by fitting the model to the sample data, 
thereby optimizing the parameter estimates (Hair et al., 2014). Counter to this practice, 
CB-SEM minimizes the difference between the conceptual model and the sample 
covariance matrices, and its corresponding fit measures are based on this minimization 
of difference between the theoretical or conceptual covariance matrix and the sample 
data’s covariance matrix (Hair et al., 2014). PLS-SEM uses measures of the model’s 
predictive ability instead of CB-SEM’s goodness of fit statistics to determine the value of 
the model in predicting the independent variables’ effects on the dependent variables 
(Hair et al., 2014). R2 values, effect sizes (f2) and Q2 (predictive relevance) are used 
together to exhibit the predictive value of the model (Hair et al., 2014).  
The R2 values are in this model moderate (above 0.50) for both likelihood of 
relationship termination and perceptions of relationship financial performance (Hair, 
Ringle and Sarstedt, 2011; Henseler et al., 2009). This analysis indicates that the 
exogenous variables in the full model are responsible for 52% of the variance explained 
for likelihood of relationship termination, and 66% of the variance explained for 
perceptions of relationship financial performance. 
The magnitude of the R2 of both dependent variables is acceptable. An additional 
measure of the model’s value is predictive relevance, also called the Stone-Geisser test 
(Q2) (Geisser, 1974; Stone, 1974). If a PLS-SEM model has predictive relevance, the 
independent variables are accurately predicting the dependent variables. Positive Q2 
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values indicate acceptable levels of predictive relevance for the model (Hair et al., 2014). 
Both endogenous variables have positive Q2, indicating predictive accuracy of the 
model.  
Table 25: Model Evaluation Statistics 
 R2 Adjusted R2 Q2 
Likelihood of 
Relationship 
Termination 
0.523 0.48 0.621 
Perceptions of 
Relationship 
Financial 
Performance 
0.657 0.629 0.729 
 
Adjusted R2 takes into account the explanatory power of the model as well as the 
sample size and complexity of the model. This measure is affected by the number of 
exogenous relationships within the model and adjusts the R2 accordingly (Hair et al., 
2014). The adjusted R2 for the likelihood of relationship termination is 0.48 and for 
perceptions of relationship financial performance, 0.629, showing that the model 
complexity does not detrimentally affect its explanatory power.  
4.5 Hypothesis testing 
 
Next, the path testing results are discussed. The effect sizes, path coefficients and 
p-values are used to determine which paths are significant and substantial to the full 
model. The effect sizes in the model numerically describe the effect on R2 when a 
particular exogenous variable is eliminated from the model. This effect size indicates if 
the construct has a substantial impact on the dependent variables (Hair et al., 2014). 
The recommendations for evaluating the effect size, or f2, are that values of 0.35, 0.15, 
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and 0.02 are large, medium and small, respectively (Cohen, 1988; Hair et al., 2014). The 
model exhibits both small and medium effect sizes.  
Table 26: Effect Size (f2) in the Full Model 
Effect size (f2) 
 Likelihood of Relationship 
Termination 
Perceptions of Relationship 
Financial Performance 
Relational Social 
Capital 
0.035 Small 0.031 Small 
Long Term 
Orientation 
 
0.525 Large 0.333 Moderate 
Relationship 
Specific 
Investment 
0.007 Very small 0.029 Small 
Learning and 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
0.029 Small 0.14 Small 
Reciprocity 0.032 Small 0.118 Small 
Importance 0.076 Small NS NA 
RQ * Relational 
Social Capital 
0.156 Moderate 0.042 Small 
RQ * Long Term 
Orientation 
0.048 Small 0.129 Small 
RQ * Relationship 
Specific 
Investment 
0.095 Small 0.105 Small 
RQ * Learning and 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
0.01 Very small 0.069 Small 
RQ * Reciprocity 0.046 Small 0.128 Small 
 
While the effect size indicates the change in R2 if the variable were to be removed 
from the analysis, significant path coefficients are interpreted in the same manner as 
beta coefficients in regressions (Hair et al., 2014; Kock, 2015). That is, the path 
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coefficients estimate the change in the dependent variable resulting from that 
independent variable (Hair et al., 2014). The aim of this study is to identify significant 
path coefficients with a substantial effect on the dependent variable. Even in an analysis 
of potentially non-linear relationships, the meaning of the path coefficients calculated 
by WarpPLS have the same general interpretation, applying to the overall trend of the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Kock, 2015).  
The main effects testing reveals some particularly interesting relationships. For 
the dependent variable, perceptions of relationship financial performance, there are 
three positive significant paths: long term orientation, learning and reciprocity, 
supporting the current formulation of SET. However, there are no significant negative 
paths between any of the independent variables and likelihood of relationship 
termination, as would be predicted by the current formulation of SET. The changes in 
these results are particularly interesting when evaluating the effect of the moderator, 
relationship quality, in the hypothesis testing next.  
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Table 27: Test of Paths in Full Model 
 Perceptions of Relationship 
Financial Performance 
 Likelihood of Relationship 
Termination 
Latent 
Independent 
Path 
Coefficient 
P-value R2  Path 
Coefficient 
P-value R2 
Long Term 
Orientation 
0.413 <0.001 0.657  0.697 <0.001 0.523 
Relationship 
Social Capital 
0.048 0.287  0.071 0.203 
Relationship 
specific 
investment  
0.05 0.28  -0.0174 0.42 
Learning  0.223 0.004  0.073 0.235 
Reciprocity  0.185 0.014  0.078 0.128 
      
RQ x LTO 0.249 <0.001  0.109 0.099 
RQ x SocCal -0.091 0.142  0.41 <0.001 
RQ x RSI 0.259 <0.001  -0.264 <0.001 
RQ x Learn -0.186 0.013  0.027 0.004 
RQ x Recip -0.273 <0.001  0.113 <0.001 
 
 
4.5.1 Hypothesis 1a 
 
Hypothesis 1a examined the moderated relationship between relationship 
specific investment and perceptions of relationship financial performance. The results of 
this research confirms that perceptions of relationship financial is affected by 
relationship specific investment, and that effect is a stronger positive effect for higher 
levels of relationship quality than for lower levels of relationship quality, as is evident in 
by the positive, significant (p<0.001) path coefficient (path coefficient=0.259) of the 
interaction term: relationship quality and relationship specific investment. Hypothesis 
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1a is supported. This result is very interesting in that the main effect of RSI on 
perceptions of relationship financial performance is non-significant; however, when 
moderated by RQ, the relationship is highly significant and positive. This suggests that 
while RSI does not have a significant effect on perceptions of relationship financial 
performance, in conditions of high RQ, RSI does indeed have a strengthening effect on 
the dependent variable.  
This finding is supported by the classic tenets of SET, which have been very 
influential in management research (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). The central 
theorem of SET is that a business relationship is built on iterative social exchanges 
which create social obligations, and eventually will create long-term, mutually beneficial 
business relationships (Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005).   
SET contends that if one partner acts in a certain way, in this specific hypothesis, 
by investing in relationship specific investments, the other partner will act in a similar 
way; thereby strengthening and extending the relationship (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 
1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). The positive effect 
resulting from the interaction term between relationship specific investment and 
relationship quality on perceptions of relationship financial performance bears out this 
tenet of SET. This result also indicates that if supply chain partners maintain a high 
level of RQ, they can keep the dark side effect at bay, for this particular relationship.  
Central to all the hypotheses in question is the dark side effect of relationship 
variables. The dark side effect is the situation in which relationship variables, which are 
suggested by literature or theory to exhibit a positive effect on relationship performance 
in fact have no benefit, or even detrimentally effect the relationship (Anderson and Jap, 
2005; Villena et al., 2011). Relationship specific investment has been proposed as 
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having a potential dark side effect (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Backhaus and Buschken, 
1999; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).  This hypothesis, however, does not support the 
existence of a dark side effect of relationship specific investment on perceptions of 
relationship financial performance when moderated by relationship quality. This result 
contributes to theory by supporting the rosy tenets of SET; and to the literature by not 
supporting relationship specific investment as a dark side effect variable in this context.  
4.5.2 Hypothesis 1b 
 
Hypothesis 1b looked at the relationship between relationship specific investment 
and likelihood of relationship termination. This research shows a significant effect on 
likelihood of relationship termination by the interaction term of relationship quality and 
likelihood of relationship termination. The results also show that, as is stated in the 
hypothesis, there is a significant (p<0.001), stronger negative effect (path coefficient=-
0.264) of high levels of relationship quality than low relationship quality on likelihood 
of relationship termination. Hypothesis 1b is supported.  
This result is very interesting, in that the main effect of RSI on likelihood of 
relationship termination is non-significant. However, once the relationship is 
moderated by RQ, RSI exhibits a highly significant negative effect on likelihood of 
relationship termination. This result indicates that in conditions of high RQ, RSI 
reduces the likelihood of termination, but does not do so in the absence of the 
moderating effect of RQ.  
This result is determined from the significant, negative path coefficient of the 
interaction term of relationship quality and relationship specific investment on 
likelihood of relationship termination. Similar to H1a, this hypothesis is supported by 
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SET. In the same way that business relationships are built upon iterative social 
exchanges which create social obligations, the creation of relationship specific 
investments would strengthen and extend the continuity of a relationship (Emerson, 
1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), thereby reducing the likelihood of relationship 
termination, as was hypothesized.  Again, this result emphasizes the beneficial effect of 
maintaining high levels of RQ in continuing a beneficial supply chain relationship.  
Like Hypothesis 1a, the primary goal of this dissertation is to investigate the dark 
side effect of relationship variables. It has been suggested that relationship specific 
investment has a dark side effect on performance (Jap and Ganesan, 2000; Backhaus 
and Buschken, 1999; Bensaou and Anderson, 1999).  This hypothesis does not support 
the existence of a dark side effect of relationship specific investment on likelihood of 
relationship termination when moderated by relationship quality. This result 
contributes to literature by not supporting the dark side effect of relationship specific 
investment, and supports the reciprocal obligations tenets of SET.  
4.5.3 Hypothesis 2a 
 
Hypothesis 2a examined the moderated relationship between long term 
orientation (LTO) and perceptions of relationship financial performance. This research 
confirms that long term orientation, moderated by relationship quality, has a stronger 
positive relationship at high levels of relationship quality than low levels of relationship 
quality, on perceptions of relationship performance. This conclusion is supported by the 
significant (p<0.001), positive path coefficient (0.259) between the interaction term of 
relationship quality and long term orientation. Hypothesis 2a is supported.  
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The main effect of LTO on relationship financial performance was significant and 
positive. While the moderated effect of LTO on relationship financial performance is 
also significant and positive, the path weight is half that of the main effect. This 
indicates that, while still significant, the presence of RQ as a moderator to the 
relationship reduces the strength of the effect of LTO on perceptions of relationship 
performance.  
These findings support the current formulation of SET in management literature, 
which includes mutually beneficial behavior and return of social obligation in response 
to good treatment (Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). The results of this 
hypothesis test show that as long term orientation increases, moderated by relationship 
quality, the perceptions of relationship financial performance increase; thereby 
illustrating the aforementioned central tenet of SET. For practice, this result indicates 
that if supply chain partners maintain high levels of RQ, they can keep the dark side 
effect at bay, for the relationship between LTO and perceptions of relationship financial 
performance.  
Similar to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, this dissertation is interested in investigating 
the dark side effect of relationship variables. Research has supported the relationship 
between long term orientation and reduced costs and increased profits to both parties to 
the relationship over time (Ganesan, 1994; Skarmeas, 2006). However, a dark side 
effect of long term orientation has been proposed, in that long term orientation does not 
always produce the expected profit (Dowling and Uncles, 1997; Helm et al., 2006; 
Reinartz and Kumar, 2003; Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande, 1992) and negative 
influences become more common with long term oriented relationships (Barnes, 2005; 
Grayson and Ambler, 1999; Moorman et al., 1992). The results of this hypothesis test 
150 
 
 
does not support the dark side effect of long term orientation on perceptions of 
relationship financial performance, but do support the performance benefits and 
improvement of long term relationship orientation.  This result contributes to theory by 
supporting the central tenets of SET, and to literature by not supporting the existence of 
a dark side effect for long term orientation, related to performance.  
 
4.5.4 Hypothesis 2b 
 
Hypothesis 2b looked at the relationship between long term relationship 
orientation, moderated by relationship quality, and likelihood of relationship 
termination. The results showed that though the path is significant at p<0.10 (p=0.099), 
the path is has a positive coefficient (0.109), which is not negative, as was hypothesized. 
Hypothesis 2b is not supported. 
It is very interesting that the interaction effect of long term relationship 
orientation and relationship quality on perceptions of relationship financial 
performance was positive, indicating that as long term relationship orientation 
increases, the perceptions of relationship financial performance increase; while this 
hypothesis is not supported. That is, in Hypothesis 2b, as long term orientation 
increases, moderated by relationship quality, likelihood of relationship termination does 
not decrease. It becomes evident that perceptions of relationship financial performance 
do not automatically indicate that a relationship will not be terminated prematurely. It 
appears that, in the case of long term orientation and likelihood of relationship 
termination, a dark side effect is supported. Specifically, an increase in long term 
orientation has an amplifying, or dark side effect on likelihood of relationship 
termination.  
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It is also observed that the main effect of LTO on likelihood of relationship 
termination is significant and positive, indicating that as LTO increases, the likelihood 
of relationship termination also increases. However, once the relationship is moderated 
by RQ, the path becomes non-significant. This indicates that while the main effect 
indicates an amplifying effect of LTO on likelihood of relationship financial 
performance, this effect is made non-significant by the presence of high levels of RQ.  
This result concurs with Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande’s (1992) empirical 
finding that long term relationships experience a dampening effect on trust, 
commitment and satisfaction, which leads to a staleness in the relationship and lack of 
perception of value added by one or both partners. As these feelings increase over time, 
there is an increase in possibility of opportunistic behavior (Moorman et al., 1992), 
complacency (Barnes, 2005), relative dissatisfaction with the relationship (Moorman et 
al., 1992), and dissolution of the relationship (Fang et al., 2011).  
This finding does not support the current SET formulation, which would state 
that as business relationships are strengthened through repeated social interaction, 
likelihood of relationship termination would reduce, particularly when coupled with 
high relationship quality (Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). This 
appears to be a boundary condition of the current SET. However, looking at the lost 
tenets of SET which this dissertation is bringing to light, it becomes evident that SET 
has, from its birth, helped explain why relationship variables may not always have a 
positive effect on performance or a reductive effect on likelihood of relationship 
termination (Homan, 1958; Emerson, 1976).  
Foundational authors of SET described a point of diminishing returns on 
relational variables (Homan, 1958; Emerson, 1976), and the related concepts of fatigue 
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and comparison level (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). These concepts help explain why long 
term relationship orientation, coupled with high relationship quality may not lead to an 
improved relationship or, in this case, a reduction in the likelihood of relationship 
termination. If business partners, despite their high level of long term relationship 
orientation and relationship quality, begin to feel dissatisfaction due to their increased 
comparison level (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959) or level of diminishing return on their 
reciprocal obligations (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005), it 
may be a logical step to prematurely end the relationship, despite the level of perception 
of relationship financial performance, as seen in H2a. This result contributes to theory 
by supporting the reincorporation of the foundational tenets of SET (e.g. comparison 
level, fatigue, point of diminishing returns), while also contributing to literature by 
supporting the existing of a dark side effect of long term relationship orientation on 
likelihood of relationship orientation.  
4.5.5 Hypothesis 3a 
 
Hypothesis 3a examined the moderated relationship between learning and 
absorptive capacity and perceptions of relationship financial performance. The results 
show that although the path is significant (p=0.013), the path coefficient is negative (-
0.186), which shows that, in this data set, as the interaction term between relationship 
quality and learning increases, all else equal, there is a negative effect on perceptions of 
relationship financial performance. The hypothesis suggests that the path coefficient 
would be positive, suggesting that as an increase was shown in the interaction term 
between learning and perceptions of relationship financial performance, there would be 
a more positive effect on the dependent variable. Hypothesis 3a is not supported.  
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While the main effect of learning and absorptive capacity is significant and 
positive, once the relationship is moderated by RQ, the path is changed to significant 
and negative. This exhibits the dark side effect of learning and absorptive capacity that 
is not mitigated by the presence of even high levels of RQ.  
Though this hypothesis is not supported, this result concurs with literature which 
described the potentially one-sided nature of learning alliances, also called mercenary 
intentions (Hamel, 1991). However, other authors point out that there are negative 
effects or potential results from learning alliances, such as unintentional disclosure of 
information (Bresser, 1998). This result also agrees with Hamel (1991) and Dyer et al. 
(2008) who point out that, in some cases, learning is highly goal-driven or 
opportunistic, to the extent of reducing performance.  
Though these results represent a boundary condition of the current formulation 
of SET in organizational studies, they are supported by the revisited tenets of SET, 
namely the concept of diminishing returns, fatigue, and comparison level (Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano and Mitchell, 2005). That is, if learning is the initial goal, 
as the knowledge gains remain the same over time; one or both partners may begin to 
feel they are not receiving the relationship benefits they were expecting. This result 
contributes to theory by supporting the newly exposed tenets of SET, discussed in this 
dissertation, and to literature by supporting the existence of a dark side effect of 
learning and absorptive capacity.  
4.5.6 Hypothesis 3b 
 
Hypothesis 3b looked at the moderated relationship between learning and 
absorptive capacity and the likelihood of relationship termination. Though the 
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relationship between the interaction term of relationship quality and learning/ 
absorptive capacity was significant (p=0.004), the path coefficient was positive (0.027). 
This indicates that at higher levels of relationship quality, there is a higher likelihood of 
relationship termination than at lower levels of relationship quality; the opposite effect 
of the hypothesized relationship. Hypothesis 3b is not supported.  
However, of significant interest is the effect of the moderator, RQ, on the main 
effect. The main effect of learning and absorptive capacity on likelihood of relationship 
termination is non-significant. Once the moderator, RQ, is introduced, the relationship 
becomes significant and positive. This result exhibits the dark side effect of learning and 
absorptive capacity, in that even in the presence of high levels of RQ, this independent 
variable has an increasing effect on the likelihood of relationship termination.  
The data analysis shows the opposite result from what was expected. However, 
like Hypothesis 3a, literature has described the potentially one-sided and problem-
causing nature of learning alliances, also known as dark side effects (Hamel, 1991). 
Counter to Poppo et al, (2009), who indicated that deeper learning strengthens business 
relationships and makes it more difficult for partners to disengage or dissolve the 
relationship, this result concurs with Inkpen and Beamish (1997) which described the 
abnormally high percentage of relationships terminated in the case of learning alliances. 
Hamel (1991) also states that, in relationships where learning is a specific goal of the 
relationship, the relationship may be ended suddenly when on party achieves their 
learning objective.  
The result of this hypothesis test represent a boundary condition for the current 
formulation of SET. SET’s earlier tenets would also point out that, though a relationship 
was once based upon the mutual benefit of learning, the likelihood of relationship 
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termination increases inversely with the perception of value derived from the learning 
process (Blau, 1964; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959).  This result contributes to theory by 
supporting the rediscovered tenets of SET of point of diminishing returns, fatigue and 
comparison level leading to feelings of dissatisfaction (Blau, 1964; Thibaut and Kelly, 
1959; Homans, 1958). This result also contributes to literature by supporting the 
existence of the dark side effect of learning and likelihood of relationship termination.  
4.5.7 Hypothesis 4a 
 
Hypothesis 4a examined the moderated relationship between relational social 
capital and perceptions of relationship financial performance. The relationship, 
however, is non-significant (p=0.142), and the path coefficient is negative (-0.091). 
Hypothesis 4a is not supported.  
The main effect of relational social capital on perceptions of relationship financial 
performance is also non-significant, indicating that relational social capital neither has a 
significant main effect, nor a significant moderating effect on the dependent variable. 
This result contradicts both the literature supporting the positive effect on performance 
of relational social capital, and the literature supporting and  testing the dark side effect 
of relational social capital on performance.  
4.5.8 Hypothesis 4b 
 
Hypothesis 4b looks at the relationship between relational social capital and the 
likelihood of relationship termination. Though the relationship between the interaction 
term of relationship quality and relational social capital and the dependent variable is 
highly significant (p<0.001), the path coefficient is positive (0.41). This indicates that, in 
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this data set, at higher levels of relationship quality, there is a higher likelihood of 
relationship termination than at lower levels of relationship quality, when moderating 
the relational social capital- relationship termination linkage. Hypothesis 4b is not 
supported.  
The main effects of relational social capital on likelihood of relationship 
termination are non-significant, indicating that this independent variable does not have 
an effect on the dependent variable. However, once the moderator, RQ, is introduced, 
the moderated effect becomes significant and positive. This indicates that, in the 
presence of RQ, relational social capital begins exhibiting an effect on the dependent 
variable, but it is positive, showing an amplifying effect on the likelihood of relationship 
termination. This result may be indicating the presence of the dark side effect of 
relational social capital, in that the presence of RQ does not mitigate an amplifying 
effect of relational social capital.  
Though they hypothesized relationship is not supported, the results reveal a 
boundary condition of the current version of SET, and are supportive of the tenets of 
SET rediscovered in the literature by this dissertation; e.g. comparison levels leading to 
feelings of dissatisfaction, fatigue, and point of diminishing returns of relationship 
variables (Blau, 1964; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). That is, it is possible 
that as relational social capital increases, there is a point of fatigue for the partner at 
which there is dissatisfaction, which may lead to an increase in the likelihood of 
relationship termination.  
This result concurs with previous organizational literature concerned with the 
dark side effect of relational social capital. Organizational literature has repeatedly 
cautioned against the dark side effect of relationship variables (Adler and Kwon, 2002; 
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Granovetter, 1985; Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). Lock et 
al. (1999) went as far as to say that high levels of relational social capital will lead to 
extreme performance disadvantage. Other authors report that social capital allowed the 
relationship to deteriorate, at an imperceptible rate, to an unrecoverable level. The 
result of Hypothesis 4b bears out that relational social capital increases the likelihood of 
relationship termination, thereby supporting the existence of the dark side effect of 
relational social capital. This result contributes to theory by supporting the rediscovered 
tenets of SET; and contributes to the literature by supporting the potential dark side 
effect of relational social capital in relation to likelihood of relationship termination.  
4.5.9 Hypothesis 5a 
 
Hypothesis 5a examined the relationship between reciprocity and perceptions of 
relationship financial performance. Though the relationship between the interaction 
term (reciprocity and relationship quality) is highly significant (p<0.001), the path 
coefficient is negative (-0.273). This indicates that at higher levels of relationship 
quality, there is a reduced perception of relationship financial performance, given a 
particular level of reciprocity. Hypothesis 5a is not supported.  
The main effect of reciprocity on perceptions of relationship financial 
performance is significant and positive, showing a beneficial relationship between the 
two variables. However, once the moderator, RQ, is introduced, the relationship 
becomes significant, but negative, indicating a reduction in perception of relationship 
financial performance. This shows that RQ does not mitigate a negative relationship 
between reciprocity and perceptions of relationship financial performance, supporting 
the dark side effect of reciprocity.  
158 
 
 
Though this hypothesized relationship is not supported thereby indicating a 
boundary condition of SET, the results are supported by the earlier tenets of SET 
including the concept of fatigue, the point of diminishing returns in relationship 
variables and feelings of dissatisfaction with the relationship arising from an unsatisfied 
comparison level (Blau, 1964; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). In this 
particular hypothesis, reciprocity, even when moderated by high relationship quality, is 
not increasing perceptions of relationship financial performance. This indicates that the 
positive effect which would be predicted by the current formulation of SET, which is 
focused on social obligations and its resulting mutual benefit, did not occur. This result 
reaffirms the relevance of these ‘new’ tenets of SET to organizational research.  
The dark side effect of reciprocity arises from its potential consumption of 
relationship resources without a guarantee of a return on investment (Hansen, 1999; 
Lechner et al., 2010). High reciprocity instills a feeling of obligation which may be 
strong enough to reduce objective goals and performance objectives (Gimeno and Woo, 
1996; Uzzi, 1997; Lechner et al., 2010). This dark side effect of reciprocity is evident in 
the results of this hypothesis test; thereby supporting the existence of a dark side effect 
of reciprocity on perceptions of relationship financial performance. This result 
contributes to theory by supporting the new tenets of SET; and contributes to literature 
by providing support for the dark side effect of reciprocity in relation to relationship 
financial performance.  
4.5.10 Hypothesis 5b 
 
Hypothesis 5b looks at the relationship between reciprocity and the likelihood of 
relationship termination. Though the relationship between the interaction term 
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(relationship quality and reciprocity) is highly significant (p<0.001), the path coefficient 
(0.113) is positive, indicating that at higher levels of relationship quality, there is an 
increase in the likelihood of relationship termination, all other things equal. This is the 
opposite result as hypothesized. Hypothesis 5b is not supported.  
The main effect of reciprocity on likelihood of relationship termination is non-
significant. However, once the moderator RQ is introduced, the relationship becomes 
significant, but positive. This is showing that at high levels of RQ, reciprocity has a 
significant amplifying effect on the likelihood of relationship termination. This result is 
indicative of the dark side effect of reciprocity.  
Though this hypothesis is not supported indicating the existence of a boundary 
condition to the current formulation of SET, the results support the inclusion of the 
earlier tenets of SET, including the point of diminishing returns on efforts at improving 
relationship variables, fatigue in relationships, and a comparison level which leads to 
reduced satisfaction and may thereby increase the likelihood of relationship termination 
(Blau, 1964; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). Though literature has not 
specifically proposed an inverse relationship between reciprocity and likelihood of 
relationship termination, this hypothesis test result supports the existence of a dark side 
effect of reciprocity on likelihood of relationship termination.  
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Table 28: Summary of Hypotheses Testing Results 
Hypothesis IV DV Main effects Moderated 
effects 
Support current 
SET? 
Support dark side 
effect? 
H1a Relationship 
specific 
investment 
Perceptions of 
relationship 
financial 
performance 
Non-
significant 
Significant, 
positive 
Yes No 
H1b Relationship 
specific 
investment 
Likelihood of 
relationship 
termination 
Non-
significant 
Significant, 
negative 
Yes No 
H2a Long term 
orientaton 
Perceptions of 
relationship 
financial 
performance 
Significant, 
positive 
Significant, 
positive but at 
half the size of 
the main effect 
Yes Mixed 
H2b Long term 
orientation 
Likelihood of 
relationship 
termination 
Significant, 
positive 
Non-significant No Yes 
H3a Learning Perceptions of 
relationship 
financial 
performance 
Significant, 
positive 
Significant, 
negative 
No Yes 
H3b Learning Likelihood of 
relationship 
termination 
Non-
significant 
Significant, 
positive 
No Yes 
H4a Social capital Perceptions of 
relationship 
financial 
Non-
significant 
Non-significant No No 
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performance 
H4b Social capital Likelihood of 
relationship 
termination 
Non-
significant 
Significant, 
positive 
No Yes 
H5a Reciprocity Perceptions of 
relationship 
financial 
performance 
Significant, 
positive 
Significant, 
negative 
No Yes 
H5b Reciprocity Likelihood of 
relationship 
termination 
Non-
significant 
Significant, 
positive 
No Yes 
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The results of this hypothesis contribute to literature by supporting the existence 
of the dark side effect of reciprocity, by increasing the likelihood of relationship 
termination. The results also contribute to theory by revealing boundary conditions of 
the current version of SET in organizational research and supporting the revisited tenets 
of SET exposed by this dissertation: including comparison level, fatigue, and 
diminishing returns of higher levels of reciprocity in relation to likelihood of 
relationship financial performance.   
4.5.11 Conclusion of Hypothesis Testing 
 
 In conclusion, RQ improved some of the relationship under study in this 
dissertation while not affecting others. These empirical tests have 1) confirmed the 
existence of boundary conditions for the current formulation of SET, 2) supported the 
existence of the dark side effect of some relationship variables, and 3) supported 
inclusion of the earlier concepts in SET.   
 
163 
 
 
Table 29: Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Supported? 
H1a: The relationship between relationship-specific investment and relationship financial 
performance is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of 
relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of relationship 
quality.  
 
Yes 
H1b: The relationship between relationship-specific investment and likelihood of 
termination is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a low level of relationship 
quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a high level of relationship quality.  
 
Yes 
H2a: The relationship between long-term relationship orientation and relationship financial 
performance is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of 
relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of relationship 
quality.  
 
Yes 
H2b: The relationship between long-term relationship orientation and likelihood of 
termination is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a low level of relationship 
quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a high level of relationship quality.  
 
No, 
significant 
but 
opposite 
direction 
H3a: The relationship between learning/ absorptive capacity and relationship financial 
performance is stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of 
relationship quality than for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of relationship 
quality.  
 
No, 
significant 
but 
opposite 
direction 
H3b: The relationship between learning/ absorptive capacity and likelihood of termination is 
stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a low level of relationship quality than 
No, 
significant 
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for mature supply chain relationships for a high level of relationship quality.  
 
but 
opposite 
direction 
H4a: The relationship between social capital and relationship financial performance is 
stronger for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of relationship quality than 
for mature supply chain relationships for a low level of relationship quality.  
 
No, NS 
H4b: The relationship between social capital and likelihood of termination is stronger for 
mature supply chain relationships with a low level of relationship quality than for mature 
supply chain relationships for a high level of relationship quality. 
No, 
significant 
but 
opposite 
direction 
H5a: The relationship between reciprocity and relationship financial performance is stronger 
for mature supply chain relationships with a high level of relationship quality than for 
mature supply chain relationships for a low level of relationship quality.  
 
No, 
significant 
but 
opposite 
direction 
H5b: The relationship between reciprocity and likelihood of termination is stronger for 
mature supply chain relationships with a low level of relationship quality than for mature 
supply chain relationships for a high level of relationship quality.  
 
No, 
significant 
but 
opposite 
direction 
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4.6 Post Hoc Testing 
 
 Though the hypotheses were tested using the interaction term between the 
moderator, relationship quality, and the independent variables; there is considerable 
academic interest in empirically verifying the mere existence of the dark side effect of 
relationship variables (Anderson and Jap, 2005). The main effects of the independent 
variables, when significant, were evaluated for their linearity in relation to the 
dependent variables to evaluate the existence of the dark side effect of relationship 
variables in this data set through main effects testing (See Table 27 for significant main 
effects in the full model). The significance levels and path coefficients calculated by PLS 
can be interpreted similarly to linear regression coefficients as a general trend (Kock, 
2014). However, WarpPLS will fit a line either linear or curvilinear (termed ‘warped’) to 
minimize the residual errors (Kock, 2014). The dark side effect of relationship variables 
will cause them to have non-linear relationships to performance-related variables 
(Anderson and Jap, 2005). These potential non-linear relationships can be modeled 
using WarpPLS software; at the time of this writing, WarpPLS is the only software 
capable of estimating non-linear structural equation relationships (Kock, 2014).  
 Upon visual inspection, five of the relationships have main effects which exhibit 
non-linear relationships with the dependent variables of interest. See Table 29 for the 
paths exhibiting non-linear, or warped, relationships. One of the relationships was 
observed to be non-linear when tested in the full model: learning and perceptions of 
relationship financial performance; while the other four non-linear relationships were 
observed when testing one independent latent construct and one dependent variable. 
That is, the only significant warped relationship found in the full model is learning and 
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absorptive capacity and perceptions of relationship financial performance. However, 
post-hoc testing of each independent variable individually with each dependent variable 
reveals that some of the variables, when tested alone, exhibit a warped relationship, 
indicating the presence of the dark side effect of that variable on the dependent variable. 
Due to the strong interest in empirically detecting the existence of the dark side effect, 
these tests were conducted in a post-hoc manner. 
Table 30: Non-linear Main Effects 
Model Independent variable Dependent variable 
Full model Learning and absorptive capacity Perceptions of relationship 
financial performance 
Individual model Relational social capital Perceptions of relationship 
financial performance 
Individual model Relational social capital Likelihood of relationship 
termination 
Individual model Relationship specific investment Perceptions of relationship 
financial performance 
Individual model Relationship specific investment Likelihood of relationship 
termination 
 
WarpPLS models these nonlinear relationships by determining the line, whether 
straight or curved, which minimizes the standard error of all points in the data (Kock, 
2015). When a curvilinear relationship is present, this indicates that there may be a 
point of diminishing returns, as is suggested by both the dark side effect literature and 
the added tenets of SET.  
Figure 7 shows the main effects of learning and absorptive capacity on 
perceptions of relationship financial performance.  There is a very clear nonlinear 
relationship between the two variables, with a point of diminishing returns occurring in 
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the middle portion of the chart. This indicates that, with relationships involving learning 
or absorptive capacity, there is a point at which an incremental increase in learning or 
absorptive capacity does not create a proportional gain in perceptions of relationship 
financial performance. This warped relationship does not explain why H3a (the 
moderated relationship between learning and absorptive capacity and the perception of 
relationship financial performance, is non-significant. This graph shows only the main 
effect of the independent variable upon this dependent variable.  
This conclusion supports the existence of a point of diminishing returns for 
learning and absorptive capacity and perceptions of relationship performance. Though 
this does not necessarily support the dark side effect, the graph is suggestive of a point 
at which the expected return on the relationship variable is not attained, which is akin to 
the dark side effect (Anderson and Jap, 2005).  
4.6.1 Testing individual constructs with one dependent variable 
 
 Though only the main effects discussed in the previous section were 
significant in the full model, other main effects were significant when tested individually 
with one dependent variable. Some of these relationships exhibited a curvilinear 
pattern, indicative of the dark side effect of variables. These curvilinear relationships 
resulted from relationship social capital and relationship specific investment. For 
example, in Figure 8, the point of diminishing returns becomes apparent near the point 
0 of social capital on the x-axis. (Note: The variables are standardized.) Though the 
general trend of the relationship is positive, a point of diminishing returns in the 
relationship is revealed. This relationship suggests there is a point at 
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Figure 7: Main Effects of Learning and Absorptive Capacity on Perceptions of 
Relationship Financial Performance 
 
which the increase in relational social capital does not achieve the expected increase in 
perceptions of relationship financial performance.  This result again reinforces the 
boundary conditions of SET, while supporting both the existence of the dark side effect, 
and the earlier conceptualizations of SET. 
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Figure 8: Main Effect of Relationship Social Capital and Perceptions of Relationship 
Financial Performance 
 
Figure 9 shows the main effect of relationship social capital and the likelihood of 
relationship termination. As was seen in Figure 8, the general trend is negative, 
indicating that in general terms, as relational social capital increases, the likelihood of 
relationship termination decreases. However, there is a flattening of the curve around 
the point 0 on the x-axis of relational social capital, indicating a point of reduced 
effectiveness of relational social capital in reducing the likelihood of relationship 
termination.  
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Figure 9: Main Effect of Relationship Social Capital and Likelihood of Relationship 
Termination 
 
Figure 10 shows the main effect of relationship specific investment on 
perceptions of relationship financial performance. As was evident in some of the 
previous figures, there is a considerable curve visible in the relationship between the two 
variables. From approximately -1.3 to roughly 0.5 on the standardized variable axes, 
there is nearly no improvement in performance for the increased level of relationship 
specific investment. Figure 11 shows a similar curvilinear relationship between 
relationship specific investment and likelihood of relationship termination. Though they 
are in different general trends, both  curves are indicative of a point of diminishing 
returns of relationship specific investment on perceptions of relationship financial 
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performance; thereby supporting the facets of SET which are newly emphasized in this 
dissertation.  
Figure 10: Main Effect of Relationship Specific Investment and Perceptions of 
Relationship Financial Performance 
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Figure 11: Main Effect of Relationship Specific Investment and Likelihood of 
Relationship Termination
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this research confirmed three hypotheses (H1a, H1b, and H2a). 
However, the unsupported hypotheses also inform the topic of interest, the dark side 
effect of relationship variables, and lend support to the inclusion of the tenets of SET 
brought forth in this dissertation. The full model showed excellent reliability, 
convergent validity and discriminant validity; and face validity was established with a 
pretest, theoretical foundation, and considerable literature to develop the constructs 
and arguments. There are numerous theoretical contributions in the findings of this 
study, which will be fully described in Chapter 5. Post-hoc testing was conducted to 
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determine if any variables which may not have been significant in the interaction effect, 
may have non-linear effects on the dependent variables, which would be indicative of a 
point of diminishing returns, or in some cases, the dark side effect itself. The post-hoc 
testing indicated that learning, relational social capital, and relationship specific 
investment exhibit a point of diminishing returns which suggests the dark side effect, 
concurring with the newly emphasized facets of SET brought forth by this dissertation.  
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5.0 Discussion, conclusion and future research 
5.1 Discussion 
Social Exchange Theory (SET) has been long used to support the positive effect of 
relationship variables on various performance measures (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 
1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). However, literature 
over decades has pointed out, and in some cases empirically supported, mixed results, 
non-significant results, or significant negative results. The stream of literature which 
predicts negative or no effect of these relationship variables on performance variables 
has been termed the ‘dark side effect’ literature (Anderson and Jap, 2005). There have 
been very few empirical studies evaluating or supporting the dark side effect. This 
dissertation contributes to this literature stream by empirically testing the effect of five 
independent variables on a performance measure and a relationship continuity 
measure.  
SET in management literature has included the norm of reciprocity and the 
concept of social obligations created by iterative interactions which strengthen the 
relationship and enhance performance of both parties (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 
1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958). However, when 
revisiting the foundational SET works, several theoretical tenets were discovered that 
support the existence of dark side variables (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 1976; 
Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958) and upon which this 
dissertation was founded. These theoretical propositions include the concept of 
diminishing returns of increased relationship variables, fatigue and satiation, and 
comparison level (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 
1959; Homans, 1958).  
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The findings supported three of ten hypotheses (H1a, H1b, and H2a), and lead to 
the rejection of the other seven hypotheses. However, the rejection of H2b through H5b 
shows the boundary conditions of the current formulation of SET and supports the 
existence of the dark side effect of those independent relationship variables and those 
tenets of SET which are brought to light in this dissertation. This dissertation is one of 
the first empirical tests of the dark side effect of relationship variables. The results 
reaffirm that the resurrected concepts of SET are relevant to business relationships 
today. 
They hypotheses that were supported indicate that high levels of RQ can help 
keep the dark side effect of relationship variables at bay. However, the hypotheses which 
were not supported indicate that there are some relationship variables which, regardless 
of the level of RQ, there is still the potential for diminishing returns, or the dark side 
effect of those variables.  
There are explicit contributions to theory including identifying boundary 
conditions of the current formulation of SET; supporting earlier conceptualizations of 
SET; replicating previous empirical work; extending previous empirical work; and 
adding a newly-tested dark side effect: relationship specific investment. The 
contribution to practice includes providing knowledge and some guidance in 
maintaining the value of mature supply chain relationships.  
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Table 31: Specific Contributions of this Dissertation 
Contribution Result 
Theoretical Identify the boundary conditions of the current formulation of SET 
Support the earlier concepts of SET, which are supportive of the dark 
side effect 
Replication: Villena, Revilla and Choi, 2011 
Extension: McFadyen and Cannella, 2004 
Extension: Hamel, 1991 
Extension: Grayson and Ambler, 1999 
Extension: Gu, Hung and Tse, 2008 
New test: the dark side effect of relationship-specific investment 
Managerial Providing guidance in maintaining value of mature supply chain 
relationships 
 
5.2 Theoretical implications and contribution 
 Both the hypothesis results and the post-hoc results support the tenets of SET. 
SET, even in its current state, would support that higher levels of RQ would improve a 
relationship and reduce its chances of ending prematurely (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1962; 
1976; Gouldner, 1960; Thibaut and Kelly, 1959; Homans, 1958), which supported the 
results of H1a, H1b and H2a.   
This dissertation has revealed boundary conditions of SET, at which point either 
relationship variables or RQ as a moderator, was insufficient to prevent the negative, 
diminishing returns, or dark side effect from resulting. This dissertation has also 
provided empirical support for the existence of the dark side effect, or curvilinear effect 
of some relationship variables on the dependent variables of interest. Finally, this 
dissertation has provided empirical support for reincorporating the earlier theoretical 
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concepts in SET studies in organizational behavior, which show a more realistic, 
multidimensional view of supply chain relationships. Table 27 shows which hypotheses 
and variables support the dark side effect, and includes long term orientation, learning 
and absorptive capacity, relational social capital, and reciprocity.  
The post-hoc testing, in particular, supports the neglected aspects of SET that 
this dissertation is bringing to light. This dissertation is extending SET by bringing in 
previously-neglected parts of the theory. When SET was brought into the organizational 
and management research, several parts of the theory were left behind, such as 
comparison level, fatigue and satiation. These parts of SET support the existence of the 
dark side effect of variables, by discussing the point of diminishing returns, or 
diminished marginal utility.  These new aspects are supported in this dissertation by the 
post hoc testing in particular.  
Theh boundary conditions of the current formulation of SET which are revealed 
in this study are that high levels of relationship quality do not always, or even often, 
improve the perceptions of relationship performance or the likelihood of relationship 
termination, and three of the five relationship variables tested reveal that higher levels 
of the relationship variable itself, and or relationship quality do not improve the 
relationship outcomes. These outcomes indicate that SET does not provide explanatory 
power for the results in these three variables. This result supports the inclusion of the 
earlier theoretical constructs of SET, supporting the negative side of relationships and 
the dark side effect.  
The Political Economy Framework provides a general framework for 
organizational research including supply chain relationship research. The structure 
created by the Framework allows researchers to focus efforts on less researched areas, 
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such as the dark side effect of relationship variables. SET fits within the Political 
Economy Framework with and without its boundary conditions revealed in this study 
and fit very well into the exchange construct, as described in the literature review 
section.  
Though this dissertation is testing boundary conditions of the current 
formulation of SET, the study also contributes to theory by testing the revisited aspects 
of SET (Goldsby et al., 2013; Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011).  This study contributes to 
literature by answering calls for theory testing in the field of supply chain management 
and business relationships, particularly negative outcomes of supply chain relationships 
(Carter, 2011; Mentzer et al., 2001; Mentzer and Kahn, 1995; Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 
2012) and by empirically testing the dark side effect of relationship variables (Villena et 
al., 2005). An additional contribution of this dissertation is testing causes of 
relationship termination, which has been lacking (Anderson and Jap, 2005; Fang et al., 
2011).  
This dissertation also contributes to supply chain management literature by 
extending existing empirical work on social capital (McFadyen and Cannella, 2004); 
learning (Hamel, 1991); long term orientation (Grayson and Ambler, 1999); and 
reciprocity (Gu, Hung and Tse, 2008). A new contribution of this study is the testing of 
the dark side effect of relationship variables on perceptions of relationship financial 
performance and likelihood of relationship termination.  
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Table 32: Overall Research Contribution 
Issues Why needed? This study 
Imbalanced theory 
development and 
testing in business 
research (focused 
on positive) 
(Mitrega and 
Zolkiewski, 2012) 
Possible negative 
effects of 
relationships are 
neglected in 
research 
Investigates the dark side effects of 
relationship variables 
Mixed results of 
social capital 
relationship to 
performance 
(Villena, Revilla and 
Choi, 2011; 
McFadyen and 
Cannella, 2004) 
Continual 
promotion of social 
capital development 
as a means of 
improving 
performance; must 
be tempered with a 
balanced view of the 
potential results of 
increased social 
capital 
Empirically studies the relationship 
between relational social capital and 
perceptions of relationship financial 
performance and likelihood of relationship 
termination, moderated by relationship 
quality 
Extending 
conceptual and 
qualitative work on 
relationship 
variables (Hamel, 
1991; Grayson and 
Ambler, 1999; Gu, 
Hung and Tse, 
2008) 
Overly positive 
focus on studies of 
relationship 
variables 
Extends studies on relationship variables 
(social capital, learning, long term 
orientation, and reciprocity) and adds a 
new variable: relationship specific 
investment 
Need to discover 
causes of supply 
chain partnership 
failure (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002; Autry 
and Griffis, 2008) 
To assist managers 
in best developing 
supply chain 
relationships 
Provides empirical evidence from nearly 
200 companies on the effects of five 
relationship variables on relationship 
termination and performance 
 
5.3 Managerial implications 
The results support the previous literature which said that blindly recommending 
increasing relational variables may be unfounded and may not make any gains 
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whatsoever (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Autry and Griffis, 2008; Fang et al., 2011; Landolt 
and Portes, 1996; Villena et al., 2011). Relationship specific investment showed an 
amplifying effect on perceptions of relationship financial performance and a 
diminishing effect on likelihood of relationship termination. Relationship specific 
investments represent a shared risk in the relationship. Shared risk is a fundamental 
aspect of business operation and success, as both parties, together, may fail or succeed. 
When two entities share a common risk, as is the case with relationship specific 
investments, there may be a buffering effect in which two different positions are brought 
to bear on tactical and strategic decisions which are involved in the perception of long- 
and short- term financial success. An organic self-correction process takes place which 
may not occur when the risk is carried by just one partner. This knowledge contributes 
confidence to managers in the positive effect expected when investing in relationship 
specific investments, and can contribute faith in the likely beneficial results of doing so.  
Long term orientation showed an amplifying effect on perceptions of relationship 
financial performance. Long term orientation creates a strategic business environment 
that sees past the volatile nature of short-term results. Short-term success or failure can 
result from a variety of market and operations conditions beyond the control or 
predictive capabilities of managers. A long term orientation encourages corrective 
actions and strategic responses that have a greater probability of yielding results beyond 
the short-term expectation.  
The results bear out, however, that there is a great risk to investing in increased 
relationship variables and that there is both a dark side effect, and a point of 
diminishing returns for these relationship variables. Increasing investment to 
strengthen a relationship must be done with caution, and with an understanding that 
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there may be a point at which the investment yields no benefit and that it is possible the 
relationship may end regardless. The benefit of RQ is also supported in this study, 
particularly in relationship specific investment and long term relationship orientation. 
Managers can be aware of the ongoing beneficial nature of maintaining high levels of 
RQ, though simultaneously be aware that  high levels of RQ are not always enough to 
mitigate the dark side effect of relationship variables.  
However, this is a great opportunity! According to Ernst and Bamford (2005), 
stability in a relationship is not always the best option for performance. 75% of the 
executives surveyed in their study said their companies do not often evaluate their 
business relationships for performance levels or restructuring, which, according to the 
authors could save up to 75% of business relationships. Even though the relationship 
variables under study often contribute to reduced perceptions of relationship financial 
performance and an increase in the likelihood of relationship termination, this 
information can spur companies to regularly reevaluate and improve their relationships 
and alliances.  
An example of the dark side effect of social relational capital and its remedy was 
reported by a marketing agency: Scott Elser, who worked in a marketing agency, 
reported that when he was first made to be specific client’s counterpart, he initially 
found that the previous relationship had been extremely close which appeared to convey 
benefit (Elser, 2014). His firm was strongly focused on keeping the client happy and his 
firm had even become “an extension of the client’s team” (Elser, 2014). However, after a 
brief time as the client’s counterpart, Scott was told by the client’s CMO that the 
contract was to be put out to review and possibly offered to another marketing agency 
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(Elser, 2014). This issue is illustrative of the dark side of social relational capital and its 
ability to increase the likelihood of relationship termination.  
Scott wondered how such a close business and personal relationship, in other 
words, a relationship with high social relational capital, could be falling apart (Elser, 
2014). He reported that a large part of the problem was that representatives of his firm 
were simply trying to keep the client happy and not pushing them to become better, and 
not contributing true forces for improvement and that “healthy tension, innovation, and 
reinvention” were all missing (Elser, 2014). This illustrates the concept pointed out in 
the literature review of this dissertation that high levels of social relational capital may 
lead to complacency or a lack of objectivity in decision making. However, there are 
solutions recommended by professionals. 
Scott wrote that it was easy to fix this situation, even though many of the 
individuals involved in these relationships may have felt uncomfortable with the effort 
(Elser, 2014). His recommendation was that each and every decision made between the 
marketing agency and the client be deeply explored to evaluate its value, regardless of 
the personal relationships of those involved in the decision (Elser, 2014). Scott also 
recommends that the best time to toughly evaluate these types of relationships is when 
they are going well (Elser, 2014).  
5.4 Contribution 
This study makes contributions to literature, theory, and methodology. In terms 
of literature, this study supports the dark side effect of the following variables, in that 
the relationship between these independent and dependent variables was nonlinear, and 
show a point of diminishing returns for performance and likelihood of relationship 
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termination. The hypotheses which were supported also lend evidence to the positive 
effects of SET. Relationship specific investment, at high levels of relationship quality, 
lead to increased perceptions of relationship financial performance. Hypothesis 1b 
shows that relationship specific investment, at high levels of relationship quality, reduce 
the likelihood of relationship termination. Finally, long term orientation, at high levels 
of relationship quality, increase the perceptions of relationship financial performance. 
These results support the positive aspects of the current conceptualization of SET.  
However, the hypotheses which were not supported lend evidence to the dark 
side effect theoretical constructs of SET which are brought to light in this dissertation. 
That is, the concepts of diminishing marginal utility, fatigue, satiation, and comparison 
levels leading to reduced satisfaction, are supported by the negative effects of the 
independent variables upon the dependent variables of this study.  
This dissertation also methodologically contributes by shedding light on a recent 
software package, WarpPLS 5.0, which can model non-linear relationships. Non-linear 
relationships are common in behavioral research, yet structural equation modeling 
software packages have not been capable of modeling these relationships and instead 
have been forcing the estimates into linear relationships regardless of their actual 
proclivities (Kock, 2015). WarpPLS 5.0 explicitly identifies non-linear relationships and 
calculates their multivariate coefficients taking the curvilinear relationship into account 
(Kock, 2015).   
5.5 Research limitations 
 
There are limitations to any study of any type, and this dissertation is no 
different. The primary limitations of this particular dissertation are  the non-
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representative sample and the high number of non-completes for the survey. However, 
there is a trade-off between the number of variables which can be studied, and the 
length of the survey, which is directly proportional to the number of respondents who 
end their survey before it is complete. The non-representative sample was used to 
increase the response rate, since the researcher has worked with the same population 
several times in the past and had a high chance of reaching the population of interest 
(managers involved in purchasing or providing logistics services) at the response rate 
required to perform the analysis.  
5.6 Future research opportunities 
 
Future study will include a sequential qualitative study to evaluate the results of 
this paper; e.g. how realistic is the problem of the dark side effect of relationship 
variables? What are the practitioners’ proposed ways to deal with it? What do they see 
as the main problem related to dark side relationship variables? What is their 
experience in point of diminishing returns with relationship variables?  How can they 
tell when they are approaching this point of diminishing returns, or even the onset of 
the dark side effect of relationship variables? There is also value in determining any 
other relationship variables which should be included in a future study, from the 
practitioner point of view.  
Future study will also include evaluating the dark side effect alongside the 
concept of relational power to evaluate how power imbalance may change the effects of 
the dark side variables. This study will be replicated with the addition of other variables 
which have been suggested in conceptual literature to have a dark side effect including 
embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997; Lechner et al., 2010), network centrality (Uzzi, 1997; 
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Lechner et al., 2010), information sharing (Grover et al., 2006), deep relationships 
(Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 2012), and trust (Kusari et al., 2013).  
Previous empirical work found that embeddedness and network centrality 
exhibited a non-linear relationship to economic performance (Uzzi, 1997; Lechner et al., 
2010). While no previous empirical work was located, conceptual work and content 
analysis suggest a dark side effect of high levels of information sharing (Grover et al., 
2006).  Qualitative empirical work identified dark side effects of deep relationships 
(Mitrega and Zolkiewski, 2012), while a strongly supported beneficial variable, trust, 
however, in one empirical study, there was an inverted relationship between trust and 
performance and satisfaction (Kusari et al., 2013). Particularly due to the mixed results 
and the strong conceptual underpinnings of these variables, they are good candidates 
for further study on dark side effect of relationship variables.  
5.7 Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, this test of the dark side effect of relationship variables has 
revealed boundary conditions of a well-regarded theory in organizational and supply 
chain research, SET, while simultaneously providing support for earlier concepts from 
the theory which were neglected once the theory was pulled from social psychology into 
the world or organizational research, namely the point of diminishing returns, fatigue 
and satiation of relationship variables. This study also provides considerable support for 
the existence of the dark side effect of relationship variables: 7 of the 10 hypotheses 
supported the existence of the dark side effect; while 3 of the hypotheses show support 
for the current formulation of SET. The study considerably contributes to theory by 
advancing literature and testing theory, within the framework of the Political Economy 
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Framework, and contributes to practice by clarifying somewhat the mixed effect of high 
levels of RQ on relationship performance. 
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